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Abstract 
Farm-level operations have lasting and amplified impacts that promulgate the entire supply 
chain, and the farm is increasingly in the forefront of today’s headlines on topics such as social 
responsibility, environmental sustainability, traceability, and food safety. Despite its significance, 
however, the farm remains a ‘black box’ and has traditionally operated independently with little 
information-sharing, trust, or collaboration with buyers downstream. This dissertation begins to 
unpack this ‘black box’ by employing different methodologies to identify the factors influencing 
exchange in the farm-supply chain interface. In Essay 1, I examine why the farm continues to be 
a challenge for ‘traditional’ collaborative approaches to buyer-supplier exchange. I use an 
interpretive approach to identify the individual and institutional factors influencing farmers’ 
operations decision-making. Field interviews reveal that farmers approach buyer-supplier 
exchange differently and tend to rely more heavily on market mechanisms to coordinate activities 
with buyers and inform their decision-making. In Essay 2, I build on this finding to examine the 
institutional factors influencing exchange in the spot market, which accounts for a majority of the 
total value of agricultural commodity production. I use a proprietary data set and time series 
econometrics to investigate how spot market exchanges between farmers and buyers are influenced 
by the futures market—an institution serving critical informational and risk management functions 
in the industry. In line with the predictions of Austrian economics, the findings indicate that 
farmers and buyers use the information conveyed by the futures market as they negotiate prices in 
the spot market.  In Essay 3, I build on this finding and further explore how the futures market 
influences spot market exchanges by examining how information asymmetry affects the price 
adjustment process. I draw on economic theory to develop hypotheses that are tested using a 
proprietary data set and nonlinear time series econometrics. The findings suggest that buyers 
  
exploit their informational advantage by adjusting spot market prices asymmetrically. Taken 
together, the three essays demonstrate how institutions influence decision-making and exchange 
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Exchange is at the heart of supply chain management.  Effective supply chain management 
involves managing the exchange of products, services, finances, and information between firms to 
create value for the ultimate customer (Mentzer et al., 2001), so understanding interfirm exchange 
has been a central focus of supply chain management research. Extant research has proposed 
various mechanisms to manage buyer-supplier exchange, such as contracts (e.g., Sluis & Giovanni, 
2016), collaboration (Cao & Zhang, 2011), coordination (Fugate et al., 2006), information-sharing 
(Sahin and Robinson, 2002), trust and commitment (Narayanan et al., 2015), relationship-specific 
investments (e.g. Handley and Benton, 2012), and even supply chain integration (Flynn et al., 
2010; Wong et al., 2011).  As evidenced by these examples, the vast majority of extant research 
has focused on relational exchange – what Williamson (1991) referred to as ‘hybrids and 
hierarchies’– despite the fact that the exchange continuum spans from transactional (i.e., “arm’s 
length”) to relational (Kim and Choi, 2015; Sheng et al., 2018). While this relational emphasis is 
understandable given the myriad of performance benefits (Cao &Zhang, 2011; Fugate et al., 2006), 
relational exchange is “is not, nor should it be, the goal for all interfirm relationships” (Davis-
Sramek et al, 2007 p.45). Indeed, transaction cost economics suggests that firms should choose the 
mechanism that minimizes the costs of exchange (Williamson, 1981).  Furthermore, in practice, 
buyer-supplier exchange in several critical industries, such as bulk ocean shipping (Stopford, 
2009), trucking (Belzer, 2000), and agriculture (MacDonald, 2015), tends to be more transactional, 
and the recent growth of online business-to-business marketplaces like Alibaba and Amazon 
Business “has the potential to radically alter” the structure of exchange (Seifert et al., 2004 p.781).  
Beyond the dyad, neo-institutional economics suggests that the structure of interfirm 
exchange is contingent on the institutional environment surrounding the exchange (Williamson, 
2000; North, 1990). Supply chains are inherently embedded in a broader institutional environment 
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that includes sociopolitical institutions, like governments and regulatory agencies, and economic 
institutions, like financial markets and banking systems (North, 1990). These institutions – “the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction” (North, 
1991 p.97) – form the ‘rules of the game’ for exchange. In doing so, institutions shape firms’ 
decision-making and intentions, as well as the performance outcomes of these decisions, by 
determining the associated transaction costs and value of engaging in exchange (North, 1991; 
Williamson, 1991), The structure and performance of interfirm exchange is thus a function of the 
institutional environment (Sheng et al., 2018).  
Amidst a global macroenvironment characterized by heightened uncertainty, supply chain 
thought leaders have called for research that explicitly accounts for the role of institutions (e.g., 
Fugate et al., 2019; Joglekar et al., 2016). Recent studies have explored how institutions affect the 
outcomes of buyer-supplier exchange, such as the development of information-sharing practices 
and trust (Cai et al., 2010), contract effectiveness (Shou et al., 2016), and supply chain performance 
(Dong et al., 2016). In the context of emerging economies like China and India, recent studies have 
also examined the contingency effects of “weak” institutions (e.g., Bai et al., 2016; Zhou et al., 
2016) and institutional voids (e.g., Craighead et al., 2017; Parmigiani &Rivera-Santos, 2015) on 
interfirm exchange. While understanding how institutions influence the outcomes of interfirm 
exchange is important, largely missing from this literature is an examination of their influence on 
the structure of interfirm exchange. This dissertation begins to fill this important gap by examining 
how institutions influence interfirm exchange in the farm-supply chain interface.  
 Idiosyncrasies of the agricultural supply chain allow me to contribute to extant research in 
supply chain management in two important ways. First, in contrast to the often “weak” institutions 
examined in previous studies, institutions play an active, significant role in the agriculture indusry 
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given concerns over farmers’ welfare and global food security (MacDonald et al., 2004). While 
this generally comes in the form of government price supports and subsidized crop insurance 
(Orden et al., 1999), another important role played by institutions is the provision of information 
(Arbuckle et al., 2012). Government agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
futures markets play a vital informational role in the agricultural supply chain (e.g., Adjemian, 
2012; McKenzie &Darby, 2017). In light of this involvement, political economy scholars have 
found that farmers have an elevated sense of the personal relevance of institutions (Wolfinger 
&Rosenstone, 1980), which makes examining the farm-supply chain interface a lucid context to 
investigate how institutions influence interfirm exchange. Second, the agricultural supply chain is 
facing increased scrutiny amidst consumer demands for transparency, social responsibility, 
environmental sustainability, food safety, and traceability (Castillo et al., 2018; Wowak et al., 
2016), but the farm continues to pose a challenge to achieving many of these objectives. For 
example, overproduction and burdensome inventories at the farm-level have increased food waste, 
reduced operational efficiency, and threatened farmers’ profitability and survival (Gunders 
&Bloom, 2017). While the recent development of technologies such as blockchain and various 
direct-marketing networks may help to decrease the distance between the farm and downstream 
buyers (e.g., Tongarlak et al., 2017), the agricultural supply chain has traditionally operated 
independently with little to no information-sharing, trust, or collaboration (Dillard & Pullman, 
2017; Pullman &Dillard, 2010). This is in stark contrast to the often-relational nature of interfirm 
exchange in downstream echelons—e.g., manufacturers and retailers (Davis-Sramek et al., 2007), 
so understanding if and to what extent institutional factors are contributing to this structural 
difference is warranted.    
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 The three studies comprising this dissertation employ different methodologies to 
understand the institutions influencing exchange in the farm-supply chain interface. In the first 
essay, I examine why the farm continues to be a challenge for ‘traditional’ relational approaches 
to buyer-supplier exchange. I use an interpretive approach to identify the individual and 
institutional factors influencing farmers’ operations decision-making. Field interviews reveal that 
farmers approach buyer-supplier exchange differently and tend to rely more heavily on market 
mechanisms to coordinate with buyers and inform their decision-making. In the second essay, I 
build on this finding to examine the institutional factors influencing exchange in the spot market, 
which accounts for approximately 65% of the total value of farm production. I use a proprietary 
data set and time series econometrics to investigate how spot market exchanges between farmers 
and buyers are influenced by the futures market—an institution serving critical informational and 
risk management functions in the industry. In line with the predictions of Austrian economic 
theory, the findings indicate that farmers and buyers use the information conveyed by the futures 
market as they negotiate prices in the spot market. In the third essay, I build on this finding and 
further explore how the futures market influences spot market exchanges between farmers and 
buyers by examining how information asymmetry affects the price adjustment process. I draw on 
economic theory to develop hypotheses that are tested using a proprietary data set and nonlinear 
time series econometrics. The findings indicate that buyers exploit their informational advantage 
by adjusting spot market prices asymmetrically.  
 Taken together, the three essays demonstrate how institutions influence decision-making 
and exchange in the agricultural supply chain and offer important insights for theory and practice. 
For research, this dissertation illustrates the role of the market as a coordination mechanism and 
informational conduit, which is in contrast to extant studies focused primarily on how ‘hybrids and 
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hierarchies’ are used to govern buyer-supplier exchange and inform decision-making (Williamson, 
1991). In doing so, this dissertation also extends the current conception of institutions beyond their 
role as contingency factors to include their direct influence on exchange and informational role 
(Ostrom, 1990). For farmers and supply chain managers, this dissertation sheds light on both the 
value of and challenges with using the futures market – a longstanding institution in the industry 
– to inform their decision-making and approach to buyer-supplier exchange. For policymakers, 
this dissertation identifies unintended consequences of their involvement in the agriculture 
industry and provides timely guidance regarding the provision of information amidst declining 
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Environmental, social, and economic sustainability, transparency and traceability, and 
even traditional operational performance outcomes have at least one important commonality: each 
directly or indirectly hinges on decisions made at the raw materials echelon of the supply chain 
(Shafiq et al., 2014; Touboulic et al., 2014; Narasimhan et al., 2015).  Operations decisions made 
by actors within this echelon, particularly farmers, have profound environmental, social, and 
economic outcomes that promulgate the entire supply chain. For example, farmers are tasked with 
making production decisions, including what, how much, and how to produce, and storage 
decisions, including when and how much to sell versus store as well as where to sell, how, and to 
whom.  
For merchandisers, processors, and manufacturers downstream, farmers’ operations 
decisions determine the quality and availability of critical inputs. Inconsistent and/or unpredictable 
supply throughout the year creates significant challenges for downstream buyers’ operations, 
including production scheduling, raw materials inventories, and cash flow. In fact, large buyers 
have attributed poor operational performance in recent years to the “persistent problem of slow 
farmer selling”—a phenomenon in which farmers are reluctant to sell and instead store their goods 
on-farm with the hope that prices will rise in the future (Singh et al., 2017). For example, the Chief 
Executive Officer of Bunge Limited, an international food company, noted in an interview that, 
although farmers eventually decide to sell, their reluctance “postpones the timing of when [Bunge] 
might buy that grain” (Meyer, 2014).  
Beyond downstream buyers, farmers’ operations decisions also have implications for 
retailers and, ultimately, consumers. Retailers face increased pressure from consumers to provide 
more information; consumers want to know where the product came from, who produced it, how 
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it was produced, and if the environment and employees were treated appropriately throughout the 
course of production (Parmigiani et al., 2011; Wowak et al., 2016). The products and quantities 
farmers decide to produce determines the price and availability of consumer goods with those 
products as inputs, and the method of production (e.g., conventional, organic) farmers choose has 
substantial social and environmental sustainability implications (e.g., Touboulic et al., 2014).  
Despite the significance of farm-level decisions, however, the farm continues to be a “black 
box” within the supply chain. Farmers have traditionally operated independently with little to no 
information-sharing, trust, or collaboration with the rest of the supply chain (Pullman & Dillard, 
2010; Dillard & Pullman, 2017), and even the use of contracting has declined (MacDonald, 2015).  
Further, farm-level operations decisions do not easily lend themselves to be examined by 
traditional decision models because the decision-making process and who is involved in that 
process differ from echelons downstream. First, the farm sector is overwhelmingly comprised of 
family businesses and small and medium enterprises (SMEs), with small and midsize family farms 
accounting for 95.8% of farms in the United States (Hoppe & MacDonald, 2016). Recent research 
suggests that SMEs (Kull et al., 2018) and family businesses (Maloni et al., 2017) differ from 
large, non-family firms along several important dimensions that influence their approach to supply 
chain operations. Second, the farm sector is characterized by significant involvement from various 
institutions because of concerns over farmers’ welfare and global food security (Arbuckle et al., 
2012). Government agencies, futures markets, non-governmental organizations, and university 
extension services play a prominent role in the industry, as they provide information to help 
farmers make various decisions (e.g., Feder & Slade, 1985). These institutions form the “rules of 
the game” and shape farmers’ decision-making and intentions (North, 1991; Coase, 1992).  
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We begin to unpack the “black box” that is the farm by delving into the minds of farmers 
to understand their operations decision-making processes. Specifically, I explore farmers’ 
underlying objectives, information acquisition activities, and approach to buyer-supplier exchange 
and how these aspects of operations decision-making are influenced by idiosyncrasies of the farm 
echelon. To do this, I use an interpretive qualitative approach – the hermeneutic method (Geertz, 
1973) – which is effective for understanding experience in context and providing “thick 
descriptions” for conceptual development and richness. Whereas the positivist qualitative 
approach is typically used for theory construction (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014; Narasimhan, 2014), 
the interpretive approach is used for theory contextualization because its epistemology emphasizes 
a particularistic approach to studying phenomena in a particular time and place (Hudson & Ozanne, 
1988). At this early stage of understanding farm-level operations decisions, our goal is not to 
construct a general overarching “theory” but to illustrate idiosyncrasies of farmers’ decision-
making by middle-range theorizing (Craighead et al., 2016; Stank et al., 2017).  
Understanding idiosyncrasies of the farm echelon and their effect on farmers’ operations 
decisions offers important insights for both research and practice. For research, this study expands 
understanding of the factors influencing operations decisions by focusing on idiosyncrasies of the 
farm echelon—particularly the prevalence of small and midsize family businesses and the 
prominent role of institutions. In doing so, I contextualize farmers’ decision-making process and 
also contribute to the nascent literature on SMEs (Kull et al., 2018), and family businesses (Maloni 
et al., 2017). For practice, our research provides guidance on the farmers’ perspective, which can 
help buyers better gauge if and when farmers would be willing to sell versus store. Lastly, for 
policymakers, our research sheds light on the role of public information in farmers’ operations 
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decisions and corroborates the continued importance of government agencies and futures markets 
in the farm echelon.  
The structure of the remainder of this research is as follows: The relevant literature and 
theoretical foundations are reviewed in the following section to conceptualize the orienting frame-
of-reference. The hermeneutic method is then introduced with a detailed discussion of the 
philosophical assumptions and methodological and analytical procedures. The empirical findings 
are then described followed by a discussion that contextualizes the orienting frame-of-reference. 
Lastly, the implications for theory and future research, supply chain practice, and public policy are 
discussed.  
Background and Literature Review 
Operations Decisions in the Farm Echelon  
 
Farmers are tasked with making various operations decisions. At the beginning of the 
season, farmers make production decisions, which involve what to produce, how to produce1, and 
how much to produce. Upon harvest, farmers then have to decide how much to sell versus store—
what I refer to as storage decisions.2 Because there is continuous demand year-round, farmers are 
tasked with making storage decisions during the pre-harvest, harvest, and post-harvest periods. 
Most farmers have their own on-farm storage—e.g., bins, sheds, and other structures (National 
Agricultural Statistics Service, 2019), so farmers continuously decide if, how, when, and how 
much to sell versus store, as well as where to sell and to whom.  
 
1 For the purposes of this study, this refers to the method of production—e.g., conventional, organic, free-range, etc.  
2 The nature of storage decisions differs based on the storability of the agricultural product. Many field crops (e.g., 
corn, soybeans, wheat, rice, etc.) can be stored for over a year, whereas the storability of fresh produce varies. Further, 
live poultry and livestock are typically not “stored” but raised to a particular age or weight then sold within a matter 
of weeks. Given the low storability of some agricultural products, storage decisions are also referred to as marketing 




While there are numerous decisions involved in farm management, I focus on production 
and storage decisions for three primary reasons. First, production and storage decisions are in line 
with the “traditional” decisions examined in previous research (e.g., Bierman, Jr., & Thomas, 
1977; Sogomonian & Tang, 1993); this allows us to contribute by identifying idiosyncrasies in 
farm-level decision-making processes. Second, production decisions are long-term and typically 
made once per year whereas storage decisions are short-term and made much more frequently 
throughout the year—almost daily in some cases. This allows us to explore idiosyncrasies of farm-
level decision-making across different time horizons. Lastly, as discussed previously, farmers’ 
production and storage decisions have significant implications for the operational performance of 
firms downstream in the supply chain.  
Idiosyncrasies of the Farm Echelon  
 
In a similar vein to the conceptual framework used in positivist qualitative research, the 
orienting frame-of-reference is what is used in the interpretive approach to provide a framework 
for the methodological and analytical procedures (Prasad, 2017). Our orienting frame-of-reference 
aims to understand how farmers’ operations decision-making processes are influenced by three 
idiosyncrasies of the farm echelon. First, the farm echelon is overwhelmingly comprised of family 
businesses with 99% of farms classified as family farms and accounting for 89% of farm 
production (Hoppe & MacDonald, 2016). Recent research suggests that family businesses tend to 
have more diverse objectives that include financial and non-financial goals (LaPorta et al., 1999; 
Maloni et al., 2017). Non-financial goals, such as family legacy (Astrachan, 2010), long-term 
sustainability (Tongarlak et al., 2017), and socioeconomic wealth (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007), are 
often emphasized more than financial goals, although the nature and degree of emphasis can vary 
widely across family businesses (Maloni et al., 2017). As a consequence, family businesses tend 
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to approach buyer-supplier exchange differently and generally take a more passive role (e.g., Smith 
et al., 2014). For example, contractual arrangements and strategic partnerships can be perceived 
as a threat to their independence and longevity (Roessl, 2005; Stanley & McDowell, 2014). This 
desire for autonomy and diversity of objectives thus may influence how farmers make operations 
decisions.   
Second, most family farms are SMEs; small and midsize family farms represent 95.8% of 
farms in the U.S. and account for 45% of total farm production (Hoppe & MacDonald, 2016). 
Recent research suggests that SMEs differ from large corporations in several important ways that 
influence their approach to supply chain operations (Kull et al., 2018). For example, SMEs differ 
from their larger counterparts in terms of resources and capabilities. On the one hand, SMEs may 
have unique resources and capabilities due to the small number of employees and cohesive nature 
of intrafirm relationships (e.g., Arend, 2014). These concentrated governance structures provide 
greater discretion for SMEs to make decisions quickly and pursue different strategies (e.g., 
Terziovski, 2010). On the other hand, however, SMEs have limited time and resources (Freeman 
et al., 1983; Bruderl & Schussler, 1990) and may face “disadvantages in accessing other resources 
such as professional managers, technical assets, and external financing” (Kull et al., 2018 p.25). 
While unique resources may be an asset, resource constraints pose potential challenges for 
operations decision-making, particularly related to information acquisition (Harland et al., 2007).    
Lastly, the farm echelon is characterized by significant involvement from institutions given 
concerns over farmers’ welfare and global food security. While this generally comes in the form 
of government price supports and subsidies (Orden et al., 1999), another important role played by 
government institutions is the supply of information (Arbuckle et al., 2012). The U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) and National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) have long provided 
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information to “aid market participants in making impending and future production and marketing 
[storage] decisions” (MacDonald et al., 2004 p.55). For example, the USDA and NASS provide 
various monthly reports, including U.S. and World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates 
(WASDE), production forecasts, prospective plantings estimates, and crop acreage estimates. On 
a weekly basis, the USDA also provides prices and sales information for various locations across 
the country. These monthly and weekly reports are considered to be useful, low-cost sources of 
information for operations decisions (e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2019). 
Since the late 1800s, futures markets have also played a prominent role in the farm echelon. 
A futures market is a centralized financial exchange where futures contracts are bought and sold 
for delivery on a specified date in the future (CME Group, 2019). While many firms downstream 
use the futures market to manage price risk (e.g. Weiss & Maher, 2009; Wang et al., 2015; 
Kouvelis et al., 2018), farmers tend to use the futures market as a source of information. A futures 
contract is a financial derivative, so its value is, by definition, directly tied to the underlying asset 
(CME Group, 2019). The futures market thus acts as “an information processing system” (Bowles 
et al., 2017 p.215), and information is quickly communicated via price changes (Hayek, 1945). 
For example, a futures price increase implies a decrease in supply and/or an increase in demand 
(or a combination of the two) whereas a decrease implies the opposite. Futures market information 
is easily accessible and publicly available in real time for farmers to use in their operations 
decisions.  
Beyond government institutions and futures markets, non-governmental organizations, 
university extension services, and consumer groups (among others) also play a prominent role in 
the farm echelon (Maloni & Brown, 2006). Farmers are thus subject to competing influences 
because they operate within multiple institutional spheres—a phenomenon known as institutional 
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pluralism (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Dunn & Jones, 2010). In light of this involvement, political 
economy research suggests that farmers have an elevated sense of the personal relevance of 
institutions (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Underlying institutional perspectives is the idea that 
“institutions matter” because they form the “rules of the game” (North, 1991), so it is important to 
understand how different institutions shape farmers’ decision-making and intentions.  
Methodology  
The purpose of this section is to outline a methodology from which the orienting frame-of-
reference can be contextualized—or understood in the context of the actual lived experiences of 
farmers. At the core of our orienting frame-of-reference is the premise that farmers’ operations 
decisions are not solely the product of personal intentions and desires but are also the outcome of 
aspects of the cultural context, such as sociocultural, political, and institutional forces with which 
farmers interact on a daily basis (Arnold & Fischer, 1994). Farmers make operations decisions 
continuously throughout the pre-harvest, harvest, and post-harvest periods, so it is important to 
examine farmers’ everyday experiences to understand how these decisions are made and the 
factors influencing these decisions. Recognition of the value of everyday life experiences warrants 
an interpretive approach (Mello & Flint, 2009), which is effective in explicating empirical 
narratives and providing insights and descriptive details that are difficult to obtain from 
quantitative methods (Narasimhan, 2014).  
 While there is some overlap in the methods that are used in interpretive research and 
positivist qualitative research and both share a common commitment to rigorous empirical 
research (Thompson et al., 1989), the approaches differ in their aims and underlying philosophical 
assumptions (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988; Narasimhan, 2014). Positivist qualitative research, such as 
grounded theory and case studies, tends to be used for theory construction (Mello & Flint, 2009; 
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Ketokivi & Choi, 2014), whereas interpretive research is typically used for theory 
contextualization because its epistemology emphasizes a particularistic approach to studying 
phenomena in a particular time and place (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988). At this early stage of 
understanding farm-level operations decisions, our goal is not to provide a general overarching 
“theory” but to better understand idiosyncrasies of farm-level decision-making. An interpretive 
approach is thus suitable for this study because it allows us to identify particular factors in context 
(Geertz, 1973). Further, the interpretive approach maintains a dynamic, holistic view of reality and 
a voluntaristic view of human behavior (Hudson & Ozanne, 1988), so its ontology is aligned with 
the individualized, autonomous nature of decision-making on small and midsize family farms and 
the simultaneous nature of the actor-institution relationship present in institutional pluralism (i.e., 
institutions are constitutive of actors and their actions and actors are also “self-directed” – Kraatz 
& Block, 2008).  Indeed, interpretive research is “aimed at producing an understanding of the 
context” and the process whereby the actor “influences and is influenced by the context” 
(Walsham, 1993 p.4-5). This aim is in line with our orienting frame-of-reference, which 
emphasizes how farmers’ operations decisions are influenced by the context in which they are 
embedded.  It is important to note that this in no way suggests the interpretive approach is “better” 
than the positivist approach; rather, I highlight the differences here to illustrate the alignment of 
the interpretive approach with our research context, purpose, and orienting frame-of-reference.   
There are a number of methods within the interpretive approach, such as existential-
phenomenology, semiotics, and ethnography. Fundamental to each of these interpretive methods 
is the part-to-whole process – the hermeneutic circle – depicted in Figure 1 (Klein & Myers, 1999). 
The hermeneutic circle represents an iterative spiral of understanding wherein the “parts” can only 
be understood in relation to the “whole” (Prasad, 2017), which includes relevant histories, social 
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customs, and economic and sociopolitical institutions. Underlying the hermeneutic circle is 
empathetic understanding, in which the researcher “feels one’s way inside the experience of the 
actor” (Blumer, 1969; Hudson & Ozanne, 1988 p. 518) to identify relevant motives, meanings, 
and experiences. The motives, meanings, and experiences are then used to understand the 
influences that are driving actors’ decisions and behaviors in context, and empathetic 
understanding is conveyed through detailed “thick descriptions” that are time- and context-bound 
(Geertz, 1973).  
Figure 1: The Hermeneutic Circle  
Copied from Darby et al. (2019) p.402 
 
Methodological Procedures 
 The orienting frame-of-reference outlined in the previous section is the first step of the 
hermeneutic circle and provides the framework for the methodological and analytical procedures 
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that follow. The orienting frame-of-reference was first used as a guide to form criteria and select 
potential informants. Because interpretivism’s axiology is depth of understanding (Geertz, 1973), 
the number of informants interviewed in hermeneutic studies is typically small and has ranged 
between three (Fournier, 1998) and twenty (Thompson & Haytko, 1997). 
Farmers that represent a wide range of crops/livestock produced, size of farm, involvement 
with institutions, and other individual characteristics were solicited to participate in the interviews. 
From a pool of thirty potential informants, a judgment sample of eighteen farmers was selected 
based on their potential to provide conceptual insights. In interpretive research, the purpose is not 
to make generalizations to a population of farmers, but rather to provide depth of understanding 
(Geertz, 1973). Representative of the industry, seventeen of the eighteen informants interviewed 
were males (although wives also participated in three of the interviews), ranging from 28 to 73 
years of age. All of the informants were from the U.S., representing states primarily in the Midwest 
and Southeast given the strong agricultural presence in those regions. The education level of 
informants ranged from high school diploma to Doctor of Veterinary Medicine with the vast 
majority of informants falling somewhere in between. In line with our orienting frame-of-
reference, all of the farms in the sample are family farms and are primarily small and midsize farms 
according to the classification developed by the USDA.3 A diverse range of crops and livestock 
are represented, including conventional varieties like broiler chickens, beef cattle, rice, corn, 
soybeans, wheat, and cotton, and more contemporary varieties, such as grass-fed, grass-finished, 
and pastured beef cattle and lambs, organic produce and herbs, and free-range pullets (young hens).  
 
3Although four of the eighteen farms included in the sample are classified as “large scale” according to the USDA 
(Hoppe & MacDonald, 2016), they are still family farms and have less than twenty employees. A farm with one 
million dollars or more in gross sales is formally considered a large farm, but it is a small business by most 
standards of business size and owned and operated by a farm family (MacDonald et al., 2004).  
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Following selection of the judgment sample, multiple rounds of interviews were conducted. 
The purpose of the interviews was to provide a first-person description of a domain of experience 
(Thompson et al., 1989), so both existential-phenomenological and ethnographic techniques were 
utilized (Miles et al., 2013).  The general purpose of the research was first explained to the 
informant. The informant was then provided with an assurance of confidentiality and anonymity, 
and the research team requested to record the interview. If the informant did not permit recording 
of the interview, extensive field notes were taken. 
Given the underlying emphasis on experience (Prasad, 2017), the ideal interview consists 
of short open-ended questions from the research team followed by lengthier informant responses. 
An interview guide based on the orienting frame-of-reference was followed and is provided in 
Appendix A. The interviews, however, were semi-structured (Miles et al., 2013), as directed by 
the stated purpose of the research team and relevant experiences of the informant.  This is in line 
with the epistemology underlying interpretive research, which holds that the researcher and subject 
interact to create a cooperative inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Wallendorf, 1987; Wimpenny & 
Gass, 2000). Moreover, allowing for the “interaction between the researcher and the subjects” is 
one of the seven principles upon which interpretive research is evaluated (Klein & Myers, 1999 
p.74).  
 The strength of interpretive interview techniques is to provide descriptive detail, so the 
interview setting should be one in which informants are willing to describe their experiences freely 
and openly (Thompson et al., 1989). The interviews were conducted in various settings, including 
farmers’ homes, trucks, tractors, combines, chicken houses, and irrigated rice fields. The setting 
in which each interview was conducted was at the discretion of the farmer to ensure open 
conversation and facilitate understanding by creating opportunities to experience the empirical 
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context directly. This is in line with the contextualization principle underlying interpretive 
research, which “requires that the subject matter be set in its social and historical context” to 
facilitate understanding between the researcher and informant (Klein & Myers, 1999 p.73).  
The length of the interviews ranged from 35 minutes to almost four hours, with the majority 
lasting approximately two hours. The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim in order 
to provide data quality in the analysis. For the interviews conducted on the farm, a technician was 
hired to extract the interview dialogue from the background noise. Table 1 profiles the judgment 
sample of farmers; pseudonyms were used to protect anonymity.   
Table 1: Characteristics of Judgment Sample 
 
Farmer (Pseudonym) Farm Size Classification* Crop/Livestock Produced 
James Small Rice, Soybeans 
Robert Large Scale Free-Range Pullets 
Gary and Dorothy Small Beef Cattle 
Mark Midsize Broilers, Beef Cattle 
Peter Midsize Corn, Soybeans, Beef Cattle 
Jack Large Scale Soybeans, Corn, Wheat, Rice, Cotton 
George Large Scale Cotton, Soybeans, Rice, Corn 
Roger Midsize Soybeans, Rice, Cotton, Corn 
Scott and Henry Large Scale Corn, Soybeans, Cotton, Rice 
Brian Midsize Soybeans, Rice, Cotton, Corn 
Benjamin Small Broilers, Beef Cattle 
Jacob and Elizabeth Midsize Cornish Game Hens, Beef Cattle 
Chad Midsize Rice and Soybeans 
Michael and Diane Midsize Non-GMO Corn, Rice, Soybeans 
Tucker Midsize Corn, Soybeans, Wheat, Rice 
Elijah Small Organic Produce 
Abraham Small Organic Produce, Herbs 
Alice Small Grass-Fed Beef Cattle, Lambs 
*We use the farm classification developed by the USDA; farm size is measured by Gross Cash Farm 
Income (GFCI), which includes sales, government payments, and other-farm related income such as 
fees from production contracts. Small family farms are characterized by GCFI less than $350,000; 
midsize family farms have GFCI between $350,000 and $999,999; large scale family farms have GFCI 







The level of analysis is another important point of differentiation between interpretive and 
positivist qualitative research. In interpretive research, the transcribed interview and empirical 
narrative provided through the interview reflect the individual’s lived experience in the context of 
their lifeworld (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  The “level” of analysis for the hermeneutic method thus 
is the context in which the informant is embedded, which includes layers such as behavioral, 
cognitive, material, historical, and so on (Prasad, 2017). It is this emphasis on the informant’s lived 
experience and the premise that their experience cannot be understood outside of the context that 
provides the empirical insights key to understanding farmers’ decision-making (Thompson, 1997).   
The orienting frame-of-reference provided the framework to interpret the text in context 
for each informant, and the first phase of analysis was intratextual analysis (Stern, 1995). To do 
this, the research team began with one informant at a time and read and reread each interview 
transcript (Thompson, 1997). The first analytical challenge was to understand the temporal 
sequencing of key events in the informant’s empirical narrative (Thompson, 1997; Prasad, 2017). 
From this, a summary was identified for each informant that captured an in-depth description of 
the informant’s experience in context (Denzin, 2001). Each summary was then used to inform 
additional readings of the respective interview transcript, and each interview transcript was 
reanalyzed to identify contextual details, decision patterns, and other relevant factors not noted in 
the initial analysis (Thompson & Haytko, 1997). This process continued until the researcher 
captured each informant’s empirical narrative in its full contextual detail (Prasad, 2017) because 
the strength of the hermeneutic method is “thick description” (Geertz, 1973). The resultant 
empirical narratives are an emic interpretation (i.e., from the perspective of the farmer) of farmers’ 
decision-making processes and the factors influencing their operations decisions.  
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Upon completion of this initial phase, intertextual analysis was conducted. Intertextual 
analysis is an iterative process that uses a “part-to-whole reading strategy” (Thompson & Haytko, 
1997 p.19), in which the researcher read each interview transcript independently while also noting 
similarities across transcripts. In this phase of analysis, the researcher identified common 
storylines across the empirical narratives and moved up a level of abstraction (Prasad, 2017). The 
goal was to conceptualize an etic4 interpretation across informants; that is, as farmers perceive, 
interpret, and react to relevant aspects of their environments, what do they have in common? Based 
on these commonalities, each individual transcript was then reanalyzed to identify patterns not 
noted in the initial analysis and further develop the etic interpretation. This iterative movement 
across the interview transcripts, empirical narratives, and themes is an analytical technique referred 
to as “dialectical tacking” (Geertz, 1973). In line with previous research (e.g., Arnould & 
Wallendorf, 1994), several rounds of dialectical tacking were conducted to identify the themes 
described in the next section. At this stage, extant research was also used to further interpret and 
link these themes to our orienting frame-of-reference (Murray, 2002). Following convention (e.g., 
Osborne, 1991), the process of moving toward an etic interpretation continued until the orienting-
frame-of-reference was contextualized. 
Assessment of Rigor 
Interpretive and positivist approaches to qualitative research both share a common 
commitment to rigorous empirical research (Thompson et al., 1989). Previous studies have 
established a set of criteria to evaluate the rigor of case study research (e.g., Barratt et al., 2011; 
Ketokivi & Choi, 2014; Touboulic et al., 2014). However, these criteria are based on the 
 
4 An etic view is from the perspective of the observer (i.e., researcher), whereas an emic view is from the 
perspective of the informant (e.g., Morris et al., 1999). Intertextual analysis moves beyond the emic view of the 
interview transcripts and empirical narratives by identifying themes and making connections with existing research 
to develop an etic interpretation (Thompson & Haytko, 1997).  
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“conventions of positivism” and are thus “inappropriate for interpretive research” (Klein & Myers, 
1999 p.68) because the two approaches are founded on very different philosophies (Hudson & 
Ozanne, 1988; Narasimhan, 2014). Instead, to evaluate the rigor of interpretive research, Klein 
and Myers (1999) outline seven principles that are consistent with interpretivism and its underlying 
assumptions. Table 2 details how this study addresses each of these seven principles. 
Table 2: Principles for the Evaluation of Interpretive Field Research 
Principle Assessment of the Principle in This Study 
1. Principle of the Hermeneutic Circle  
This principle suggests that all human understanding is 
achieved by iterating between considering the 
interdependent meaning of parts and the whole that 
they form. This principle of human understanding is 
fundamental to all other principles.  
• The research explicitly recognizes the 
principle of the hermeneutic circle.  
• The research describes the hermeneutic 
circle, its underlying assumptions, and 
how it informed the methodological and 
analytical procedures employed.  
2. Principle of Contextualization 
This principle requires critical reflection of the social 
and historical background of the research setting, so 
that the intended audience can see how the current 
situation under investigation emerged.  
• The nature of farmers’ decision-making 
processes is described in their historical, 
political, and economic contexts.  
• The setting in which each interview was 
conducted was at the discretion of the 
farmer to ensure open conversation. The 
interviews were conducted in various 
settings, including farmers’ homes, 
trucks, combines, chicken houses, and 
fields.  
• The general purpose of the research was 
explained to each farmer.  
• The farmer was provided an assurance of 
confidentiality and anonymity.  
• The extent to which the interview was 
recorded was at the farmer’s discretion.  
3. Principle of Interaction Between the 
Researchers and the Subjects 
This principle requires critical reflection on how the 
research materials (or “data”) were socially 
constructed through the interaction between the 
researchers and participants.  
• The general purpose of the research was 
explained to each farmer.  
• The interview prompts and “grand tour” 
questions are provided in Appendix A.  
• Following the purpose and initial 
questions, the interviews progressed 
based on the recurring interaction of the 
researcher and farmer.  
• The progression of the interview was 
influenced by what the farmer deemed to 





Table 2 (Cont.) 
Principle Assessment of the Principle in This Study 
4. Principle of Abstract and Generalization 
This principle requires relating the idiographic details 
revealed by the data interpretation through the 
application of principles one and two to theoretical, 
general concepts that describe the nature of human 
understanding and social action.  
• The orienting frame-of-reference was 
used as a “sensitizing device” with which 
the interview transcripts were interpreted.  
• The emergent findings were related back 
to the concepts drawn from the literature 
on SMEs, family businesses, and 
institutional pluralism.  
5. Principle of Dialogical Reasoning 
This principle requires sensitivity to possible 
contradictions between the theoretical preconceptions 
guiding the research design and actual findings (“the 
story which the data tell”) with subsequent cycles of 
research.  
• The research describes the philosophical 
assumptions underlying the interpretive 
approach and the methodological and 
analytical procedures involved in the 
hermeneutic method.  
• The research discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the hermeneutic method 
relative to the purpose of the research.  
6. Principle of Multiple Interpretations 
This principle requires sensitivity to possible 
differences in interpretation among the participants as 
are typically expressed in multiple narratives or stories 
of the same sequence of events under study; similar to 
multiple witness accounts even if all tell as they saw it.   
• Family members, employees, and even 
pesticide consultants participated in the 
interviews alongside the farmers.   
• The research discusses the viewpoints of 
various stakeholders in terms of the 
political and economic interests of the 
actors.  
7. Principle of Suspicion1  
This principle requires sensitivity to possible “biases” 
and systematic “distortions” in the narratives collected 
from the participants.  
• The research discusses the institutions, 
family business factors, power structures, 
vested political and economic interests, 
and resource constraints to sensitize 
readers to alternative meanings.  
• Direct quotes and relevant contextual 
details are provided to allow readers to 
interpret farmers’ narratives on their 
own.    
1Klein and Myers (1999 p.78) note that the principle of suspicion is optional because “there is 
considerable disagreement among interpretive researchers concerning the extent to which social 
research can (or should be) critical.” 
Left column copied from Klein and Myers (1999 p.72); right column added to demonstrate this 
study’s alignment with each of the seven principles 
Findings  
 At the core of the orienting frame-of-reference was the idea that farmers’ operations 
decision-making is shaped by idiosyncrasies of the farm echelon—particularly family business, 
SME, and institutional factors. With this in mind, there were three primary themes that emerged 
from the analysis: (1)” Diversity of Objectives: Farming as a Business and a Way of Life”, (2) 
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“Resource Constraints: Controlled Chaos or Just Chaos?”, and (3) “Institutional Pluralism: Part of 
the Whole or Apart from the Whole?”. Following convention (e.g., Press et al., 2014), descriptions 
of each theme will be provided in the subsections that follow using a combination of empirical 
narratives and excerpts from interview transcripts. Then, in the Discussion section, these themes 
will be used to contextualize the orienting frame-of-reference and develop propositions.  
Diversity of Objectives: Farming as a Business and a Way of Life  
The first theme emerging from the analysis was the diversity of objectives underlying 
farmers’ decision-making processes, as agriculture is perceived as both a business and a way of 
life. The empirical narratives of two informants, Peter and James, are used as exemplars to describe 
this theme, and Table 3 profiles excerpts from other informants that were also representative.  
Peter is a fourth-generation row crop farmer whose family farm dates back to 1895. Peter 
grew up working in corn and soybean fields alongside his father and has since bought into the 
family farm. As the operation has expanded to include beef cattle, the management responsibility 
has shifted mostly to Peter, but he still relies heavily on his father’s experience and opinion as a 
source of information for his decisions.  
Peter allocates most of his time to managing the row crops, as corn and soybeans make up 
the majority of the farm’s production. Before production decisions are made, Peter uses futures 
prices to determine the acreage he allocates to corn and soybeans: “The futures markets dictate 
when we plant more because the market is telling us at those prices ‘hey, we want more’ when the 
price goes up.” If the harvest-time futures price is high enough for one of the crops, he will shift 
some acreage to that particular crop. However, Peter generally tries not to deviate from the fifty-
fifty rotation his father has cultivated historically, so futures price information only has a marginal 
impact on his production decisions.  
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After production decisions are complete, Peter and his father continue to track futures 
prices throughout the year to determine the best time to sell. When he is in the tractor or combine, 
he tunes to the local radio stations that announce the market prices every hour. When he is out in 
the fields, he is subscribed to a text message service that sends him market updates every hour. 
Peter generally knows the price where he will break even and waits to sell when the futures price 
is at or above that threshold; otherwise, he stores the crop in his on-farm storage bins as he waits 
for prices to rise. Prices, however, have not risen much in recent years given the consistent surplus 
of grain. Peter is cognizant of the market fundamentals, but he continues to farm despite the 
economic losses. For Peter, running his family’s farm is more than just a business; it is a calling, 
as illustrated in the following quote:  
You know, for me personally, I almost feel like it’s a calling from God, you know, He works 
through us, and I produce food to feed the world. And, if I have done something – if I lose 
a calf, or I have a crop that fails for reasons – a management decision that wouldn’t fail 
completely but maybe doesn’t do as well – you know, I feel that responsibility is kind of 
placed on me to perform and provide. And, I know there’s still a lot of world hunger, but 
I, you know, I’m feeding people in a sense, and I feel that’s a calling from God. We own 
some of this land only for the time that we’re here, and uh, I think it’s more – it all belongs 
to God, and He’s just providing through us. 
 
 Unlike Peter, James was not born into agriculture, nor did he expect to enter into 
agriculture. In high school, however, James met a woman who would later become his wife, and 
during the summers, James worked on her family’s farm. Her father had moved to the area in the 
early 1980s to start farming. A couple of years into James’ new career at a nearby hospital, James’ 
father-in-law became ill. With limited options to transition the family farm given that his wife was 
an only child, James and his wife took over the family’s farm.  
James has been farming for almost twenty years now, but he still feels like a newcomer. 
Not growing up in agriculture generated a sense of animosity in James towards other farmers. 
Many of the farms in his area have been in the same family for over a hundred years and have 
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longstanding relationships with local buyers. James feels that some of the large-scale family farms 
native to the community are “too friendly” with buyers, who James believes control the market 
and take advantage of small farmers. Indeed, a consistent theme throughout his narrative was the 
feeling of being “starved out,” as illustrated by the following quote:  
If you don’t make it more friendly for small growers and quit concentratin’ your producers, 
which is just, you know, less producers, if they don’t make it where we can make a living, 
one of these days…  we’ll be starved out… you know, there’s just so much that we can do. 
 
 Despite the challenges he faced as a small farmer, James was willing to deal with the risks 
and market hostility because he felt that it was his duty to preserve American agriculture, as 
illustrated by the following quote:  
Because there’s… somebody’s gotta do it… unless you don’t want to eat. The things we 
grow feed the cattle and chicken and turkeys that you eat, and the rice, you know what I 
mean? It’s not just a career. It’s a life, you know what I mean? It’s not just a job. It’s more 
than a job... If we don’t do it, you know what I mean, they’re gonna buy it from another 
country and it’s going to be reflected in the cost of food. 
 
Table 3: Representative Excerpts for “Diversity of Objectives: Farming as a Business and a 





“For the most part, it’s been good to me. It’s given me something to do and kept me off 
the streets and out of the pool halls. Uh, I’ve enjoyed it. If I didn’t have my cattle, I don’t 
know what I’d do.” 
Mark “And, some of it is, I think the lifestyle of it. I mean, a lot of times, ones my age and 
younger, maybe their family farmed.” 
George “[My boss] was ready to give me the opportunity for promotion, you know, and, in my 
heart, I wanted to farm… It hasn’t been a very lucrative thing the last couple years, so, 
with these markets, and last year, the weather just took our crop, but I still love it. [points 
to the dash in his truck] You know, this is my office. I enjoy it. I love puttin’ seed in the 
ground. I love watchin’ it grow. Uh, and the markets will always be tough. That’s why I 
do what I do.”  
Benjamin “The chicken business was good to me, not financially, but I never missed a school play, 
I never missed a ball game. When my son got off the school bus, I was there and we 
worked on the farm and we done things, worked on construction equipment, ran bulls, 
and he’s a man… We are very close. My daughter and I are very close, and that is the 
one thing I will never regret about the chicken business because had I stayed in 
corporate America, not only would I probably had a heart attack or strangled someone, I 
would have missed all that.”  




Table 3 (Cont.) 
Informant Excerpt1 
Jack “That farm means nothing to them, and you know, truth be known, their daddy was out 
there sweat and blood to provide that farm so they could have it one day.” 
Jacob “The poultry industry gets such a bad rap all the time that I told [the visitors], I said ‘that’d 
be fine’, and later on, I told him ‘if I can cast one positive every once in a while, then it’s 
well worth it for doing all this.’” 
Abraham “Agriculture is like this rare bird now in our urban-based culture... We find our 
newsletters very popular with our customers because they’re kind of fascinated by our 
lifestyle. What does life look like waking up on a farm in the [Region] when you’re going 
out to take care of the summer squash? You know, it’s an unusual, um, it’s not a shared 
reality so the people in town find that fascinating, and also I feel like it’s a very balancing 
force to the kind of chaos people can experience living in urban areas… I think that kind 
of grounding in the local landscape is very grounding to the culture at large. I feel like it 
[farming] has almost a limitless kind of healing effect once someone cues into it.”  
1A critical foundation of the hermeneutic method is the hermeneutic circle, which is an iterative spiral 
of understanding in which “the parts” (i.e., the farmers’ operations decisions) can only be understood 
from “the whole” (i.e., the context in which farmers are embedded), and “the whole” can only be 
understood from its “parts” (Prasad, 2017). That is, the hermeneutic circle suggests that the meaning of 
the quotes does not reside solely in the words and sentences (Prasad, 2017). Although the quotes 
included in the table are most representative of the thematic category, their comprehensive 
dimensionality can only be understood as embedded in the farmers’ full narratives, which are not 
included due to page limits. Further, the quotes included in the table were determined to be the most 
representative from the sample of informants and not intended to be an exhaustive list. Again, the 
purpose is not to make generalizations to a population of farmers but to provide conceptual insights.  
 
Constraints: Controlled Chaos or Just Chaos?  
The second theme emerging from the analysis was the multitude of constraints that farmers 
must contend with as they make day-to-day operations decisions. The very nature of farming 
magnifies the effect of time and resource constraints typically facing SMEs. The empirical 
narratives of two informants, Tucker and Jack, are used as exemplars to describe this theme, and 
Table 4 profiles excerpts from other informants that were also representative.  
Tucker is a row crop farmer and grows corn, soybeans, rice, and wheat on the midsize 
family farm he now owns with two of his nephews. Tucker’s father served in World War II, and 
his mother saved every check his father sent home. When his father returned from the war, 
Tucker’s parents had saved enough money to purchase some acreage. Over the next few years, the 
farm and the family continued to grow.   
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Tucker started working on the family farm in third grade and has worked on the family 
farm every year since then. Tucker was the first member of his family to earn a college degree, 
and he is now responsible for all farm management decisions. Tucker believes successful farming 
is “all in the details,” as he puts it, so he is eager to adopt new technologies that streamline 
operations and provide real-time information to his smartphone. In fact, every tractor and sprayer 
working the family’s farmland is guided by GPS, all of the chemicals and fertilizers are precision-
applied, and all of the data is documented and analyzed extensively on the computer at the office 
he shares with his nephews in town. Despite this desire for precise decision-making, however, the 
immediacy imposed by other decisions involved in farm management limits Tucker’s ability to 
focus on operations decisions—particularly storage, as illustrated by the following quote:  
I was the sole person that made all of the selling decisions for grain. I get the markets on 
my phone six times a day, so I’d kind of watch the futures market and say ‘that’s a pretty 
good price’, and I’d sell. But, as far as me, I’m not the one to sit behind the computer all 
day and analyze charts, watch weather patterns, look at drought maps, that sort of thing. I 
can’t do that because I’m busy trying to operate this farm, get the crops in, get ‘em 
harvested, fertilized, get ‘em weed free, irrigated, that sort of thing, so that [marketing and 
storage] is just like the least of my worries, but really it’s the most important because you 
can make, you can do fifty thousand dollars either way in a day if you’re not careful with 
the way you market your crop.   
 
Like Tucker, Jack also grew up in agriculture. Jack was born and raised in the rural town 
where he still resides, and his house is only a mile and a half from the house he grew up in. Jack 
had always known he wanted to farm, as his father and grandfather had before him. Jack’s 
grandfather had previously owned farmland in the rural town, but he was no longer actively 
farming by the time Jack was old enough to work during the summers. So, Jack went to work for 
another farmer in town until he graduated high school. After high school, Jack worked various 
jobs in order to save enough money to purchase the family’s old farmland. Sometimes, Jack regrets 
that he went straight into the workforce instead of going to college, as he believed college may 
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have helped him with some of the decisions involved in farm management. Ultimately, however, 
he believes that he would not have been able to save enough money to buy the family farm back 
if he had not gone straight to work after high school.  
Jack has since grown his family’s farm from a couple hundred acres to thousands of acres 
and diversified the production to include corn, wheat, soybeans, rice, and cotton. As the sole farmer 
and operator of a large-scale family farm, Jack has a multitude of decisions to consider on a daily 
basis. The day-to-day operations mostly consist of managing his employees, but there is no such 
thing as a “typical” day on the farm. Every day, it seemed, posed a new challenged, as illustrated 
in the following quote:  
I’ve got a crew gettin’ rice all ready to go to water with, I’ve got a harvest crew, and a 
bean plantin’ crew. You never know. You know they may change tomorrow. Some of these 
guys will be over there or vice versa, or in their trucks, or whatever… Most of the days it’s 
controlled chaos. Other days it’s just chaos. [laughs] You know what I mean? 
 
 The daily stresses of farm management and recent downturn in commodity prices have 
further impacted Jack’s ability to make decisions. Already limited in terms of time and resources, 
additional constraints posed by nature are detrimental, especially when combined with market 
uncertainty. As Jack explains in the following excerpt, low prices highlight the necessity for 
precise decision-making but also magnify the effect of constraints on his ability to make informed 
decisions:  
Everything, you know, you can rock and go and do okay as long as, uh, your yields are 
good, but, uh, then you get a year when your yields are off and there’s nothin’ you can do 
– you know, nothin’ you’ve done wrong, there’s nothing you could’ve done different. 
There’s just years when, during pollination, the heat hits, or you get a late planting ‘cause 
the spring was so wet, or some stress or too much water in the spring when the plants are 
young. There’s nothing you can do. You don’t plan on that, and you mix a low price with 
a low yield, and then you’re where everybody’s at right now around here. I mean, they’re 
just strangling. Banks are strangling, farmers are strangling, you know, there’s a lot of 
nervousness and worry. When you start worrying, you don’t make good decisions ‘cause 








Scott “People are concerned all the time about what’s their perceived risk. I use the word 
perceived importantly because it’s different than speaking of their greatest risk.” 
Brian “Weather is a big thing, and that’s something I can’t do anything about, so you see the 
insanity involved there.” 
Mark “I mean, but uh, we still – the responsibility aspect of, you know, we still have to do 
things on weekends. We don’t get Sunday off… I mean, weekends and week nights. If 
the power goes out, you know, things have to be taken care of very quickly out here.” 
 
“I mean, we watch the cattle prices and stuff. So, not that we don’t watch it, but time 
crunch wise, when it comes time to sell them, we just have to sell them. That’s just it. 
We’re kinda time-crunched that we have to, you know, we kind of have a window 
because we don’t have a place ‘cause once they get so big of a cow, you’re gonna have 
to do somethin’ with them, and we don’t have another forty acres or eighty acres that we 
could take and wean ‘em off and then. You know, some people have more flexibility in 
that they can do that if the market’s high whenever they take them off the cows, they can 
sell them or they can take and what they call ‘background’ ‘em for a while, and some 
people do that, and some people are big enough around here – I mean, we’re not.”  
Peter “For me, it’s more that it’s a whole ‘nother layer of management that I really don’t have 
time for... It is stressful. I mean, it is a whole other layer. I think maybe, as a farmer, 
we’re already – we’re accountants, we’re supervisors and business managers, we’re the, 
we’re not the vet, but we’re the animal health specialist when we’re out looking at our 
livestock and making sure they’re healthy, and we’re also the operator, and you know 
we also do the electric. You just wear SO many hats. It’s absurd.” 
Jacob “But I’ve also been in the top ten literally out of the [hundreds] in one year, then in the 
bottom ten in the next year doing nothing wrong … Something was in there, and they 
just wouldn’t do what we needed. Dead last, dead last, dead last, dead last, extremely 
dead last… I’m doing everything I can think of, the field tech is out there doing 
everything he can think of…” 
Michael “You got to make those decisions, or you’re out. I mean, to make it all work, a lot of 
companies don’t have to do that. You got to look at us like a company. [Retailer], they 
can change things on a daily deal. Well, you understand what I’m saying. We can’t do 
that. We got to plan in the fall for the next year coming up, so you can talk to the bank 
and lock in all the seed, and you’ve pretty well set your program before it’s even time 
to plant.”  
Elijah “I really try to let good data drive my decision-making, but that’s hard to do working 
in a, you know, nature-based business. You’re working hundred-hour weeks from 
March to November.” 
Abraham “In the early part of the season, it’s, um, trying to, um, just get down on paper all of 
things that have to be done and just how to prioritize them so that you don’t have to 
carry that around with you worrying about it all the time. Um, so that you have, if you 
have ten things floating around in your mind that are pressing on you that need to be 
done, the first thing to do is write them all down and then prioritize, and then start 
doing them (laughs) instead of worrying about them. I mean, it’s too easy just to 
worry. Um, it’s never all done, so this is an ongoing problem, you know? You have to 
find a way to reduce anxiety, um, about the things that have to be done.” 
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Institutional Pluralism: A Part of the Whole or Apart from the Whole?    
The third theme emerging from the analysis was the fragmented nature of the institutional 
environment. Farmers operate within multiple institutional spheres and deal with competing 
pressures from formal and informal institutions.5 Farmers vary in the pressures they focus on and 
how they respond, so institutions influence each farmer’s decision-making differently. The 
empirical narratives of two informants, Elijah and Roger, are used as exemplars to describe this 
theme, and Table 5 profiles excerpts from other informants that were also representative.  
 Elijah is the owner and operator of a small family farm that is certified organic by the 
USDA. Prior to purchasing his own farm, Elijah spent fifteen years making production and storage 
decisions for his family’s fifth generation vegetable and row crop farm. Although he grew up 
working in “conventional” agriculture, Elijah became passionate about organic production 
practices and sustainability after selling the family’s vegetables at farmer’s markets during high 
school. Unable to convert his family’s farm, Elijah started his own farm to pursue his passion for 
sustainability, as illustrated in the following quote: 
Farming has been the way to get the experience I need to effect real change in the food 
policy world… I’m trying to be one of those agents of change for organic production and 
try to bring a very level-headed ‘hey, I come from the conventional world, but also I’m 
going this way, and this is where I want to take my community and the people around me.’ 
I want to loop towards sustainability. How are we keeping our families fed, our kids in 
college, taxes paid, you know, and land paid? To me, that’s all sustainability and I try to 
talk about it through that lens. How are we keeping our family farms alive? 
 
Although his experience making decisions for his family’s farm and selling at farmer’s 
markets during high school has been helpful, Elijah still faces challenges in dealing with buyers 
because of the size of his operation, as illustrated in the following quote:  
 
5 I conceptualize formal institutions as organizations that are formally structured and established, such as firms, non-
governmental organizations, and government agencies, whereas informal institutions are traditions, norms, and 
social customs emanating from family, communities, and society (North, 1991).  
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 If there is anything I’ve learned, that’s one thing small growers are really good at – and 
that is totally pissing off major customers… They [buyers] are used to dealing with big 
brokers and outfits that never miss a delivery and have never missed deliveries period… 
They’re brokers. They make deliveries; that’s what they do. I’m a farmer. I just grow food. 
You know, I do deliveries too, but I’m a farmer, not a delivery man… I still need logistics 
support and resources. Otherwise, it’s just overwhelming. I’ve been there, done that. I 
mean, I’ve done as many as eight farmer’s markets a week and delivered to twenty, thirty, 
forty wholesale customers and managed retail accounts. It’s a nightmare. 
 
However, despite the pressures he faces from major buyers, Elijah is proud to be part of 
the local food system and enjoys the connections he has created by supplying his local community 
with organic produce. A consistent theme throughout his narrative was the role that consumers and 
local communities play in defining the norms that govern his production decisions, as illustrated 
in the following quote:  
I think it comes back to this direct interaction with customers. You know, I think that’s what 
makes a lot of people go this [organic] route… when you have to see your customers day 
in and day out and your customer is not the back of a truck, it really does make you look 
at your practices. 
 
 Roger owns a midsize family farm and grows a variety of row crops, including soybeans, 
cotton, rice, and corn. Roger grew up on the family farm he now owns, as his father and grandfather 
had before him. Before the introduction of cellphones and computers, Roger remembered watching 
his father and grandfather check the futures prices every day in local newspapers and on local radio 
stations to determine how to allocate acreage and when to sell their crops. These memories stuck 
with Roger after he inherited the family farm; as the futures markets became more sophisticated 
and the farm grew, Roger began acquiring additional pricing information from various third-party 
marketing services to use in his operations decisions. The services provided recommendations 
based on his operations and desired profits, but Roger was ultimately the one who made the final 
decisions. The autonomy to make his own decisions was important to Roger. As markets became 
more volatile and third-party services increased their fees, he soon became disenchanted with 
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outside information. Roger became wary of outside information, particularly from buyers, and 
built grain storage bins on his farm so that he would not have to rely on buyers at harvest time, as 
illustrated in the following quote: 
I always put it in my own grain bins. Otherwise, I’ve got two choices. I could either sell it 
for whatever the price is at that time… or I can carry it to a customer’s and wait until later. 
Do you know what it’s like to go to the person that owns the bin after you came, and your 
corn has already been in there for two months and try to negotiate a good price? He’s 
already got your damn grain! 
 
 As the owner of a midsize farm, Roger has enough experience and capital to “stick it to the 
man” (as he puts it). However, Roger expressed substantial concern for small family farms, who 
he believes are at the mercy of buyers to store their grain as they wait for prices to rise. In an effort 
to help them achieve greater autonomy, Roger contracts with fellow farmers and allows them to 
store their grains in his storage bins at a significantly lower price than buyers currently charge. 
Further, Roger is a member of a farmers’ cooperative that is developing a program to circumvent 
the current chain of middleman and go directly to the manufacturers, who he perceives to be less 
adversarial and more receptive to allowing farmers to manage their own operations.  
Table 5: Representative Excerpts for “Institutional Pluralism: Part of the Whole or Apart 
from the Whole?” 
 
Informant Excerpt1 
Formal Institutions  
James  “You know, what we get as producers is such a small part of the retail. That’s 
what’s frustrating as a producer. There’s so many steps in the supply chain, and 
those guys in the middle are making more than the producer. You know, uh, 
that’s where everyone seems to like to get it from – the farmer!”   
Jack “We know if the crop’s short, if people are holding rice, because we are sittin’ 
in rice country. I mean, it’s not very big. It’s a small market... and they’ll just 
burn you every time and go the other way… [Buyers] control it… We’re 
narrowed up in our area. There’s four people we can sell to now, and I’m scared 
to death of all four of ‘em.”  
 
“My banker tells me ‘gosh, darn, you are one of the best damn operators I’ve 
ever seen, but you are the absolute worst at paperwork!’ I’m just tryin’ to keep 
up, and there’s a lot of paperwork involved from recordkeeping to FSA Farm 
Service Agency) to NRCS (Natural Resources Conservation Service) to I don’t 
know on yields, farms, inputs, anything.”  
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Table 5 (Cont.) 
Informant Excerpt1 
Benjamin “I had a perfect place between [Town] and [Town], and [the buyer’s 
management team] didn’t have to go on a dirt road because it was on the 
highway, so that’s where they met up… [The managers would] all meet up 
there and have their meetings at my farm. One time they were there and they 
had all these kids who were going to work for [Company], and she asked ‘so 
what advice would you give to someone who wanted to [enter this industry]’ 
and I said ‘[buy land] on the roughest dirt road you can find’, and she said 
‘why?’, and I said ‘so [the buyers] won’t come to your [farm].’ You did not 
want to be that guy that was easy to get to.” 
Chad “We walked in the dryer after working so hard to make a bean crop. We 
walked in the dryer to sell our beans, and they were over nine dollars, which 
was a great price at that time, and, so, I walked in – dad and I did. We had ten 
thousand bushels of beans to sell, and there was a couple guys around a little 
ticker tape machine sitting there in the corner, and every ten minutes, it was 
spitting out the commodity prices, and so, uh, I, uh, they said ‘what are you 
guys gonna do?’ and I said ‘well, we’re selling our beans’, and they said 
‘man, don’t sell your beans, they’re going to eleven dollars’, so to make a 
long story short, we walked out of there and only sold one thousand bushels 
out of that ten thousand. Well, two weeks later, beans are down at seven fifty 
a bushel, and I thought ‘that is the dumbest move I have ever made in my 
life.’” 
Scott “We had an audit from the State Plant Board on Thursday and Friday. Of 
course, they don’t tell you when they’re comin’, so that takes a lot of our 
time…We’re running a little behind.”  
Jacob “[Buyer] has representatives out here telling us they have multiple fields where 
they have flown drones on farms and tried to catch people doing stuff… I can 
tell you right now, if [Buyer] walks on the farm and sees something they do not 
like, especially when it comes to culling – the euthanization, you will not get 
any more business with [Buyer], and I am serious about that.”    
Informal Institutions 
Brian “We depend on this ground year after year to make a living. I’m farming ground 
that my father and grandfather farmed. It’s our most important asset.”  
 
“If you want to buy [organic], buy it, have at it. If you’ve got that kind of 
money, have at it. I’m not gonna campaign against it. On the other hand, 
[consumers] campaign against me. They spend money to put down what I’m 
doing [with conventional agriculture], which they’re talking about these 
community gardens and all this. I’m not talking about feeding [his hometown]. 
I’m talking about feeding the world.”  
Jack “That farm means nothing to them, and you know, truth be known, their daddy 
was out there sweat and blood to provide that farm so they could have it one 
day.” 
Roger “Most people think their food comes from grocery stores. I’m not trying to be 
facetious, but I am not so sure that people want to be educated. They like what 
they’ve got, and, uh, they’re comfortable with it, so when someone is 





Table 5 (Cont.) 
Informant Excerpt1 
Scott “Most farmers, most of the land is – a lot of it is – still farmed by, you know, a 
father and a son or a father and an uncle or they may have just one person, and 
it’s a three or four-person deal… You know, they grew up together.” 
Jacob ““The biggest challenge I face as a poultry farmer is public opinion. You’ve 
got the animal welfare issues, no antibiotics, the feed to satisfy the consumer, 
and some of it’s real and the others is just, you know… It depends on the 
people. People get on one side or the other side strong.” 
 
Discussion  
The empirical narratives suggest that farmers prefer to make decisions autonomously. 
Consider Roger, for example, who built on-farm storage so he would not have to rely on buyers at 
harvest time, or Benjamin, who advised young farmers to buy land “on the roughest dirt road” to 
make it undesirable for buyers to visit the farm. This tendency to keep buyers at “arm’s length” is 
a consequence of the family owned-nature of the farm and the diversity of objectives underlying 
farmers’ decision-making (Theme 1). Farmers perceive more integrated arrangements with buyers 
as a threat to their personal independence and the family’s autonomy to retain decision-making 
control. For example, Benjamin inherited the family’s poultry farm from his father but sold it as 
soon as he got the chance to raise beef cattle with his son instead. Benjamin valued the autonomous 
decision-making that raising cattle allowed, which was in stark contrast to the poultry farming he 
grew up with:  
I can really make decisions in the cattle business that can make or lose money. Now, I can’t 
control the market for the cattle, but I have infinitely more control over raising cattle than 
I do for chickens. I don’t miss the absolute lack of control when you’re a contract grower. 
I had no choices [in the poultry business]. There’s a lot more flexibility in the cattle market, 
and it gives you more control. You know, work with your rations and figure out what works 
best for your feed program.  
 
Farmers are also wary of more integrated arrangements with buyers due to size 
asymmetries. Exchanges between farmers and buyers are characterized by many small and midsize 
farms selling to a few large buyers. Jack, for example, explained that there were only four buyers 
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in his area, and he was “scared to death of all four of ‘em.”  Mark also shared that his cattle were 
“bought by just a few big packers.”  Such size imbalances are common in conventional agriculture 
(e.g., Touboulic et al., 2014), but organic farmers also discussed issues related to size imbalances. 
For example, Elijah talked about the expectations large buyers have because of their experiences 
dealing with large suppliers. As a small farmer, Elijah felt that he needed more “logistics support 
and resources” to meet large buyers’ demands.  
The empirical narratives suggest that such size asymmetries also foster perceptions of 
power asymmetries (Handley & Benton, 2012). For example, some of the farmers discussed the 
pricing power that large buyers have—large buyers “got the market cornered” (Tucker), “dictate 
the price” (Peter), or “will just burn ya every time” (Jack).  To overcome the asymmetries, James 
explained that farmers could work together and pool their resources, but farmers were “a funny 
bunch. We’re kind of independent you know what I mean? Farmers, in general, and that’s what’s 
kept us from doing some of that stuff. Everybody does their own thing.” Elijah also shared: “You 
need a lot of growers to do that, and it’s been challenging, I have to say. I feel like I’ve not had 
the other farmers beside me to push through these barriers and gain at these markets.” 
 In combination, the empirical narratives suggest that farmers prefer to operate 
independently and sell their products via local markets instead of via contracts or other 
arrangements.6 The grain and oilseed farmers called local buyers when they decided it was time to 
sell; livestock farmers brought their livestock to auctions when they were ready to sell; organic 
farmers sold most of their produce and herbs at local farmer’s markets.  Selling via local markets 
 
6 I note that the poultry farmers in our sample are the exception; poultry farmers – sometimes begrudgingly (e.g., 
Benjamin) – contract with buyers. The poultry supply chain is highly integrated relative to other agricultural supply 
chains, and virtually all poultry farmers – more than 90% – operate under production contracts (MacDonald, 2014). 
Production contracts dictate when and how many chicks farmers receive, as well as feed, veterinary, and technical 
requirements. However, similar to other farmer groups, poultry farmers operate independently in the sense that they 
manage other aspects of production and are compensated based on their performance and the average market price. 
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allows farmers to maintain their sense of autonomy; they decide if, when, where, how much, and 
to whom to sell. For example, like Roger, Brian built his own grain bins on-farm to provide 
autonomy in his storage decisions:  
I have grain bins, so I can sell soybeans on January delivery or March delivery, and I can, 
you know, I can break up the income flow. You know if I need to get some delivered… I can 
play with it however I want to, so just makin’ sure I have options to do what needs to be 
done. 
 
I thus posit:  
Proposition 1: Resource constraints and diversity of objectives interact to influence farmers’ 
approach to exchange such that farmers prefer market-based exchange.  
Farmers’ approach to exchange influences how they make decisions and the information 
they need. Given their preference for market-based exchange, it is imperative for farmers to 
understand the future course of prices in order to plan and execute their operations decisions. Scott, 
for example, uses prices to determine what to produce: “I grow corn and cotton in rotation, and I 
grow rice and soybeans, and if the price is right, I grow wheat.” Peter uses prices to determine 
how much to produce: “The market is telling us at those prices ‘hey, we want more’ when the 
price goes up.” Gary shared that prices drive production decisions for cattle farmers as well: “Well, 
from what prices were, they’re down a bunch. Because of all those good prices a few years back, 
everybody started producing more or trying to.”  
Beyond production decisions, farmers also use prices to inform their storage decisions. 
Peter (Theme 1) and Tucker (Theme 2), for example, track prices continuously throughout the year 
to determine when and how much to sell versus store. Michael also uses prices to determine when 
to sell: “I’ve kind of got a target price. Like rice, if we can get five, five and a quarter with it, I’ll 
sell it.” As Gary shared, however, prices are not always at the level farmers require to make 
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optimal storage decisions: “I’ve held on to some (cattle) this last go-around a little longer than 
what I should have, but prices is down and I waited to let them come back a little bit ‘fore I sold.”  
Prices are thus an imperfect but critical source of information given farmers’ preference 
for market-based exchange. For example, Brian shared: “The market is where I get paid. I mean, 
what that price is, that’s where I make my money.” Scott also shared: “Prices are how you measure 
better in this business. Whoever gives you the most money.” By communicating important 
information about supply and demand, prices guide farmers’ decision-making and serve as a signal 
for resource allocation. Accordingly, I posit:   
Proposition 2: Resource constraints and diversity of objectives interact to influence farmers’ 
information acquisition activities such that farmers rely on prices to inform their operations 
decisions. 
There are, however, significant costs associated with discovering prices (Stigler, 1961), 
and these costs are greater for small and midsize farms because they are more limited in the time 
and resources they can devote to acquiring relevant information (e.g., Freeman et al., 1983; Bruderl 
& Schussler, 1990).  Consider Peter, for example: information search is: 
a whole ‘nother layer of management that I really don’t have time for... It is stressful. I 
mean, it is a whole other layer. I think maybe, as a farmer, we’re already – we’re 
accountants, we’re supervisors and business managers, we’re the, we’re not the vet, but 
we’re the animal health specialist when we’re out looking at our livestock and making sure 
they’re healthy, and we’re also the operator, and you know we also do the electric. You 
just wear so many hats. It’s absurd. 
  
Similarly, Jack referred to his experience managing day-to-day farm operations as 
“controlled chaos,” and Tucker did not have the time to search for technical information because 
he is the “sole person making selling decisions” and is “busy trying to operate this farm, get the 
crops in, get ‘em harvested, fertilized, get ‘em weed free, irrigated, that sort of thing.” As these 
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excerpts illustrate, farmers are limited in the time and resources they can devote to acquiring the 
information needed to determine current and future prices.  
Further, because farmers prefer to operate independently from the rest of the supply chain, 
they typically do not have access to information about downstream markets beyond the aggregate 
demand forecasts provided by the USDA. Given the transactional – and sometimes even 
adversarial – nature of exchange, buyers are not incentivized to share such information with 
farmers. For example, Mark shared: “the thing about it is it’s so hard to find buyers that will share 
beef prices.” Benjamin’s eighty-seven-year-old grandfather (who also farms) did not like selling 
to the new buyers in town because they were too transactional:  
It only takes them fifteen seconds to unload my truck. You used to have time to go in and 
get a cup of coffee and talk to the guys that work there. Now, before I can even get out of 
the truck, the damn thing is empty. It’s terrible. It’s ruining my life!  
 
Moreover, when buyers do share information, farmers do not always trust the information. 
Chad, for example, talked about a negative experience with a buyer who he perceived to have 
shared “false” information (see Table 5) and explained that the negative experience was the 
impetus for him to learn more about futures markets and “how they worked to do something to 
better my situation.” 
In line with Chad’s story, the informational role of futures markets was prominent during 
the field interviews. Farmers received texts when we were out in the fields or in tractors or farm 
trucks with futures market updates. Sometimes they would grumble or curse, but other times, they 
would immediately call local buyers to see if they were interested in buying at current prices. For 
example, Peter consistently tracks futures prices throughout the year to determine the best time to 
sell based on his breakeven price. Tucker also tracks futures prices to determine the best time to 
sell based on if it’s a “good price.” The empirical narratives thus suggest that farmers rely on 
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futures markets to acquire price information—but to varying degrees. Futures markets are not 
available for all agricultural products, including specialty breeds of poultry and livestock, produce, 
and herbs. Instead, the specialty poultry and livestock farmers used more general poultry and 
livestock futures prices as a baseline, and the organic produce and herb farmers used their own 
historical price data. For example, Abraham explained that he used his “own thirty-two-year track 
record” to guide his production decisions.  
Given their stated missions (e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2019), I expected that 
monthly and weekly reports from government agencies would play a larger role in farmers’ 
information acquisition activities—especially for organic produce farmers who do not have other 
sources of public information available (i.e., futures markets). However, the acquisition of 
government information was not apparent in the field interviews. Few farmers mentioned the 
information that government agencies provided; the farmers who discussed government agencies 
typically did so regarding reference prices—thresholds the USDA uses to determine whether 
insurance indemnities are paid to farmers, required paperwork and recordkeeping, and regulations. 
One potential explanation for the less prominent role of government agencies is that futures prices 
quickly reflect supply and demand information contained in reports promulgated by the USDA 
and NASS (e.g., Summer & Mueller, 1989; Garcia et al., 1997; Adjemian, 2012). As expected, 
futures prices rise in response to forecasted increases in aggregate demand and/or decreases in 
aggregate supply and fall in response to forecasted decreases in aggregate demand and/or increases 
in aggregate supply. For example, Brian shared: “I’ll use some of those government numbers like 
ending stocks, and then I’ll look at the futures prices.” Futures prices thus may be a more 
“efficient” way for farmers to acquire price information and gauge market conditions. That is, just 
as stock prices summarize many pieces of information about a firm, futures prices summarize 
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many pieces of information about supply and demand. The easily accessible and heuristic nature 
of futures prices is particularly important given the resource constraints small and midsize farms 
face. I thus posit:  
Proposition 3: Resource constraints and diversity of objectives interact to influence farmers’ 
information acquisition activities such that farmers acquire price information via public 
sources to inform their operations decisions.  
In addition to buyers, government agencies, and futures markets, the empirical narratives 
suggest that farmers’ operations decisions are also subject to influences from informal institutions, 
including family, local communities, and society. For example, Chad described his farm as “a one-
man operation with some of my family helping me all these years.” He had the opportunity to 
expand the size of his operation but ultimately chose not to because “that’s kind of the way I wanted 
it. I mean, I could’ve expanded, but, you know, I’m kind of a family guy, and I wanted to be able 
to work and spend time with my family.” Robert was also “family-oriented” and loved that his sons 
were involved in the family farm, but he felt that did not always fare well for his decision-making:  
I have a couple old cows I need to get rid of. I have a tendency to keep them too long. I 
have a few too many head. I want to try to get rid of some. They’re not a good moneymaker, 
but, of course, my boy likes to rope, so we keep ‘em around. 
 
Similarly, Gary shared that his wife, Dorothy, influenced his decision-making: “I sold my 
last bull because of her. She didn’t think he was doin’ his job. When I bought a new one, it cost 
me twice as much! But she was happy.”  
 Beyond family influences, farmers’ operations decisions are also influenced by local 
communities. For example, George waited to harvest one of his fields because it was so popular 
in the local community: “I left that cotton field ready to pick for three weeks just so people could 
get their pictures, then came back to it. People were taking their engagement pictures out here, 
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their graduation pictures.” Abraham delivered newsletters about his daily farming operations to 
help connect with the local community: “I feel like it’s a very balancing force to the kind of chaos 
people can experience living in urban areas. I think that kind of grounding in the local landscape 
is very grounding to the culture at large.”  
The role of consumer pressures was also prominent during the field interviews, as 
consumers increasingly demand information about farming practices. Some farmers expressed 
concerns about consumers’ demands and worried about public perceptions. For example, Peter 
shared:  
As farmers, the number one thing that I want and that a lot of organizations want involved 
with agriculture is an educated consumer. I say that based on, I’ll use [Company] for an 
example. They have taken this big stance, you know, ‘hey, we only use organic, non-
medicated, non-GMO, that sort of thing’, and I think that creates a little bit of hysteria in 
the marketplace for the consumer. It can shed a negative light on the producer because I 
mean, we want to take the best care of our crops, the best care of our land, the best care of 
our animals because it means more money for us.  
 
Abraham, an organic farmer, also noted: “There’s a big gap between what actually 
happens on farms in production and what the public actually is aware of, and I’m not quite sure 
of how to bridge that.” Jacob felt that the biggest challenge he faced as a poultry farmer was 
“public opinion,” and he hosts tour groups on his farm to “cast a positive image on the poultry 
industry and farming in general” (Table 3). However, Jacob also noted that everything he’d 
changed in the last few years was “to satisfy the consumer because of public opinion.” Like Jacob, 
other farmers also changed their production practices in response to consumer demands. Elijah, 
for example, grew up on a conventional farm but switched to organic after interacting with 
consumers at farmer’s markets (Theme 3). Michael and Diane also switched to non-GMO corn 
and soybeans because “that’s what our customers expect us to do.”  
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Overall, the empirical narratives suggest that farmers face an extremely fragmented 
institutional environment as they make operations decisions. Balancing influences from numerous 
institutions (e.g., government agencies, futures markets, buyers, family, local communities, and 
consumers) is particularly challenging for small and midsize farms because they lack the resources 
to be continually focused on all aspects of their institutional environment. To overcome this 
pluralism, the empirical narratives suggest that underlying objectives direct farmers to focus on 
particular aspects of their institutional environment. Similar to the underlying assumption in 
traditional operations decision models (e.g., increasing profits or reducing costs), farmers aim for 
economic viability in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the family farm for future 
generations. However, Theme 1 illustrated that farmers also have strong beliefs about their role in 
society and rural communities—they support local economies and “feed, fuel, and clothe the 
world,” as Brian put it. For example, Benjamin shared that farming allowed him to raise two 
productive children (Table 3), and Peter believed that it was a “calling from God.”  
The pursuit of non-financial objectives directs farmers to focus on informal institutional 
pressures as they make operations decisions. Pressures from non-economic actors such as family, 
local communities, and society are more salient because they are aligned with farmers’ sense of 
greater purpose. For example, Peter and James (Theme 1) continue to farm despite low prices and 
economic losses because “somebody’s gotta do it… unless you don’t want to eat.” Moreover, the 
empirical narratives suggest that most farmers perceive pressures from informal institutions as 
normative rather than coercive, which allows farmers to maintain their sense of autonomy. That 
is, farmers can decide if and to what extent they respond to normative pressures whereas their 
autonomy is lessened in response to coercive pressures from government agencies or buyers. This 
is in line with institutional pluralism research suggesting that actors are more likely to adhere to 
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institutional pressures that affect how they pursue their goals rather than which goals they pursue 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). I thus posit:  
Proposition 4: Resource constraints and diversity of objectives interact to influence the 
relative balance among competing institutional pressures such that farmers focus on 
informal institutional pressures to a greater extent than formal institutional pressures.  
To cope with institutional pluralism, the empirical narratives suggest that farmers default 
to existing decision-making processes. Among the farmers interviewed, very few planning tools, 
forecasts, or computer models were used; farmers instead made do with a rough intuitive estimate. 
The value of additional information and precise decision-making are perceived in terms of its effect 
on farmers’ most important objectives, which are not entirely economic in nature. When coupled 
with limited time and resources, this encourages the use of intuition and experience in decision-
making. For example, Jack felt that the stress of farming operations constrained his ability to 
acquire additional information:  
I love information. My memory’s just gone. Stress, it just. I used to have a memory of an 
elephant. Now I can’t remember what I eat for lunch. You know, I think it’ll get better when 
the stress level goes down and things get a little better. I hope it does. 
 
Mark also shared that the size of his farm limited the time he had to make “optimal” storage 
decisions based on price levels: “We watch the cattle prices and stuff, but time crunch wise, when 
it comes time to sell them, we just have to sell them. That’s just it.” Jacob also expressed a desire 
to acquire additional information but admitted that he typically relied on existing decision-making 
processes:  
What we’ve done for so long is so set in what we have been doing. I’ll read, I’ll read 
whatever. I’m always looking for information, but nowadays, our program is so set, unless 
somebody comes up with something really new, which they’re trying to do. But then we 




The normative and intuitive nature of decision-making was prominent during the field 
interviews. For example, Peter explained that he “shoots for as close as we can get to 50-50 
rotation, where half of our acres will be in beans and the other half in corn” because that is what 
his father has cultivated historically. Abraham also shared:  
The way I think that most farmers do [make production decisions] is they have a general 
idea of what’s enough, and then they, that’s how much they plant. A beginning grower 
might try to do it a little bit more mentally, but as growers get experience, they sort of rely 
on their gut-level instincts about how much to plant given their past experience. 
  
Even as a relatively new farmer, Elijah also explained that his production decisions were 
largely based on experience: “It was just kind of a feeling; my experience tells me to grow this. 
Forward projections have been a big help for me, but I think that takes decades of experience of 
growing before you can get into that.” As these examples illustrate, farmers tend to rely on their 
own experience or norms that have been passed down across generations to make production 
decisions. We thus posit that farmers’ pursuit of non-financial objectives and limited bandwidth 
and resources encourage the use of intuition and experience in decision-making. Stated formally:  
Proposition 5: The interaction of institutional pluralism, resource constraints, and diversity 
of objectives encourages the use of intuition and experience in farmers’ decision-making.  
 Institutional pluralism also has implications for the extent to which farmers incorporate 
and use objective price information to inform their decision-making process. For example, 
consider the competing institutional pressures farmers face as they make storage decisions at 
harvest time. At the macro-level, the USDA promulgates reference prices, which anchor farmers’ 
expectations and predispositions to store or sell based on current prices. Within local communities, 
buyers pressure farmers to sell because prices are typically the lowest at harvest time with the 
influx in supply, whereas fellow farmers may encourage other farmers to “hold out” or establish 
cooperatives to collectively store their goods until prices rise (e.g., Roger’s story in Theme 3). At 
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the farm-level, farmers face pressures from family members and employees related to the 
preservation of the family farm for future generations. At the individual-level, farmers face internal 
pressures stemming from the tension between economic viability and a sense of greater purpose 
(Theme 1). Farmers thus contend with competing institutional pressures as they make operations 
decisions. The relative importance of price, an “economic” variable, is perceived differently in 
light of each of these institutional pressures, which dampens the extent to which farmers use prices 
to inform their operations decisions. I thus posit:  
Proposition 6: Institutional pluralism dampens the role of price information in farmers’ 
operations decisions.  
Conclusion and Implications 
 
We sought to understand how farmers make operations decisions by exploring their 
underlying objectives, information acquisition activities, and approach to buyer-supplier exchange 
and how these aspects of decision-making are influenced by farm-level idiosyncrasies. Field 
interviews revealed that farmers’ operations decisions are shaped by internal factors related to the 
small, family-owned nature of the farm and external factors stemming from numerous institutions 
involved in agriculture. Overall, the findings provide important insights on the perspective of the 
farmer and, as detailed below, offer important implications for theory, supply chain practice, and 
public policy.   
Theoretical Implications 
In response to recent calls for research on family businesses (Maloni et al., 2017) and SMEs 
(Kull et al., 2018), I explored how family business and SME factors “manifest” in different aspects 
of operations decision-making. In terms of family business factors, the field interviews revealed 
that farmers have diverse underlying objectives; farmers pursue economic objectives to ensure the 
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longevity of the family farm for future generations, but non-economic objectives such as “feeding 
the world” and a sense of greater purpose typically take center stage.  Further, in order to preserve 
their autonomy and ensure the family retains decision-making control, farmers tend to keep buyers 
at “arm’s length” and prefer to sell their products via local markets instead of contracts or more 
integrated arrangements. This finding is in contrast to previous family business research positing 
that family businesses “will more frequently use integration and partnerships” (Maloni et al., 2017 
p.129). One potential explanation for the difference could be contextual; there may be something 
idiosyncratic about family farms relative to other family businesses that discourages integration. 
However, Maloni et al. (2017) focus on relationships with suppliers whereas I focus on 
relationships (or lack thereof) with buyers. Thus, another potential explanation is that buyers may 
be perceived as more threatening to the family’s sense of autonomy. There are only a few large 
buyers, and family farms are dependent on these buyers for survival, which fosters perceptions of 
potential coercion (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). We thus contribute by illustrating how family 
business factors influence their approach to exchanges with downstream supply chain actors 
differently from upstream supply chain actors.  
In terms of SME factors, the field interviews revealed that farmers are much more limited 
in the time and resources they can devote to operations decision-making. The farmers I interviewed 
expressed a desire to “use good data” (Elijah) and make informed decisions, but the immediacy of 
other decisions such as irrigation or pest management typically took precedent. Farmers thus tend 
to default to existing decision-making processes and rely on intuition and experience. The field 
interviews also revealed that futures markets provide a low cost, efficient “heuristic” for farmers 
to quickly gauge market conditions. This is in line with previous research suggesting that small 
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organizations tend to seek information from external sources because they have fewer resources 
to develop information sources in-house (Moriarty & Spekman, 1984).  
By illustrating how and why farmers use the futures market to inform their supply chain 
decisions, I also contribute to the body of operations management research on futures markets. 
Previous studies have primarily focused on the hedging function of futures markets, which is a 
strategy wherein futures contracts are used to reduce the risk of adverse price movements (e.g., 
Weiss & Maher, 2009; Wang et al., 2015; Zsidisin et al., 2016; Kouvelis et al., 2018). Extant 
research has also examined how futures market information can be used to design flexible contracts 
and reduce commodity price volatility across echelons of the supply chain (Goel & Tanrisever, 
2017; Li et al., 2018). While many large firms use futures contracts alongside operational strategies 
to manage their exposure to price risk, only a small percentage of farmers actually trade futures 
contracts to hedge due to resource constraints and risk aversion (e.g., Heifner et al., 1993; Pannell 
et al., 2008).  Instead, the findings revealed that farmers use the futures market as a source of 
information. I thus contribute to this body of research by expanding the role of futures markets in 
supply chain operations beyond risk management and contracting to include their informational 
role.   
In addition to SME and family business factors, I explored how institutional factors shape 
farmers’ operations decisions. The field interviews revealed that farmers operate in multiple 
institutional spheres and face competing pressures from government agencies, buyers, fellow 
farmers, family members, local communities, and consumers. It is challenging for farmers to cope 
with this institutional pluralism because they lack the resources to focus on all aspects of their 
environment. The findings suggest that farmers rely on underlying objectives to “filter” through 
all of the pressures they face. That is, resource constraints limit the number of institutional 
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pressures farmers can respond to, and farmers’ sense of greater purpose directs them to focus on 
informal, normative pressures to a greater extent.  This study thus contributes to political economy 
research suggesting that farmers have an elevated sense of the personal relevance of institutions 
(Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) by illustrating which institutions farmers focus on. Moreover, by 
examining how farmers cope with institutional pluralism, this study contributes to the 
interdisciplinary body of work on institutional pluralism (e.g., Kraatz & Block, 2008; Hsu et al., 
2014). Previous studies have focused on professional occupations, such as medical professionals 
(Dunn & Jones, 2010), state attorneys (McPherson & Sauder, 2013), and mutual fund managers 
(Lounsbury, 2007), to the neglect of other occupations that may not possess the resources or “skills 
to maneuver institutional pluralism” (Yu, 2015 p.470). This study thus contributes by focusing on 
farmers and illustrating how resource constraints influence how SMEs and family businesses 
navigate fragmented institutional environments.  
More broadly, this study contributes to interdisciplinary research on farm-level decision-
making by providing a more nuanced perspective on how farmers make decisions and the 
information they use. The field interviews revealed that farmers prefer market-based exchange to 
maintain their independence and sense of autonomy. Given this preference for market-based 
exchange, farmers rely heavily on prices to inform their operations decisions. In this sense, the 
findings corroborate agricultural economics research demonstrating the role of price in farmers’ 
decision-making (e.g., Coase & Fowler, 1935; 1937; 1940; Williams, 1951; 1953). However, the 
findings differ from previous studies in terms of how farmers acquire information and discover 
prices. Previous studies suggest that farmers use “backward-looking expectations” to inform their 
price expectations (e.g., Chavas, 1999 p.20; Boetel et al., 2007). For example, Chavas (1999) found 
that a significant proportion of pig farmers – approximately 73% – base their price expectations 
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on historical data. While this was the case for the organic farmers I interviewed (e.g., Elijah and 
Abraham), the majority of farmers instead relied on futures markets to inform their price 
expectations. Taken together with the body of agricultural economics research, the findings 
suggest that price continues to play a critical role in farmers’ decision-making.   
Beyond its influence in decision-making, price has been touted as a supply chain 
coordination mechanism (Sahin & Robinson, 2002) because it allows buyers and suppliers to 
adjust their activities independently —a process Williamson (1991) referred to as “autonomous 
adaptation” (p.278). For example, suppliers often use price discounts as a “means to induce the 
buyer to shift to a different order size.” (Rubin & Benton, 2003 p.174) to align buyers’ purchasing 
behaviors with their own production and replenishment activities. Price thus acts as a conduit 
though which supply chain actors can exchange information indirectly (Shamir, 2013).  The 
findings suggest that this coordinating role of price is particularly important in the farm echelon 
because farmers prefer to operate independently and typically do not have access to information 
about downstream markets.  
Practical Implications  
Acknowledging the distinct needs of small and midsize family farms can help to ensure 
that relevant information is utilized in operations decisions and lessen farmers’ reliance on market-
level information from the futures market. The findings suggest that farmers have less time and 
resources to devote to decisions, especially with regards to acquiring information. While the 
amount of available time to make decisions cannot be increased given resource constraints, the 
search productivity and the types of information farmers use could be improved. For example, 
many downstream firms have their own internal price indices and forecasts; supply chain managers 
could share these with farmers. Such partner-level information is more complete than the aggregate 
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supply and demand information conveyed by futures prices, so farmers can better gauge local 
market conditions. Further, the information is in a familiar format (price), which allows farmers to 
use the information efficiently. Of course, supply chain managers are not necessarily incentivized 
to share such information with farmers given tight margins in the industry, and the field interviews 
revealed that farmers do not always trust the information buyers do share. One of the directions 
that supply chain managers can take to encourage use of such information lies in working with 
fellow farmers and local communities so that the action is visible to others and can serve as a 
normative signal.  Indeed, the findings suggest that farmers are motivated by a sense of greater 
purpose and are thus more responsive to informal, normative pressures from family, society, and 
local communities.  
For exchange executives and policymakers, this study corroborates the continued 
significance of government agencies and futures markets in agriculture. The field interviews 
revealed that farmers continue to use low-cost, publicly available information from futures markets 
to inform their supply chain operations decisions but do not directly use information from the 
USDA or NASS. Farmers may, however, use information from government agencies indirectly 
given that this information is quickly reflected in futures prices (e.g., Garcia et al., 1997). 
Nonetheless, this finding suggests the need for a potential reevaluation of the types – and format 
– of information provided by government agencies. The provision of information should be 
examined in light of the consequences for farmers’ profitability and overall welfare, as well as the 
implications for the rest of the supply chain. 
Since the impetus of agricultural policy in 1933, the government has played a significant 
role in agriculture. The proponents of the continuation of agricultural policy have often used the 
“way of life” argument, asserting that there is something special about farming that must be 
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preserved and protected (Blank, 2002). Promoting an idea or mythology of traditional agrarian 
values without acknowledging the competing pressures farmers face from buyers, family 
members, non-governmental organizations, and consumers may unintentionally preserve this 
“way of life” and discourage farmers from responding to other – perhaps more “economic” – 
pressures. As illustrated in Theme 1, farmers pursue a variety of aims that include economic and 
non-economic objectives. Thus, policies aimed at protecting agriculture as a “way of life” should 
be informed by understanding of farmers’ diverse objectives as well as the other institutional 
spheres in which they operate.   
Limitations and Future Research   
 
The middle-range, interpretive approach I used emphasizes the particulars of the farm 
echelon, which is both a strength and a limitation of this research. The advantage is in-depth 
understanding and appreciation of particular factors influencing farmers’ decision-making, but the 
disadvantage is lower generalizability to other contexts (Craighead et al., 2016). The framework 
developed in this study provides mechanisms to understand other domains that are also 
characterized by significant involvement from institutions, and future research could leverage this 
to investigate other empirical contexts and identify the particular institutions at play. For example, 
future research could investigate other raw materials industries, such as mining, energy, and 
forestry, to determine if institutional influences differ despite the fact that they occupy the same 
echelon of the supply chain. Indeed, Bhakoo and Choi (2013) found that institutional involvement 
is more prevalent in upstream echelons due to “the government’s perception of upstream players 
as a bottleneck” (p. 445). 
Additionally, by focusing on the farm echelon, this study demonstrates how characteristics 
differentiating SMEs and family businesses influence decision-making. To build on this, future 
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research could focus on other echelons that are also characterized by a high prevalence of family 
businesses and/or SMEs. For example, future research could focus on the motor carrier industry 
because truck drivers continue to be a challenge in the implementation and performance of logistics 
operations and strategies (e.g., Miller et al., 2017). Indeed, given the dichotomy of individual 
owner-operators and large carriers, the motor carrier industry would be a lucid context to 
understand the effects of SME and/or family business factors. In particular, it would be interesting 
for future research to examine which factors influence truck drivers’ perceptions and 
predispositions to engage with shippers. 
With regards to methods, an interpretive approach was suitable given the assumptions and 
purposes of this study, but there are a number of other methods that could be leveraged in future 
research to further investigate the farm echelon. For example, one limitation of the interpretive 
approach is the focus on a single individual (i.e., the farmer), so future studies could use case study 
analysis (e.g., Narasimhan, 2014; Touboulic et al., 2014) to capture the perspective of managers 
in farm-facing roles in downstream firms. Future research could also use design science 
approaches (Holmström et al., 2009) to understand why the farm continues to be a challenge for 
more “traditional” or relational approaches to exchange and develop solutions. Further, the 
existential-phenomenological and ethnographic interview techniques employed in this study are 
not longitudinal, so future research could also spend more time with farmers across decision 
periods to understand how decision-making processes change and if the influence of SME, family 
business, and institutional factors varies over time. In a similar vein, future research could also 
leverage secondary data to connect farmers’ operations decisions with farm-level profitability and 
overall supply chain performance.  
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Lastly, this study focuses on operations decisions as the “dependent variables” of interest, 
but there are a number of other farm-level decisions that have important consequences for the rest 
of the supply chain. For example, future research could examine farmers’ decision-making 
processes related to risk management (e.g., Talluri et al., 2013), environmental and social 
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Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
 
The researcher first explained the general purpose of the study and provided the farmer 
with an assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. The researcher then requested to record the 
interview and informed the farmer that the recording could be stopped at any point during the 
interview.  
The researcher began the interview with a “grand tour” question – “if you were to write a 
book about your life, how many chapters would there be?” – to obtain general background 
information about the farmer (e.g., education, family history), as well as information about his or 
her farm (e.g., primary crops, size, time in operation). The researcher then shifted to the topic of 
supply chain decision-making by asking the farmers: “when you think about supply chain 
management, what comes to mind?” In line with previous research (e.g., Thompson & Haytko, 
1997), this opening question was intentionally general to begin the interview in a nondirective and 
unobtrusive manner (McCracken, 1988) and ensure open conversation.  
The dialogue that followed covered a variety of topics, ranging from technical discussions 
about planting, irrigation, and pest management to emotional discussions about challenging 
experiences with downstream buyers. Throughout the interview, the researcher asked follow-up 
questions (e.g., “could you tell me more?”; “could you elaborate on that?”) and encouraged the 
farmer to provide specific examples and lived experiences (e.g., Thompson & Haytko, 1997).  We 
provide example questions below but note that the progression of the interview was set largely by 
the farmer; this facilitates understanding because it allows the farmer to articulate the factors 
relevant to decision-making.   
1. What is your role on the farm? How long have you been in your current role? 
2. What is the primary crop grown on your farm? How long has the farm been in operation? 
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3. Within your role, what do you perceive as the most important decisions?  
4. What is your goal when you’re making those decisions?  
5. What information do you use to help you make those decisions? Where do you find that 
information?  
6. When issues arise in decision-making, what happens?  
7. How do you decide what to produce?  
8. How do you decide when to sell?  
9. Could you provide an example of a recent decision you made and how you came to that 











Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) constitute a significant proportion of the 
competitive landscape. According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2016), firms with fewer than 500 
employees and fewer than 20 employees account for 99.7% and 89.0%, respectively, of all firms 
in the United States. SMEs play a particularly dominant role in industry sectors, such as agriculture 
and trucking, that continue to pose a challenge to traditional supply chain management practices 
(e.g., Martinez et al., 2011; Marucheck et al., 2011; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2015). In 
agriculture, for example, small and midsize farms make up 95.8% of farms in the United States 
and account for 45% of total farm production (Hoppe et al., 2016). Further, in trucking, small and 
midsize carriers account for 98% of carriers, with the vast majority operating fewer than six trucks 
(Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, 2016). The ubiquity and economic 
significance of SMEs suggest that they play a critical role in the supply chain.   
Recent research, however, suggests that SMEs behave differently from their larger 
counterparts in several important ways that influence their approach to supply chain management 
(Kull et al., 2018; Maloni et al., 2017). For example, the majority of SMEs are family-owned 
businesses (La Porta et al., 1999), which tend to have more diverse objectives that include financial 
and non-financial goals (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). As a consequence, SMEs also tend to 
approach interfirm exchange relationships differently (Smith et al., 2014) and take a more passive 
role (Kull et al., 2018). While issues related to power imbalances can create higher transaction 
costs for SMEs (Arend & Wisner, 2005), contractual arrangements and strategic partnerships are 
often perceived as a threat to their independence (Roessl, 2005). Instead, interfirm exchange tends 
to be more transactional as SMEs interact with buyers in spot markets, which are local markets 
where prices are negotiated “on the spot” (e.g., Boyabath et al., 2011). In agriculture, for example, 
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the use of contracting has declined, particularly over the last decade, and spot market transactions 
now account for approximately 65% of the total value of commodity production (MacDonald, 
2015).  
Because spot markets allow buyers and suppliers to adjust prices based on current market 
conditions, research has demonstrated the informational and performance benefits they provide for 
supply chain operations and planning (e.g., Mendelson & Tunca, 2007; Seifert et al., 2004). 
Despite these benefits, however, spot markets are characterized by greater volatility, which 
exposes buyers and suppliers to significant price uncertainty (Seifert et al., 2004). This is 
particularly the case for SMEs, who face scale constraints related to resources and investments in 
information acquisition and processing (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010; Mesquita & Lazzarini, 2008). 
Thus, a key challenge for SMEs is predicting spot market prices in order to plan and execute supply 
chain operations decisions, such as when and how much to sell versus store.  
While extant research has illustrated the primary benefits of spot markets and provided 
important insights on their proper utilization in supply chain operations, less is understood about 
the factors that influence spot market prices and how they evolve over time. Given that spot market 
prices are private and costly for those outside of the transaction to acquire, actors often rely on 
other sources of information to predict spot market prices. One low-cost, publicly available source 
of information is the futures market, which is a centralized marketplace wherein prices are 
determined through the interactions of buyers and sellers (CME Group, 2019). Futures prices are 
updated and disseminated in real-time and convey important information to market actors about 
macro-level supply and demand fundamentals (e.g., Adjemian et al., 2013; Garbade &Silber, 
1983). For example, a futures price increase implies a decrease in aggregate supply, an increase in 
aggregate demand, or a combination of the two whereas a futures price decrease implies the 
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opposite. This information is then used by market actors as a benchmark for local supply and 
demand as they negotiate prices in local spot markets. Accordingly, this study aims to shed light 
on the factors driving spot market prices and how they evolve over time by investigating two 
research questions:  
(1) How do current and lagged changes in futures prices affect subsequent changes in spot 
market prices?  
(2) How does the difference between the futures price and spot market price – a phenomenon 
known in practice as the basis – affect subsequent changes in spot market prices?  
Drawing on transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1981; 1991) and Austrian economic 
theory (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1963), I develop hypotheses that examine how buyers and suppliers 
use information conveyed by price changes to coordinate their activities in the spot market. 
Leveraging futures market data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and proprietary spot 
market transaction data provided by a market intelligence and advisory firm, I fit a series of time 
series regression models (Enders, 2015) to test the hypotheses.  The hypotheses are tested in the 
agriculture industry, which is a suitable context for a number of reasons. First, the majority of 
extant research on spot markets has been in the business-to-business (B2B) context and focused 
on industrial goods such as memory chips, steel, and chemicals (e.g., Seifert et al., 2004; Zhao et 
al., 2015). In agriculture, the spot market accounts for a significantly greater proportion of 
interfirm exchange – approximately 65% (MacDonald, 2015) – as compared to industrial 
procurement, which ranges from 5% of volume in chemicals and steel to almost 30% in memory 
chips (Seifert et al., 2004). Second, in contrast to the large, non-family firms involved in 
“traditional” B2B spot markets, small and midsize family farms represent 95.8% of farms in the 
United States and account for 45% of total farm production (Hoppe et al., 2016). Extant research 
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suggests that firms of different sizes may behave differently in the spot market due to the costs 
associated with discovering price (Scott, 2018; Stigler, 1961). Family farms – and SMEs more 
generally – have limited time and resources (Kull et al., 2018; Maloni et al., 2017), and the costs 
of seeking private information often outweigh the potential benefits. I thus expect that 
idiosyncrasies related to both the prevalence of spot market transactions and nature of buyers and 
suppliers involved in the agriculture industry may result in different dynamics and allow me to 
contribute new insights.  
Overall, the findings support the hypotheses and offer important insights for both research 
and practice. For research, this study sheds light on the factors that drive spot market prices over 
time and also extends the body of knowledge on how futures markets shape supply chain 
operations and planning to include their effect on spot markets. More broadly, this study illustrates 
the role of price as a coordination mechanism (Williamson, 1991). In doing so, I contribute to the 
literature on buyer-supplier exchange, which has focused more extensively on the hybrid and 
hierarchy forms of governance given the extant focus on large firms’ approach to supply chain 
management (Kull et al., 2018). For practice, this research provides empirical insights that can be 
used by both buyers and suppliers to more effectively use futures market and spot market 
information in their supply chain operations and planning. Lastly, for policymakers, the findings 
offer timely policy guidance for the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture.  
The structure of the remainder of this study is as follows: The relevant literature is reviewed 
in the next section, and the contributions of this study are highlighted. In the subsequent section, 
transaction cost economics and Austrian economic theory are introduced and applied to develop 
the hypotheses. The empirical context, proprietary data set, and preliminary analysis are then 
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described followed by the model specification and results in the penultimate section. Lastly, the 
implications for theory, supply chain practice, and public policy are discussed, as well as the 
limitations and directions for future research. 
Literature Review 
Role of SME and Family Business Factors in Supply Chain Operations  
 Recent studies suggest that SMEs differ from large firms, which have been the primary 
focus of extant research, in several ways that influence their approach to supply chain management 
(Gray et al., 2017; Kull et al., 2018). First, many SMEs are family-owned businesses (LaPorta et 
al., 1999), which tend to be “more long-term oriented, fiscally conservative, and risk-averse” 
(Maloni et al., 2017 p.124). As a consequence, non-financial goals such as family legacy 
(Astrachan, 2010), long-term sustainability (Tongarlak et al., 2017), and socioeconomic wealth 
(Gomez-Meija et al., 2007) are often emphasized more than financial goals. These “idiosyncratic 
performance metrics and goals” (Astrachan, 2010 p.10), in turn, affect how SMEs approach 
interfirm exchange (Smith et al., 2014). Research suggests that SMEs’ long-term orientation and 
social capital can result in closer ties with suppliers and customers (Dyer Jr. &Whetten, 2006; 
Lester &Canella, 2006; Zahra, 2010), but it is often complicated by their risk-averse, conservative 
nature (George et al., 2005; Memilli et al., 2011). For example, to preserve their independence and 
minimize the risks associated with loss of control, SMEs often avoid interfirm integration (Roessl, 
2005).  
 Second, SMEs also differ from their larger counterparts in terms of resources and 
capabilities (Done et al., 2011; Harland et al., 2007; Kull et al., 2018). On the one hand, research 
suggests that SMEs may have unique resources and capabilities due to the cohesive nature of 
intrafirm relationships (Habbershon & Williams, 1999). For example, SMEs have greater 
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discretion to quickly make decisions and capitalize on opportunities (Carney, 2005) and are 
generally more responsive (Allio, 2004) than large non-family firms. On the other hand, previous 
literature also suggests that SMEs have more limited time and resources and are often at a 
disadvantage in accessing external financing, technical assets, and professional management (Kull 
et al., 2018). For example, SMEs have less time, capital, and personnel to devote to information 
acquisition and processing capabilities (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Freeman et al., 1983), so they 
often make decisions with incomplete information. These information asymmetries can lead to 
inventory management issues and other operational inefficiencies (Cheung et al., 2011), which 
have significant implications for SMEs’ profitability and long-term viability.   
I contribute to the nascent literature on SMEs’ approach to supply chain management by 
exploring if SMEs incorporate information conveyed by futures price changes into subsequent spot 
market transactions. SMEs in several critical industries, such as bulk ocean shipping (Stopford, 
2009), trucking (Belzer, 2000), and agriculture (MacDonald, 2015), conduct a large share of their 
business through exchanges in local spot markets due to both the size of the transactions and their 
risk-averse nature. However, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding whether or not SMEs, 
due to resource constraints, will use the information conveyed by futures price changes to inform 
their negotiations in local spot markets as predicted by Austrian economic theory (Hayek, 1945).     
Role of Spot Markets in Supply Chain Operations  
 Spot markets are real-time often regional markets where goods and services are purchased 
on the spot, which allows buyers and suppliers to adjust prices based on current information 
(Boyabath et al., 2011; Scott, 2018). Because of the prevalence of spot markets in practice, a 
growing body of research has explored their effects on supply chain operations and planning (e.g., 
see Haksöz & Seshadri, 2007 for a review). Research in this stream has focused primarily on the 
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informational and performance benefits of using spot markets to manage procurement and improve 
the design of supply chain contracts (e.g., Mendelson & Tunca, 2007; Seifert et al., 2004). For 
example, a number of studies have modeled the optimal balance between contracts and spot market 
transactions (e.g., Seifert et al., 2004; Boyabath et al., 2011) and have demonstrated how spot 
markets can be used to reduce procurement costs. Building on this, previous studies have also 
modeled the conditions under which information from the spot market can be used to develop and 
improve supply chain contracts (e.g., Cachon, 2003). For example, Mendelson and Tunca (2007) 
demonstrated how spot markets can be used to improve fixed-price contracts and, ultimately, 
supply chain performance. In a similar vein, Zhao et al. (2015) found that incorporating 
information from spot markets can improve the design of supply chain contracts—like through the 
use of renegotiation options that are contingent on movements in spot market prices (e.g., Feng et 
al., 2013). 
Despite the fact that spot markets have long been used in agriculture, extant research has 
focused heavily on Internet-based marketplaces for the procurement of intermediate goods in B2B 
contexts (e.g., Grey et al., 2005; Kleindorfer & Wu, 2003).7 I thus extend this body of knowledge 
by focusing explicitly on spot markets in the agriculture industry, which are different from the spot 
markets examined in previous studies in three important ways. First, as discussed previously, the 
farm sector is overwhelmingly comprised of family farms with 99% of farms being classified as 
family farms and accounting for 89% of farm production in the United States (Hoppe et al., 2016). 
The spot market thus accounts for a significantly greater proportion (approximately 65%) of buyer-
 
7An important exception is Boyabath et al. (2011), which focuses on the beef cattle industry. This study differs from 
Boyabath et al. (2011) in two important ways. First, Boyabath et al. (2011) focuses on the optimal mix of spot market 
transactions and contracting rather than the factors driving spot market prices. Second, extant research has shown that 
the poultry and livestock supply chains are characterized by significantly greater vertical integration and contracting 
than other agricultural products (MacDonald, 2015; Pullman & Dillard, 2010).   
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supplier exchange in agriculture (MacDonald, 2015) as compared to chemicals and steel 
(approximately 5%) (Seifert et al., 2004), memory chips (30%) (Seifert et al., 2004), and truckload 
freight (approximately 10%) (Caplice, 2007) that are characterized by larger non-family firms. 
Consequently, examining behavior in a context where most transactions take place in the spot 
market is warranted. Moreover, for practice, understanding how spot markets operate in various 
contexts is important for managers to identify the products and services for which spot markets 
can be used profitably in supply chain operations.  
Second, spot markets in agriculture are characterized by greater volatility (Geman & 
Nguyen, 2005), but, unlike Internet-based spot markets that have been the focus of extant research, 
spot market prices in agriculture are typically private and not publicly available in real time. 
Instead, actors often rely on other sources of information, such as futures prices, to gauge spot 
market prices (Sandor, 2012). This is particularly the case for small and midsize family farms, who 
are more limited in the time and resources they can devote to information acquisition and 
processing (e.g., Freeman et al., 1983). Third, in contrast to spot markets for industrial goods 
(Seifert et al., 2004) and truckload service (Scott, 2018), the spot market in agriculture does not 
always command a premium for added flexibility. Spot market prices can be above or below 
futures prices; the difference between the two is known in industry as the basis, which is also used 
by actors to gauge spot market prices (CME Group, 2019). In combination, the private nature of 
spot market prices and the subsequent use of other sources of information suggest that spot market 
prices may be endogenous. This is in contrast to previous studies that have modeled spot market 
prices as exogenous factors or stochastic processes (Mendelson & Tunca, 2007). Accordingly, by 
focusing on the agriculture industry and identifying the factors that influence spot market prices 
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and how they evolve over time, I also contribute empirical evidence to a body of research that has 
been largely analytical.  
Role of Futures Markets in Supply Chain Operations   
 Due to the private nature of spot market transactions and the costs associated with acquiring 
private information (Stigler, 1961), actors rely on other sources to inform their price negotiations 
in the spot market. One low-cost, publicly available source of information is the futures market, 
which provides a medium for price discovery and allows market actors to cost effectively 
determine the value of a commodity (Sandor, 2012). While there are a number of studies that 
examine the role of futures markets in supply chain operations, the focus has largely been the 
hedging function of futures markets, which is a strategy wherein futures contracts are used to 
reduce the risk of adverse price movements (e.g., Brusset & Bertrand, 2018; Gaur & Seshadri, 
2005; Kouvelis et al., 2018; Wang et al., 2015; Weiss & Maher, 2009; Zsidisin et al., 2016). For 
example, in agriculture, futures contracts are used by farmers and buyers, such as merchandisers, 
processors, and manufacturers, to “lock in” a particular price in the future (Zsidisin et al., 2016). 
Similarly, in transportation, shippers and carriers use the Baltic Dry Index (Hampstead, 2018a) 
and now Trucking Freight Futures (Hampstead, 2019) to hedge against price volatility.  
 In addition to risk management, futures markets play an important price discovery and 
informational role (Garbade & Silber, 1983). A futures contract is a financial derivative, so its 
value is, by definition, directly tied to the underlying asset (CME Group, 2019). Futures prices 
thus convey important information to market actors about macro-level supply and demand 
fundamentals. For example, previous studies have demonstrated how information from futures 
markets can be used to design flexible contracts and reduce commodity price volatility across 
echelons of the supply chain (Feng et al., 2013; Goel & Tanrisever, 2017; Li et al., 2018). Overall, 
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these studies have illustrated the important informational role that futures markets play in the 
development of contracts.  
While these studies have demonstrated how futures markets affect supply chain operations 
in terms of risk management and contracting, their effect on spot market transactions has not been 
explicitly considered. This is an unfortunate omission because spot market prices are the primary 
mechanism coordinating the activities of farmers and buyers but are not available to those outside 
of the transaction. To overcome this information gap, small and midsized family farms instead rely 
extensively on futures prices as a benchmark for negotiating prices in local spot markets. 
Accordingly, examining how futures prices influence spot market prices over time is important for 
practice and also expands understanding of the effect of futures markets on supply chain 
operations.  
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
 Coordination – particularly the matching of supply and demand – is foundational to 
effective supply chain management (Esper et al., 2010; Fugate et al., 2006; Mentzer et al., 2001). 
To facilitate coordination, extant research has proposed various mechanisms, such as contracts 
(Sluis & Giovanni, 2016), collaboration (e.g., Cao & Zhang, 2011), trust (Narayanan et al., 2015), 
relationship-specific investments (e.g., Handley & Benton, 2012), and even supply chain 
integration (Flynn et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2011). While these hybrid and hierarchy forms of 
governance are efficacious for “traditional” buyer-supplier exchange, they are not used as 
extensively in the agricultural supply chain – particularly upstream echelons (Jones et al., 2007). 
Buyer-supplier exchange in this context is characterized by minimal information-sharing, trust, 
and collaboration (Pullman & Dillard, 2010). Small and midsized family firms often view 
contractual arrangements and strategic partnerships as a threat to their sense of autonomy (Roessl, 
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2005). Instead, the market mechanism – specifically the spot market – is often used to govern 
transactions and coordinate the activities of buyers and suppliers. The market mechanism is what 
Williamson (1991) referred to as “autonomous adaptation” (p.278), which allows individual 
buyers and suppliers to adjust their behavior independently in response to price changes.  
To understand how the market coordinates the activities of buyers and suppliers, we, like 
Williamson (1991), draw on Austrian economic theory (Hayek, 1937; 1945; Kirzner, 1963; Mises, 
1949), which emphasizes the “market process” (Jacobson, 1992) and the informational role of 
prices.  Underlying Austrian economic theory is the assumption that information is dispersed 
among many actors, and each actor possesses imperfect and incomplete knowledge (Hayek, 1945). 
The market thus acts as “an information processing system” (Bowles et al., 2017 p.215), and prices 
are the mechanism through which information is communicated to market participants (Hayek, 
1945). As prices change, additional information is conveyed, and actors “adjust their activities to 
changes of which they may never know more than is reflected in the price movement” (Hayek, 
1945 p. 527). The adjustment process results in further price changes as actors continue to adapt 
and respond to changing market conditions (Kirzner, 1997).  It is this dynamic and continuous 
adjustment that is central to the theory of the market process and, thus, the focus of my theorizing. 
According to Austrian economic theory, prices are what guide market participants toward 
“decisions that tend to consider implicitly all the relevant conditions prevailing in the market” 
(Kirzner, 1963 p.39). As it relates to the present study, spot market prices are the primary 
mechanism coordinating supply and demand, and actors use spot market prices to make operations 
decisions. However, unlike many online spot markets in B2B contexts (e.g., Seifert et al., 2004), 
spot market transactions in agriculture tend to be private bilateral arrangements (i.e., between a 
single buyer and a single farmer), so it is costly for those outside of the transaction to access price 
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information in real time (Scott, 2018). To overcome this private information gap, actors instead 
rely on futures prices, which are low cost, publicly available, and convey real-time information 
about the current state of the global market (CME Group, 2019).  
Just as stock prices summarize many pieces of information about the performance of a 
company, futures prices summarize macro-level supply and demand fundamentals. For example, 
an increase in the futures price implies a decrease in supply and/or an increase in demand whereas 
a decrease in the futures price implies an increase in supply and/or a decrease in demand. Austrian 
economic theory thus predicts that actors will use the information conveyed by futures price 
changes and adjust their actions in the spot market accordingly (Kirzner, 1963). This is in line with 
the “law of one price” (e.g., Protopapadakis & Stoll, 1983), which suggests that futures price 
movements and spot market price movements should be positively correlated because they exist 
as a “common market” (Garbade & Silber, 1983; Stigler & Sherwin, 1985). Accordingly, I posit 
that actors will incorporate the information conveyed by futures price changes as they negotiate 
prices in the spot market. Stated formally:   
Hypothesis 1: Contemporaneous changes in futures prices will positively affect changes in 
spot market prices.  
While Austrian economic theory predicts that price changes will result in some immediate 
adjustment from market actors, it also suggests that there is always a “degree of ignorance” in the 
marketplace that prevents complete adjustment (Kirzner, 1973; 1979). As boundedly rational 
individuals (Simon, 1978), actors face limitations in their ability to process and incorporate the 
information conveyed by futures price changes. Actors make the best decision they can with the 
information available at the time, but the processing of that information is subject to delays 
(Arimault et al., 2006). This is particularly the case for small and midsize family farms, who have 
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limited time, resources, and personnel to devote to information acquisition and processing. I thus 
posit that futures price changes will also exhibit lagged effects.  
Moreover, Austrian economic theory suggests that knowledge is constantly changing, 
which keeps the market in perpetual motion (Jacobson, 1992).  The dynamic nature of the market 
poses additional challenges for actors to process and incorporate the information conveyed by 
price changes (Hayek, 1945). Indeed, futures markets have exhibited unprecedented volatility in 
the past decade (e.g., Pellegrino et al., 2018), which makes inferring information about underlying 
supply and demand fundamentals from price changes even more challenging. The increased 
volatility is often attributed to the financialization of commodity futures markets (e.g., Bekiros et 
al., 2017), which is characterized by an increase in trading activity from institutional investors, 
index funds, and speculators. While the financialization hypothesis has largely been debunked 
(e.g., Garcia et al., 2015; Irwin et al., 2011), actors may nonetheless attribute futures price changes 
to factors unrelated to supply and demand. Actors will thus wait to see if the changes persist 
(Leibtag et al., 2007) before incorporating this information as they negotiate in the spot market. 
As such, I posit that futures prices changes will also exhibit lagged effects on spot market prices. 
Stated formally:     
Hypothesis 2: Lagged changes in futures prices will positively affect changes in spot market 
prices. 
In addition to information about supply and demand, Austrian economic theory suggests 
that there is an equally important body of knowledge regarding particular circumstances of time 
and place, such as information related to people, local conditions, and special circumstances 
(Hayek, 1945). This information, too, is dispersed among many actors and is conveyed as actors 
transact in the marketplace. Thus, the “relevant knowledge” that market actors have at their 
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disposal is not limited to futures price changes but also includes information about local market 
conditions (Kirman et al., 2005). In practice, the difference between the futures price and spot 
market price is used to determine the value of the commodity at the local level (Chicago Board of 
Trade, 2004). This difference – known in industry as the basis (CME Group, 2019) – is used by 
market actors to determine the best time to buy or sell and when to accept an offer or bid (Chicago 
Board of Trade, 2004). A positive basis (i.e., when the spot market price is greater than the futures 
price) implies limited supply or greater demand in local markets relative to the macro-market, 
which encourages sellers to accept bids rather than store the commodity. In contrast, a negative 
basis (i.e., when the spot market price is less than the futures price) implies oversupply or limited 
demand in local markets. In this sense, the basis “localizes” the futures prices and reveals 
additional information about the current state of the local market relative to the macro-market 
(Hayek, 1945).   
As long as there is a difference between futures prices and spot market prices, I posit that 
there will be subsequent revisions to correct for this difference (Kirzner, 1963). Indeed, “would-
be buyers and sellers who were disappointed in their past activity – or who, even if not disappointed 
in the past, do not wish to be disappointed in the future – must revise their bids or offers to make 
them more attractive to the current market” (Kirzner, 1963 p.28). For example, if the local spot 
market price is higher than the futures price, this suggests that supply and demand fundamentals 
in the macro-market are not necessarily there to support higher prices. This difference will then 
lead to a downward revision in the spot market price in the subsequent period as buyers try to 
negotiate lower prices. Conversely, if the local spot market price is lower than the futures price, 
farmers are likely to hold out and demand higher prices from buyers, which will lead to an upward 
revision in the spot market price in the subsequent period. I thus posit that differences in the 
84 
 
immediate past (where the difference is equal to the spot market price less the futures price) will 
negatively affect current spot market transactions. Stated formally:  
Hypothesis 3: Differences between spot market prices and futures prices in the immediate 
past will negatively affect changes in spot market prices.  
Methodology 
Empirical Context  
 Within agriculture, he empirical context for this study is the U.S. rice industry, which is 
suitable for a number of reasons. First, in stark contrast to other agricultural commodities in the 
U.S. such as corn and soybeans, there is a distinct lack of publicly available spot market prices and 
information supplied by private analytical firms in the rice industry (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2004; McKenzie & Darby, 2017). In line with my theorizing, futures prices are the 
primary mechanism through which information is communicated to small and midsize family 
farms in the U.S. rice industry. Further, methodologically, this private information gap allows me 
to isolate the effect of futures prices on spot market prices because it is not cofounded by the 
presence of other sources of third-party information typically found in other agricultural market 
settings.  For example, for other grains and oilseeds in the U.S. (e.g., corn, wheat, soybeans), the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (2019) disseminates daily reports with spot market prices and 
contract prices at various locations across the U.S., and Farm Journal, Inc. (2019) also has a free 
tool that farmers can use to see daily spot market bids from various buyers based on their zip code. 
Second, rice is a predominant food staple in many regions of the world and a critical 
component of the diets of more than half of the world’s population (Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2004). As a top five exporter and accounting for approximately ten percent of world 
trade (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2019), the rice industry has a critical role to play in feeding 
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the world’s population, particularly low-income, food-insecure consumers in developing 
economies (U.S. International Trade Commission, 2015). Despite its significance, however, the 
U.S. rice industry has been largely unexamined—likely due to the unavailability of public data. 
As such, focusing on the U.S. rice industry allows me to articulate important implications for 
practitioners and policymakers (Joglekar et al., 2016) and also contribute to the established body 
of economics research on price adjustment (e.g., Fama & French, 1987; Garcia & Leuthold, 2004; 
Garcia et al., 1988; Reeve & Vigfusson, 2011). Third, the physical requirements for growing rice 
are limited to particular areas of the U.S. due to availability of water, soil type, and the need for 
high average temperatures during the growing season (Childs, 2001). The high geographical 
concentration of rice production helps to alleviate concerns related to delays in adjustment 
(Hypothesis 2) or differences in futures prices and spot market prices (Hypothesis 3) being due to 
transportation factors. Lastly, focusing on a single industry helps to ensure internal validity and 
allows me to explore specialized variables that may not be accessible in interindustry studies 
(Joglekar et al., 2016).  
Data and Measures 
A futures contract is “a legally binding agreement to buy or sell a commodity or financial 
instrument at a later date” (CME Group, 2008). Each contract specifies the quality and quantity of 
the underlying asset, as well as the physical delivery time and location (CME Group, 2008). For 
example, the underlying commodity for the rice futures contract is long-grain rough rice, the 
quantity is 2,000 hundredweights (100 tons), and the quality is U.S. No. 2 or better with a milling 
yield of at least 65% (CME Group, 2008). The contract specifications related to the underlying 
asset are standardized, so every futures contract is instead referred to by its delivery month and 
year. Rice futures contracts are available for January, March, May, July, September, and 
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November and can be traded up to fifteen months in advance. For example, in April 2019, the rice 
futures contracts for May 2019, July 2019, September 2019, November 2019, January 2020, March 
2020, and May 2020 were being traded. However, the liquidity of futures contracts that are further 
into the future is significantly less than the liquidity of nearby futures contracts. Extant research 
has shown the nearest-to-maturity contract reflect the most current (at the time of retrieval) set of 
information and generally has the highest ratio of volume to open interest (e.g., Thomson Reuters, 
2010; Bekiros et al., 2017), which is important for reliability.  
 Daily futures prices for the nearest-to-maturity rice futures contract were obtained from 
Quandl’s Chicago Mercantile Exchange futures database and validated with data provided by the 
Registrar’s Office at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. To create a continuous price series, I used 
the Type 0 roll method (Thomson Reuters, 2010)8, which uses the futures price for the nearest-to-
maturity contract until the first business day of the contract month. At this point, the futures price 
“rolls over” to the next contract month. For example, the futures price for the week ending on 
February 6, 2004 was calculated based on the March 2004 futures contract, which was the nearest-
to-maturity contract. Settlement prices are available each day at the end of trading9, and the weekly 
futures price was calculated by averaging across the five trading days (February 2-6) in that week. 
The subsequent weeks in February 2004 ending on February 13, 20, and 27 respectively were also 
based on the March 2004 contract and calculated in the same manner. The first business day of the 
contract month (March) was March 1, 2004, so the futures price was “rolled over” to the May 2004 
 
8While the first business day of the contract month is the most intuitive and traditionally used (e.g., Bekiros et al., 
2017), trading often continues to occur during the time between the first business day of the contract month and the 
contract’s expiry date, and futures prices are still disseminated. Thus, as a robustness check, the futures price series 
was calculated based on the Type 1 roll method (Thomson Reuters, 2010), which is detailed in Appendix A. There 
were no substantive differences in the results when using the Type 1 roll method.  
9 Some daily futures price observations were missing due to bank holidays, but the number of missing values was less 




contract on this date. For the week ending on March 5, 2004, the futures price was calculated by 
averaging the settlement price for the May 2004 futures contract, which is now the nearest-to-
maturity contract, across the five trading days (March 1-5) in that week.  
As discussed previously, there is no comparable spot market price available publicly for 
rice, which is in stark contrast to other agricultural commodities. To overcome this, I obtained 
proprietary spot market transaction data from Firstgrain, Inc., a widely respected market 
intelligence and advisory firm in the U.S. rice industry. The data are weekly and calculated based 
on a weighted average of spot market transactions in each of the respective locations. The spot 
market price represents the price paid for rice that meets the quantity and quality standards 
equivalent to those established in the futures contract; I am limited in the amount of detail I can 
disclose about these data due to confidentiality agreements.  
 For the purposes of this study, I focus on the Arkansas spot market location for three 
important reasons. First, the underlying commodity for the rice futures contract is 2,000 
hundredweights of long-grain rough rice, and the majority (approximately 57%) of long-grain rice 
produced in the U.S. is in Arkansas (Economic Research Service, 2019). Second, the locations 
declared regular for delivery on the Chicago Board of Trade are all located in Arkansas (See 
Deliverable Commodities Under Registration report issued by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
for a list). Thus, futures prices should, in theory, be the most informative for spot market prices in 
Arkansas as compared to other locations. This also allows me to control for the effect of 
transportation costs. Third, in line with my theorizing and research purpose, 96% of the 2,500 rice 
farms located in Arkansas are family-owned (USA Rice Federation, 2019). 
 While the futures price series dates back to the 1980s, time series of equal length are 
necessary, so the start date of futures prices is limited to the start date of the proprietary spot market 
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transaction data. The final estimation period is January 9, 2004 to August 29, 2017, which yields 
711 weekly observations in total for each price series. Following common practice when working 
with prices (e.g., Peltzman, 2000), I took the natural logarithm of each series. The futures price is 
denoted as 𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡, and the spot market price is denoted as 𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 . The difference between 
the futures price and spot market price was calculated as: 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 −
𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡. Additionally, to control for the effects of increased financialization in commodity 
futures markets, I included 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡, which measures the proportion of long and short open 
interest positions held by non-commercial traders (i.e., non-hedgers) such as swap dealers, 
managed money accounts, and index funds (U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2019). 
This data is published in the weekly Commitment of Traders report.  
Preliminary Analysis  
 To provide a visual representation of the nature of the data, both prices series are plotted 
in Figure 1. There are a few observations worth noting. First, in early 2008, what came to be known 
as the “global rice crisis” occurred, and the price of rice skyrocketed in international markets 
(Slayton, 2009). The global rice crisis occurred in tandem with the world food price crisis in 2007 
and 2008, but the effects persisted through late 2008 due to various export restrictions and policies 
that were implemented by governments throughout Asia to protect citizens from rising rice prices 
(Slayton, 2009). Second, between 2010 and 2012, spot market prices became increasingly 
decoupled from futures prices; see Figure 2, which graphs the difference between the two series. 
As concerns over this decoupling made its way into regulatory circles, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission increased the fixed storage rate for 
warehouses declared regular for delivery at the end of 2012 (CME Group, 2012). Following the 
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policy change, it appears that the two series were more closely tied in the remainder of the 
estimation period.  
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Figure 2: Difference Between Spot Market Prices and Futures Prices (Spot – Futures) 
Unit Root Tests  
Given the nature of the series illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, the first step is to test for 
stationarity (Enders, 2015). Standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results are reported in Table 
1 and indicate that 𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡are both I(1) processes and 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 is an I(0) 
process. That is, 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 is stationary in the level, and 𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡are non-
stationary in the level but are stationary in first differences. As such, 𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 
were transformed using week-over-week differences. This is also in line with my theorizing, which 















Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(Level) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(First Difference) 
 Test Statistic 1% Critical Value Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 -1.944 -3.439 -31.330** -3.439 
𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 -1.955 -3.439 -15.492** -3.439 
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 -6.091** -3.439 -17.041** -3.439 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
 The descriptive statistics and correlations are summarized in Table 2. In line with economic 
theory (e.g., Stigler & Sherwin, 1985), movements in spot market prices and futures prices are 
positively correlated.  However, the average change in spot market prices is greater than the 
average change in futures prices, and the standard deviation of the change in spot market prices ( 
= 0.043) is also greater than the standard deviation of the change in futures prices ( = 0.037).  The 
difference between the two is statistically significant, which suggests that local spot markets may 
be more volatile than futures markets and hence subject to extreme price realizations.   
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
 Mean Std. Dev. ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 4.56 × 10-4 0.043    
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 4.19 × 10-4 0.032 0.341   
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 -0.070 0.081 0.075 -0.268  
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 0.560 0.123 -0.001 0.038 -0.192 
 
Model Estimation and Results  
 To test the hypotheses, I fit a series of time series regression models. First, to test 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, which posit that futures price changes will exhibit 
contemporaneous and lagged effects on spot market price changes, I use the distributed lag 
approach developed by Almon (1965). The distributed lag approach reduces the number of 
parameters being estimated by imposing a shape on the lag distribution (Almon, 1965). In doing 
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so, the distributed lag approach reduces the effects of multi-collinearity. Based on anecdotal 
evidence regarding the rapid adjustment between spot markets and futures markets (Chicago Board 
of Trade, 2004), I specified a linear distributed lag model that included a contemporaneous effect 
and four lags.10  
I control for previous changes in spot market prices by including ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡−1. Dummy 
variables for each month (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) and year (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) were included to capture seasonality and 
macroeconomic conditions, and 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 was also included to control for increased 
financialization in commodity futures markets. The model to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
was specified as Model (1): 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼2∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼3∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−1
+ 𝛼4∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−2 + 𝛼5∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−3 + 𝛼6∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−4






 + 𝜀𝑡 
 The distributed lag approach (Almon, 1965) constrains 𝛼2 − 𝛼6 to lie on a linear function 
such that:  
𝛼2 =  𝜑0  
𝛼3 =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1  
𝛼4 =  𝜑0 + 2𝜑1 
𝛼5 =  𝜑0 + 3𝜑1 
𝛼6 =  𝜑0 + 4𝜑1 
 
10As a robustness check, various lag distributions (e.g., polynomial specifications) and lag lengths (e.g., two, three, 
and five lags) were also modeled. There were no substantive differences in the results.  
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The results of Model (1) are reported in Table 3. First, as hypothesized in Hypothesis 1, 
the coefficient for contemporaneous futures price changes is positive and statistically significant 
(p < .01). Second, the coefficients for lagged futures price changes are also positive and statistically 
significant for weeks one, two, and three (p < .01), which provides evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2. However, the lagged effect of changes in futures prices becomes non-significant in 
week four, which suggests that the adjustment process takes place during the current period and 
the three weeks that follow. As illustrated in Figure 3, the magnitude of the effect of changes in 
futures prices decays over time with changes in the current period (t) having the greatest effect 
followed by changes in the immediate past (t –1). In addition to examining the intertemporal 
dynamics of the adjustment process, the distributed lag approach also allows me to examine the 
long-run effect of changes in futures prices (Wooldridge, 2009). The sum of the coefficients for 
the changes in futures prices (𝛼2to 𝛼6) is 0.866, which suggests that a one percent change in futures 
prices results in an 0.866 percent change in spot market prices. The implications of this finding 
will be explored further in the discussion. Overall, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are corroborated 




Table 3: Model (1) Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  
Constant 0.011  
(0.012) 














Year Dummies Included 
Month Dummies Included 
Observations (T) 706 
R2 0.469 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are traditional OLS standard errors. 
Diagnostic checks indicated approximately normally distributed residuals 
and no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.01). Two potential outlier 
observations were identified and controlled for using dummy variables.  
 




Figure 3: Distributed Lag Effects of Changes in Futures Prices on Changes in Spot Market 
Prices (95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
To test Hypothesis 3, which posits that the difference between futures prices and spot 
market prices in the immediate past will affect current spot market prices, I added 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 
to Model (1). I also altered Model (1) slightly to include only the contemporaneous effect of 
changes in futures prices (∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡) because 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡−1is a lagged measure and already 
incorporates lagged futures prices. The model to test for Hypothesis 3 was specified as Model (2):  







 + 𝜀𝑡      
The results are reported in Table 4. As hypothesized, the coefficient on the difference 
between futures prices and spot market prices is negative and statistically significant (p < .01), 
which provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. Additionally, the coefficient on 
contemporaneous changes in futures prices is positive and statistically significant (p < .01), which 
provides further evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. The magnitude of the effect (𝛼3 = -0.219) 
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of past differences rivals that of contemporaneous changes in futures prices (𝛼2 = 0.429), which 
suggests that actors use futures prices both as a source of information and a benchmark to gauge 
local market conditions. This finding underscores Austrian economic theory’s emphasis on “local” 
knowledge (Hayek, 1945) and provides empirical evidence of the “localizing” role of basis 
(Chicago Board of Trade, 2004).  
Table 4: Model (2) Regression Results 











Year Dummies Included 
Month Dummies Included 
Observations (Weeks) 709 
R2 0.526 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are traditional OLS standard errors. 
Diagnostic checks indicated approximately normally distributed residuals 
and no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.02). Two potential outlier 
observations were identified and controlled for using dummy variables. 
   
 * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Discussion 
 Given that SMEs and family businesses rely heavily on spot markets to transact with buyers 
but face distinct challenges in predicting spot market prices due to resource constraints, this study 
aimed to understand the factors influencing spot market prices and how they evolve over time. In 
particular, I investigated how (1) futures price changes and (2) the difference between the futures 
price and spot market price affect subsequent spot market price changes. As posited in Hypothesis 
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1, futures price changes convey supply and demand information in real-time, and 
contemporaneous futures price changes were found to positively affect spot market price changes. 
However, due to limitations in actors’ information processing capacities, futures price changes 
also exhibited lagged effects on spot market price changes with the adjustment process taking place 
during the current period and subsequent three weeks, which is in line with Hypothesis 2. Beyond 
the information conveyed by futures price changes, differences between spot market prices and 
futures prices reveal information about the local market and were found to negatively affect spot 
market price changes in subsequent periods, which corroborates Hypothesis 3. Overall, these 
findings illustrate how actors use price information to inform their negotiations in local spot 
markets and, as detailed below, offer important implications for theory, supply chain practice, and 
public policy.  
Implications for Theory and Future Research  
Previous studies have identified a myriad of characteristics that distinguish SMEs and 
family businesses from large non-family firms and called for studies that examine how these 
characteristics influence their approach to supply chain management (Kull et al., 2018; Maloni et 
al., 2017). Of particular relevance to this study is how SMEs’ tendency to be risk-averse and take 
a more passive role shape their approach to buyer-supplier exchange (George et al., 2005; Memilli 
et al., 2011). Instead of the contracts and long-term partnerships often used by large firms (e.g., 
Goffin et al., 2006; Harland et al., 2007), SMEs and family businesses in critical sectors such as 
agriculture tend to rely more heavily on local spot market exchanges. I thus contribute to this 
nascent stream of literature by examining the factors that influence these spot market transactions. 
In particular, I demonstrate how small and midsize family farms use information conveyed by 
futures price changes as they transact with buyers in local spot markets.    
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Because their exchanges with buyers tend to be transactional rather than collaborative, 
SMEs and family businesses face significant information asymmetries, which can lead to 
operational inefficiencies. These information asymmetries are further confounded by the private 
nature of spot market prices and the fact that it is costlier for SMEs and family businesses to acquire 
such private information (Stigler, 1961; Scott, 2018). I thus posited that SMEs and family 
businesses rely instead on publicly available sources of information – specifically the futures 
market – to gauge spot market prices. The analysis found support for this prediction but also 
revealed that actors face limitations in their ability to fully incorporate the information conveyed 
by futures price changes and coordinate their activities accordingly. Moreover, the inherent 
volatility in futures markets makes it challenging for actors to infer information about underlying 
supply and demand fundamentals. There is thus a lag in the adjustment process as actors process 
the information, and the analysis suggests that it takes approximately four weeks for this 
adjustment to occur.  
The focus on the short-run intertemporal dynamics of the price adjustment process also 
allows me to contribute to the literature in economics and finance (e.g., Garbade & Silber, 1983; 
Garcia & Leuthold, 2004; Garcia et al., 1988). Extant studies exploring the relationship between 
futures markets and spot markets have primarily focused on long-run futures market efficiency 
(e.g., Fama, 1970) and the extent to which futures prices accurately forecast spot market prices 
(e.g., Fama & French, 1987; Reeve & Vigfusson, 2011). While these perspectives have important 
implications for exchange executives and policymakers, they tend to overlook the informational 
role of futures prices and the influence that futures markets have on spot market transactions and 
coordination. That is, actors use the information conveyed by futures price changes and adjust their 
activities accordingly regardless of how well futures markets perform relative to these technical 
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standards (Hayek, 1945). Thus, I contribute to this stream of research by adopting a supply chain 
perspective and demonstrating how futures price changes inform spot market transactions between 
suppliers and buyers. Understanding the informational role of futures prices is particularly 
important for the U.S. rice industry, which is characterized by a paucity of alternative sources of 
information and a significant number of small and midsize family farms, who have limited time 
and resources to devote to information acquisition and processing.  
While SMEs and family businesses must often make short-term operations decisions with 
incomplete information, the findings suggest that they also tend to be relatively responsive in 
acting on the information they do have. As detailed in Model (1) results, the sum of the coefficients 
for futures price changes (𝛼2to 𝛼6) was 0.866, which suggests that a one percent change in futures 
prices results in an 0.866 percent change in spot market prices. In agriculture, supply tends to be 
relatively inelastic given the time lag in production between planting and harvest. However, 
farmers generally store large stocks from the previous crop year (known as “old crop”), which 
allows them to respond to price changes throughout the year (e.g., Gunders, 2012). Indeed, a long 
run-effect close to one implies that supply may be relatively elastic, but the fact that it is slightly 
less than one suggests that farmers respond conservatively to price changes.11 One potential 
explanation for the conservatism is that farmers may view futures price changes as having some 
degree of measurement error due to market volatility and financialization (e.g., Cheng & Xiong, 
2014;  Irwin et al., 2011). That is, futures price changes signal important supply and demand 
information but are also subject to noise, so farmers may rationally choose not to respond fully to 
price changes. More broadly, this finding suggests that SMEs and family businesses incorporate 
 
11 A Wald Coefficient Test indicated that the sum of the coefficients 𝛼2to 𝛼6 was statistically significantly different 
from 1 (p < .001).  
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price information in their operations decisions and respond to market dynamics in a similar manner 
to large non-family firms.    
 In addition to the information conveyed by futures prices, I posited that actors also use 
information conveyed by differences between spot market prices and futures prices to gauge local 
market conditions. The analysis found support for this hypothesis, as the difference had an effect 
on subsequent spot market price changes even when controlling for previous spot market price 
changes and contemporaneous futures price changes. This finding underscores Austrian economic 
theory’s emphasis on the importance of information related to particular circumstances of time and 
place (Hayek, 1945) and industry reports that refer to basis as a “local phenomenon” (Chicago 
Board of Trade, 2004). Because the difference between spot market prices and futures prices 
reflects local market conditions, it varies across spot market locations. It would thus be interesting 
for future research to explore if and to what extent this difference has an effect on spot market 
prices in other locations (e.g., Karali et al., 2018) as well as how spot market prices in different 
locations are connected via transportation costs.  
More broadly, this study illustrates the role of the market as a coordination mechanism 
(Williamson, 1991) by exploring how buyers and suppliers use price to inform transactions. This 
is in contrast to extant supply chain research, which has focused extensively on how hybrids and 
hierarchies are used to coordinate the activities of buyers and suppliers (e.g., Hill & Scudder, 2002; 
Sahin & Robinson, 2005; Sluis & Giovanni, 2016). In his seminal piece, Williamson (1991) noted 
that markets are a “marvel” in terms of adaptation (p.279) because they allow actors to respond 
autonomously to changes, whereas hybrids are “arguably the most susceptible” (p.291) to 
disturbances because they require coordinated responses. Ironically, however, the coordinating 
role of prices has received less empirical inquiry in supply chain management given the emphasis 
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on long-term collaborative relationships (e.g., Cao & Zhang, 2011). Further inquiry is needed to 
understand how the market – in its various forms – acts as a coordination mechanism in other 
supply chain echelons and contexts. For example, ocean bulk shipping and truckload freight are 
also characterized by a combination of spot markets and futures markets to coordinate the activities 
of carriers and shippers (e.g., Adland & Alizadeh, 2018).  
Implications for Practice and Public Policy  
 By empirically estimating the relationship between futures prices and spot market prices, 
this study offers important insights for farmers and supply chain managers. Farmers can use these 
insights to forecast spot market prices, which, in turn, can be used to better plan and execute short-
term operations decisions, such as when and how much to sell. This is particularly important for 
small and midsized family farms, who have limited time and resources to devote to acquiring 
additional information and rely heavily on spot markets to transact with buyers. Likewise, supply 
chain managers can also leverage the insights from this study to better plan and execute the timing 
of commodity purchases in local spot markets. For example, this study suggests that it takes 
approximately four weeks for spot market prices to fully adjust to changes in futures prices. Armed 
with this knowledge, supply chain managers can achieve a cost advantage by buying sooner in 
times of increasing prices (i.e., before the futures price increase is fully incorporated) and later in 
times of decreasing prices (i.e., after the futures price decrease is fully incorporated). Holding all 
else constant, a futures price change of $0.50 results in a $0.17, $0.04, and $0.01 change in spot 
market prices in the current period and subsequent two weeks, respectively. During times of rising 
prices, supply chain managers can save $0.05 in the spot market by buying in the current period; 
conversely, during times of decreasing prices, supply chain managers can save $0.05 in the spot 
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market by waiting two weeks to buy.  Given current prices of approximately $10, a $0.05 savings 
translates to a 0.5% cost reduction—a potential $15 million in cost savings.12  
 However, the analysis also revealed that the adjustment of spot market prices to changes 
in futures prices is “incomplete”. One potential explanation for this incomplete adjustment is that 
futures price changes include a market signal and some degree of noise, so actors rationally choose 
not to respond fully to price changes. An alternative explanation, however, is that power 
imbalances in the supply chain may prevent complete adjustment to futures price changes. Buyers 
may be able to dictate prices in local spot markets given their size and concentration relative to 
farmers. Accordingly, the futures market may not be filling the “informational void” facing small 
and midsize family farms. This suggests that there may be an opportunity for third-party 
organizations to profitably provide additional sources of information to U.S. rice farmers and also 
provides guidance for the U.S. Department of Agriculture with regards to the provision of 
information. Currently, the Agricultural Marketing Service provides a national rice summary on a 
weekly basis, which details prices for milled rice and rice byproducts. While informative for 
general trends and sentiments downstream, prices for milled rice and rice byproducts are not as 
informative for transactions between farmers and buyers upstream because they include the costs 
of drying, milling, processing, etc., which are variable and often opaque. The findings suggest that 
the development of a daily report that includes spot market prices for rough rice – similar to that 
provided for corn, soybeans, and wheat – may be warranted to provide transparency and improve 
decision-making in the industry.  
 This study also offers important insights for exchange executives and policymakers. 
Although many futures markets have been around since the late 1800s, there are also a number of 
 
12 Calculations are based on the total output value of United States rice farmers, which is approximately $3 billion. 
(Richardson & Outlaw, 2010).  
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futures markets (e.g., frozen pork belly) that have “failed” due to contract specifications (Garcia 
et al., 2015) and insufficient information to attract speculation and aid in price discovery (Sandor, 
2012). The Chicago Mercantile Exchange and U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission are 
currently reviewing underlying contract specifications and delivery locations for the rough rice 
futures market, as some stakeholders have lobbied for the implementation of a variable storage 
rate and the addition of New Orleans as a delivery location given the rice industry’s reliance on 
export markets. The findings underscore the importance of policies and contract specifications that 
limit the extent to which futures price changes are due to factors other than supply and demand 
fundamentals. Ensuring that the regulatory environment is conducive to the continued functioning 
of the rough rice futures market is particularly important given the prevalence of small and midsize 
family farms who rely on futures prices as their primary source of information in light of the private 
information gap (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004; McKenzie & Darby, 2017).  
 For the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the findings suggest the need for a potential 
reevaluation of the crop insurance and revenue protection policies. Currently, the Risk 
Management Agency uses futures prices as the basis for farmers’ insurance indemnity payments 
(U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2018). While I found that price movements in futures markets 
and spot markets are indeed correlated, which is suggestive of a “common market” (Stigler  & 
Sherwin, 1985), I also found that the two are not perfectly correlated (e.g., see Figure 2). This 
finding suggests that payments based on futures prices may not fully compensate farmers because 
their revenues are based primarily on spot market prices. Understanding how changes in futures 
prices are transmitted to local spot markets can thus help policymakers determine payments that 
are more representative and create revenue protection policies that are localized and more 
appropriate for helping small and midsize family farms manage price risk.    
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
This study has several limitations that provide opportunities for future research. First, the 
empirical context was the U.S. rice industry.  Given the purposes and assumptions of this study, 
focusing on the U.S. rice industry (cf. agriculture industry more generally) was suitable and 
allowed me “to explore specialized variables and operating trade-offs that may not be accessible 
through inter-industry or broader intra-industry studies” (Joglekar et al., 2016 p.1985). However, 
it also limits the generalizability of the findings to other industries characterized by spot markets 
and futures markets. While generalizability is not the goal, this study may offer preliminary 
insights into the truckload freight industry because it shares some characteristics with the rice 
industry, such as the prevalence of SMEs and family businesses, opaqueness, and volatility. 
Indeed, small and midsize carriers account for an overwhelming proportion of carriers (Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association, 2016), and spot market prices exhibit substantial 
volatility (Miller, 2018). Moreover, with the recent launch of the freight futures market, industry 
experts have touted the potential risk management benefits (Hampstead, 2018b), but questions 
remain regarding how informative the freight futures price will be for the determination of contract 
prices and spot market prices. How representative the futures contract is of the underlying 
commodity plays an important role in determining the extent to which the information conveyed 
by futures price changes is incorporated by market actors (Sandor, 2012). I thus expect that the 
nature of the price adjustment process in truckload freight could be similar because of these shared 
idiosyncrasies. Of course, the magnitude of the effects will differ, so empirically examining the 
price adjustment process in the truckload freight industry is a fruitful avenue for future research to 
better understand the factors influencing spot market prices and the informational role of futures 
markets for supply chain and logistics operations.   
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Second, the analysis was based on the assumption that actors respond symmetrically to 
futures price increases and price decreases. While this was a reasonable assumption to establish 
the baseline relationship between futures price changes and spot market price changes, a logical 
next step would be to examine if there are asymmetries present in the adjustment process. For 
example, is information conveyed by (1) futures price increases or futures price decreases and (2) 
positive differences or negative differences incorporated into spot market prices more quickly? 
Identifying if there are asymmetries would enrich understanding of the factors influencing spot 
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Appendix A: Type 1 Roll Method  
The Type 1 Roll Method (Thomson Reuters, 2010) uses the futures price for the nearest-
to-maturity contract until the futures contract reaches its expiry date. At this point, the futures price 
“rolls over” to the next contract month. For example, the futures price for the week ending on 
February 6, 2004 was calculated based on the March 2004 futures contract, which is the nearest-
to-maturity contract. Settlement prices are available each day at the end of trading, and the weekly 
futures price was calculated by averaging across the five trading days (February 2-6) in that week. 
The subsequent weeks in February 2004 ending on February 13, 20, and 27 respectively were also 
based on the March 2004 contract and calculated in the same manner.  
Rice futures contracts expire on the final business day preceding the fifteenth calendar day 
of that contract month (CME Group, 2012). The final business day preceding the fifteenth calendar 
day of the contract month (March) was March 14, 2004, so the futures price was “rolled over” to 
the May 2004 contract on this date. So, for the weeks ending on March 5, 2004 and March 12, 
2004 respectively, the futures prices were based on the March 2004 contract, whereas the week 
ending on March 19, 2004 was based on the May 2004 contract.  
Table 1A: Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(Level) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(First Difference) 
 Test Statistic 1% Critical Value Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 -1.944 -3.439 -31.330** -3.439 
𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 -2.032 -3.439 -17.531** -3.439 





Table 2A: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Mean Std. Dev. ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 4.56 × 10-4 0.043    
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 4.47 × 10-4 0.030 0.384   
𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 -0.063 0.075 0.089 -0.259  
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 0.560 0.123 -0.001 0.022 -0.161 
 
Table 3A: Model (1) Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛_𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡  
Constant 0.008  
(0.012) 














Year Dummies Included 
Month Dummies Included 
Observations (T) 706 
R2 0.482 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are traditional OLS standard errors. 
Diagnostic checks indicated approximately normally distributed residuals 
and no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.02). Two potential outlier 
observations were identified and controlled for using dummy variables.  
 





Table 4A: Model (2) Regression Results 











Year Dummies Included 
Month Dummies Included 
Observations (Weeks) 709 
R2 0.545 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are traditional OLS standard errors. 
Diagnostic checks indicated approximately normally distributed residuals 
and no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.03). Two potential outlier 
observations were identified and controlled for using dummy variables. 
   








IV. Essay 3: Examining the Role of Futures Markets in Managing Information Asymmetry 




Prices have been the subject of empirical inquiry for centuries (e.g., Menger, 1883; Smith, 
1776) because they guide decision-making (e.g., Hayek, 1937), serve as a signal for resource 
allocation (e.g., Green et al., 2010), coordinate supply and demand (e.g., Williamson, 1991), and 
act as a link between actors in the supply chain (e.g., Sahin & Robinson, 2002). For example, 
economic theory suggests that prices guide market participants toward “decisions that tend to 
consider implicitly all the relevant conditions prevailing in the market” (Kirzner, 1963 p.39). 
Prices are then used by individual buyers and suppliers to adjust their activities independently—a 
process Williamson (1991) referred to as “autonomous adaptation” (p.278). The coordinating role 
of price has also been recognized by supply chain scholars, and price is considered a foundational 
supply chain coordination mechanism (see Fugate et al. (2006) and Sahin and Robinson (2002) for 
reviews). For instance, in the classic example, suppliers use quantity discount pricing schemes to 
align retailers’ purchasing behaviors with their own production and replenishment activities (e.g., 
Sluis & Giovanni, 2016). In addition to this coordinating role, supply chain scholars have also 
illustrated how price acts as a conduit through which supply chain actors can exchange information 
indirectly (Mendelson & Tunca, 2007; Shamir, 2013).  
 The coordination and informational benefits of price are particularly important for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs), who differ from their large-firm counterparts in several important 
ways (Kull et al., 2018). One way that SMEs differ is in their approach to buyer-supplier exchange 
(Arend & Wisner, 2005; Smith et al., 2014). Due to their risk-averse and conservative nature 
(George et al., 2005; Memilli et al., 2011), buyer-supplier exchange tends to be more transactional, 
as SMEs often keep other firms at “arm’s length” in order to minimize the risks associated with 
loss of independence (Roessl, 2015). In agriculture, for example, small and midsize family farms 
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transact with buyers in local spot markets wherein prices are negotiated “on the spot” for a 
particular commodity (e.g., Boyabath et al., 2011); these spot markets account for the majority – 
approximately 65% – of commodity production (MacDonald, 2015). Similarly, in truckload freight 
and bulk ocean shipping, small and midsize carriers conduct a large share of their business in local 
spot markets (e.g., Belzer, 2000; Stopford, 2009). Given their reliance on market exchange, it is 
thus imperative for SMEs to understand the future course of prices in order to plan and execute 
their operations decisions, such as when and how much to produce and when and how much to 
sell versus store.  
 There are, however, significant costs associated with discovering price (Coase, 1937; 
Stigler, 1961; Williamson, 1991) because market transactions are typically private, bilateral 
arrangements between two parties (Scott, 2018). Extant research suggests that SMEs are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to information search and acquisition due to the lack of available 
resources to dedicate to such activities (e.g., Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Freeman et al., 1983). 
Further, the information conveyed in market exchange has “degrees of imperfection” (Rabinovich, 
2007 p.21) because managing access to such information can favor one exchange party to the 
detriment of the other. Thus, due to their lack of visibility and influence in buyer-supplier exchange 
(e.g., Thomas & Esper, 2010; Touboulic et al., 2014), SMEs face significant information 
asymmetries when it comes to anticipating prices—a critical input to their operations decision-
making. To overcome this, SMEs often rely on external sources of information (Moriarty & 
Spekman, 1984) and even “rely on market forces as an information arbiter” (Bergh et al., 2019 
p.138). For example, in agriculture, small and midsize family farms use the futures market, which 
is a centralized marketplace that disseminates prices in real time and conveys information about 
macro-level supply and demand (CME Group, 2019).  
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While such external sources of information help SMEs reduce the asymmetries they face 
in buyer-supplier exchange, the information is “imperfect”. This imperfection allows a large firm 
to exploit its informational advantage in a way that “ensures that price changes that squeeze its 
margin are passed on more rapidly [or fully] than changes that stretch its margin” (Meyer & von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004 p.592). For example, in agriculture, farmers often complain that buyers 
are quick to adjust prices in local spot markets during times of decreasing futures prices but slow 
to adjust local spot market prices during times of increasing futures prices. Similarly, in truckload 
freight, carriers often resist reducing contract prices when spot market prices fall but try to raise 
their contract prices when spot market prices increase (e.g., Scott et al., 2017). Asymmetries in the 
price adjustment process may undermine the potential informational and coordination benefits that 
spot market prices provide for SMEs’ operations decision-making. Accordingly, the overarching 
purpose of this study is to shed light on the factors driving spot market prices and identify potential 
asymmetries in the price adjustment process.  
The empirical context is U.S. agriculture, which is suitable for the purposes of this study 
for three primary reasons. First, the business-to-business (B2B) spot markets examined in previous 
research are typically characterized by large firms (e.g., Seifert et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2015), 
whereas the farm sector is overwhelmingly comprised of small and midsize family farms, which 
account for 95.8% of farms and 45% of total farm production in the U.S. (Hoppe & MacDonald, 
2016)  Second, unlike the Internet-based spot markets examined in previous research (e.g., Haksöz 
& Seshadri, 2007; Seifert et al., 2004), spot market transactions in agriculture are generally private, 
bilateral arrangements, so the prices are not readily available in real time. This allows me to 
examine the role of information asymmetry in buyer-supplier exchange and how SMEs use other 
sources of information to inform their transactions in the spot market. Third, in agriculture, buyers 
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– rather than suppliers – have significant pricing power (e.g., Kinnucan & Forker, 1987; Ma et al., 
2019), so spot market prices do not always command a premium for added flexibility. This is in 
contrast to the spot markets that have been examined in previous research, such as those for 
truckload service (Scott, 2018) and industrial goods (Seifert et al., 2004). Spot market prices can 
be higher or lower than futures prices, so it is important to understand how spot market prices are 
adjusted in response to positive and negative spreads. In sum, I expect that idiosyncrasies related 
to the structure of buyer-supplier exchange and the nature of the spot market in the agriculture 
industry will result in different dynamics and allow me to contribute new insights.  
 Drawing on economic theory (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1963; Stigler, 1961), I develop 
hypotheses that examine if buyers adjust spot market prices asymmetrically in response to (1) 
positive and negative futures price changes and (2) positive and negative spreads between futures 
prices and spot market prices. To test the hypotheses, I compile a proprietary data set that combines 
futures market data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with proprietary spot market 
transaction data provided by a market intelligence and advisory and fit time series regression 
models with two-piece spline terms (Cudeck & Klebe, 2002; Enders, 2015; Flora, 2008). Overall, 
the findings provide evidence in support of the hypotheses and offer important insights for 
research, practice, and public policy. For research, this study sheds light on the factors driving spot 
market prices and identifies asymmetries in their effects on the price adjustment process. More 
broadly, this study illustrates how information asymmetry affects the market mechanism 
(Williamson, 1991), which has received less empirical inquiry in supply chain management given 
the extant emphasis on ‘hybrids and hierarchies’ (Williamson, 1991), particularly collaboration 
(Cao & Zhang, 2011) and information-sharing practices (Sahin & Robinson, 2002). For practice, 
I offer quantitative insights that can be used by both farmers and buyers to more effectively use 
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price information in their operations decision-making. This study also provides important guidance 
for regulators and policymakers, particularly the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, regarding asymmetric price adjustment, which has been 
shown to have negative effects on farmers’ welfare (e.g., Shrinivas & Gomez, 2016).   
The structure of the remainder of this study is as follows: The relevant literature is reviewed 
in the next section, and the contributions of this study are highlighted. Theoretical explanations 
from economics are introduced and applied to develop the hypotheses in the following section. 
The empirical setting, proprietary data set, and preliminary data analysis are then outlined, 
followed by the model specifications and results in the penultimate section. Lastly, the implications 
for theory, practice, and public policy are discussed, as well as the limitations of this study and 
recommended directions for future research. 
Literature Review 
Information Asymmetry in Buyer-Supplier Exchange  
 “Information asymmetries exist in all exchange relationships” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984 
p.390) such that one party possesses more – or better – information than the other party in the 
exchange (Akerlof, 1970; Mishra et al., 1998). Some suggest that information asymmetry is a 
critical “power resource” (Cox, 2001) that often results in “opportunistic exploitation of superior 
knowledge” (Rehme et al., 2016 p.178) by the party with the informational advantage.  
Consequently, information asymmetry in buyer-supplier exchange has been linked to a number of 
negative consequences, such as reduced supply chain performance, inventory management issues 
and operational inefficiencies (Cheung et al., 2011), decreased supply chain satisfaction (Benton 
& Maloni, 2005), and the well-known bullwhip effect (Lee et al., 1997).  
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Given its ubiquity in practice and negative consequences, extant research has identified a 
number of factors contributing to information asymmetry in buyer-supplier exchange. A 
comprehensive review of the literature (Bergh et al., 2019) suggests three primary categories of 
factors: structural, strategic, and behavioral barriers. First, structural barriers are factors that limit 
actors’ ability to access relevant information (Bergh et al., 2019) by preventing or disturbing 
information flows between firms or between the focal firm and the market (Johanson & 
Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) Structural barriers are commonly observed in market transactions (Lado 
& Wilson, 1994) due to the constant entry and exit of market actors (Stigler, 1961) and the 
continuously changing nature of supply and demand (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1997). Indeed, 
“information is not homogenously distributed in the market… nor is access to relevant information 
open to all firms in the market” (Schmidt & Keil, 2013 p.214). Second, strategic barriers are factors 
that disincentivize actors from sharing relevant information with other actors because of the 
potential benefits arising from the possession of private and/or different information (e.g., 
Rabinovich, 2007). Strategic barriers are commonly observed in competitive industries because 
“full information revelation can exacerbate competition and drive prices down” (Knill et al., 2006 
p.1476). Further, strategic barriers are also prevalent in exchange relationships characterized by 
power imbalances because powerful actors can exploit their informational advantage to capture 
more of the value conferred by the exchange (Bowles & Gintis, 1993).   Lastly, behavioral barriers 
stem from limitations on information acquisition and processing capabilities, such as bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1978) and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
To overcome these structural, strategic, and behavioral barriers, extant research has 
identified a number of remedies using various theories of interfirm exchange (see Bergh et al., 
2019 for a review), such as resource dependence theory, (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), transaction 
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cost economics (Williamson, 1981), and agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, the 
development of information-sharing practices (e.g., Klein et al., 2007; Sanders & Graman, 2016), 
coordination mechanisms (e.g., Sahin & Robinson, 2002), and various formal and informal 
governance mechanisms (e.g., Liu et al., 2009; Srinivasan & Swink, 2015; Wang & Wei, 2007) 
are often cited as “generic cure[s]” for information asymmetry in buyer-supplier exchange (Sahin 
& Robinson, 2002 p.510). Despite the popularity and reported benefits of such mechanisms (e.g., 
Cao & Zhang, 2011), however, they are not used as extensively in the agricultural supply chain – 
particularly upstream echelons (Jones et al., 2007). In agriculture, buyer-supplier exchange is often 
characterized by little to no information-sharing, trust, or collaboration (Pullman & Dillard, 2010), 
and even the use of contracting has declined (MacDonald, 2015). I thus contribute to this stream 
of research by demonstrating how small and midsize family farms use an alternative mechanism 
– specifically the futures market – to overcome the information asymmetry they face in buyer-
supplier exchange.  
Asymmetric Price Adjustment   
 Asymmetric price adjustment is a common phenomenon wherein prices are adjusted 
differently in response to increases and decreases (see Frey and Manera (2007) and Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2004) for reviews). Asymmetry comes in many forms and is typically 
classified according to three criteria (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004).  The first criterion 
refers to whether prices adjust more rapidly (i.e., speed) or more fully (i.e., magnitude) in response 
to increases or decreases (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). The second criterion refers to 
whether the asymmetry is positive (i.e., prices adjust more fully or rapidly to increases relative to 
decreases) or negative (i.e., prices adjust more fully or rapidly to decreases relative to increases) 
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(Peltzman, 2000).  The third criterion is based on whether the price adjustment is horizontal13, 
which refers to the transmission of prices across markets for similar products or services within 
the same echelon of the supply chain (e.g., across different locations), or vertical, which refers to 
the transmission of prices across echelons of the supply chain (e.g., from wholesaler to retailer).  
Various underlying causes have been proposed to explain why asymmetric price 
adjustment occurs, including market power (e.g., Peltzman, 2000), adjustment costs (e.g., Blinder 
et al., 1998), government intervention (Kinnucan & Forker, 1987), distorted price reporting 
processes (e.g., von Cramon-Taubadel et al., 1995), and information asymmetry (e.g., Bailey & 
Brorsen, 1989), but the “bouquet of often casual explanations” has often lead to ambiguous and 
sometimes contradictory results (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004 p.591). For example, 
Peltzman (2000) found overwhelming support for the existence of positive asymmetries (i.e., 
prices are adjusted more fully in response to increases relative to decreases) in downstream 
consumer and producer markets but found conflicting results for the relationship between market 
power and asymmetric price adjustment. Markets with fewer competitors were associated with 
greater asymmetry, but markets that were more concentrated had less asymmetry (Peltzman, 
2000). A potential explanation for the inconsistent support for the relationship between market 
power and asymmetric price adjustment is the extent to which market power creates information 
asymmetry. For example, Bailey and Brorsen (1989) found that if a firm expects that its 
competitors will match a price increase (decrease) but not a price decrease (increase), then positive 
(negative) asymmetric price adjustment will result. However, without “perfect” information about 
the prices charged by competitors, firms will tend to immediately raise prices in response to cost 
 
13 Horizontal price adjustment is often also referred to as spatial price adjustment (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004). For clarity, horizontal is used because the analysis focuses on the transmission of prices between the futures 
market – a financial market – and a physical spot market location.  
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increases in order to preserve margins but wait to cut prices in response to cost decreases 
(Borenstein et al., 1997; McShane et al., 2016). The resultant positive asymmetry is based on the 
assumption that, in the presence of imperfect information, firms use previous prices as a proxy for 
competitors’ future behavior to ensure competitiveness (Borenstein et al., 1997).   
As these examples illustrate, the vast majority of the underlying causes for asymmetric 
price adjustment have been used to explain asymmetries in the vertical context, such as from 
wholesaler to retailer or from retailer to consumer (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004). I thus 
contribute to this literature by adopting a supply chain perspective to explain how the “traditional” 
causes of pricing asymmetries – particularly market power and information asymmetry – 
contribute to asymmetric price adjustment in the horizontal context (i.e., between spot markets 
and futures markets).  That is, I examine how vertical market power and information asymmetries 
(i.e., across echelons of the supply chain) lead to horizontal asymmetric price adjustment. In the 
next section, I adopt a “top-down” approach to middle-range theory (Craighead et al., 2016) and 
contextualize these theoretical explanations from economics related to market power (e.g., 
Peltzman, 2000) and information asymmetry (e.g., Bailey & Brorsen, 1989) by accounting for 
idiosyncrasies of buyer-supplier exchange in agricultural spot markets.  
Theory and Hypotheses Development 
To develop the hypotheses, I must make three key assumptions about the nature of buyer-
supplier exchange in the spot market. First, in line with previous research (e.g., Kinnucan & 
Forker, 1987; Ma et al., 2019), I assume that buyers have a relative power advantage and are able 
to significantly influence spot market prices. It seems reasonable to conclude that buyers have 
pricing power in this context because of the undifferentiated nature of the product being supplied 
(Williamson, 1981) and the oligopsony structure of the spot market (i.e., many small and midsize 
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family farms selling to a few large buyers). Further, this assumption is in line with economic 
theory, which suggests that a buyer possesses local market power to the extent that there are few 
(or no) competitors within a certain radius (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004), and resource 
dependence theory, which posits that one of the primary factors determining the power of one actor 
over another is the concentration of resource control— the extent to which transactions are made 
with relatively few exchange partners (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Second, I assume that, barring 
extreme market conditions (e.g., severe shortages), buyers tend to resist increasing spot market 
prices in order to preserve their margins. This is in line with observations from industry experts 
(e.g., U.S. International Trading Commission, 2015) and empirical findings suggesting that a buyer 
that “enjoys such local market power may use it to ensure that price changes that squeeze its margin 
are passed on more rapidly than changes that stretch its margin” (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004 p.592). Third, I assume that buyers have greater access to private information but are strongly 
incentivized not to divulge such information to farmers in order to preserve their margins. Indeed, 
a key tenet of information economics is that “information in transactions has degrees of 
imperfection” (Rabinovich, 2007 p.21) because managing access to such information can favor 
one exchange party to the detriment of the other (Akerlof, 1970). For example, buyers often have 
access to information about supply and demand in downstream markets (Shrinivas & Gomez, 
2016), which provides insights into how prices will evolve in the near future (Knill et al., 2006) It 
seems reasonable to conclude that there is an information asymmetry favoring buyers due to the 
general lack of information-sharing and collaboration in the agricultural commodity supply chain 
(e.g., Pullman & Dillard, 2010; Touboulic et al., 2014) and the resource constraints small and 
midsize family farms face related to information search (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Freeman et 
al., 1983).  
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To reduce information asymmetry, small and midsize family farms rely on alternative 
sources of information. Indeed, extant research suggests that smaller organizations tend to seek 
information from outside sources because they have fewer resources and personnel to devote to 
information exchange and the development of in-house information sources (Moriarty & 
Spekman, 1984). One low-cost, publicly available source of information that small and midsize 
family farms use to inform their transactions in the spot market is the futures market, which is a 
centralized marketplace wherein prices are determined and disseminated in real-time through the 
interactions of buyers and sellers (CME Group, 2019). Futures markets have long been touted as 
an important medium for price discovery (Garbade & Silber, 1983; Sandor, 2012), and futures 
prices convey information about macro-level supply and demand fundamentals. For example, a 
large body of empirical evidence suggests that futures prices quickly reflect supply and demand 
information contained in reports promulgated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, such as the 
monthly World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (Adjemian, 2012; Garcia et al., 1997; 
Isengildina-Massa et al., 2008; Sumer & Mueller, 1989). As expected, futures prices rise in 
response to increases in aggregate demand and/or decreases in aggregate supply and fall in 
response to decreases in aggregate demand and/or increases in aggregate supply. The futures 
market thus acts as “an information processing system” (Bowles et al., 2017 p.215), and 
information about macro-level supply and demand fundamentals is quickly communicated to 
market participants via price changes (Hayek, 1945).  
Because futures prices are publicly available in real-time, they are accessible to both small 
and midsize family farms and large buyers. Indeed, industry interviews revealed that actors across 
the supply chain use various services that provide free market updates in real-time, and extant 
research suggests that futures prices are less costly for market actors to acquire and utilize 
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compared to other third-party sources (e.g., Min & Najand, 1999). Buyers thus do not have an 
informational advantage with regards to macro-level supply and demand information because 
small and midsize family farms can – and do – infer such information from futures prices. 
Accordingly, I posit that buyers will be compelled to adjust spot market prices symmetrically in 
response to increases and decreases in futures prices in order to ensure supply and remain 
competitive. That is, buyers will adjust spot market prices upward when there is an increase in 
futures prices and downward when there is a decrease in futures prices. The magnitude of the 
adjustment in response to positive and negative changes in futures prices will be similar because 
such changes are easily observed by small and midsize family farms, which puts them in a stronger 
position to demand proportionate adjustments. Stated formally:  
Hypothesis 1: Futures price changes exhibit symmetric effects on spot market price changes 
such that a futures price decrease (increase) of a given magnitude will result in a similar 
decrease (increase) in subsequent spot market prices. 
 In addition to the macro-level information conveyed by futures price changes, Austrian 
economic theory suggests that there exists an equally important body of information related to 
particular circumstances of time and place (Hayek, 1945). That is, “relevant knowledge” is not 
limited to macro-level supply and demand but also includes information about local market 
conditions and special circumstances (Hayek, 1945). This information is dispersed among many 
actors and is conveyed in the process of transacting in the local spot market (Kirman et al., 2005). 
Indeed, extant research suggests that one of the secondary benefits of the spot market for supply 
chain operations is that it serves as a conduit through which actors can exchange information 
indirectly (Mendelson & Tunca, 2007; Shamir, 2013). For example, each spot market bid offered 
by the buyer conveys information to farmers about local demand conditions, and each acceptance 
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or refusal of that bid conveys information to the buyer about local supply conditions and farmers’ 
price expectations (Kirman et al., 2005).  
However, unlike many online spot markets in B2B contexts (e.g., Seifert et al., 2004), spot 
market transactions in agriculture tend to be private bilateral arrangements (i.e., between a buyer 
and a farmer). Spot market prices are thus typically unavailable to those external to the transaction 
until after the transaction is completed, which makes acquiring timely and accurate spot market 
price information costly (Scott, 2018). Acquiring such information is even costlier for small and 
midsize family farms because they are more limited in the time, personnel, and resources that they 
can devote to information search (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; Freeman et al., 1983), whereas large 
buyers can often achieve economies of scale in information acquisition (Bailey & Brorsen, 1989). 
Large firms also tend to have formal mechanisms for information exchange and the development 
of internal information sources (Moriarty & Spekman, 1984), such as creating their own internal 
indexes of spot market rates (Bignell, 2013).  
In addition to advantages related to information acquisition and processing capabilities, 
buyers interact more frequently with the spot market. For example, in truckload transportation, 
large brokerage operations have a very strong understanding of spot market prices because they 
source capacity from motor carriers on a spot basis, whereas small asset-based motor carriers that 
infrequently engage in spot exchanges are less informed regarding spot prices (Scott, 2018).  
Information economics suggests that “inexperienced buyers pay higher prices in a market than do 
experienced buyers” because “the former have no accumulated knowledge of asking prices” 
(Stigler, 1961; p.218-219). Building on this insight, I expect that buyers are able to achieve an 
informational advantage relative to farmers because of the experience they obtain through ordinary 
business activities. Buyers are constantly making bids to small and midsize family farms in the 
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spot market and acquire information about local supply conditions and farmers’ price expectations 
through these frequent interactions (Kirman et al., 2005). In contrast, farmers tend to be more 
concerned with their own operations and often do not know the price that other farmers are willing 
to sell for in the spot market. Further, although farmers interact with a limited number of buyers, 
they may not be able to quickly gather spot market bids from other buyers due to the costs of search 
(Stigler, 1961; Scott, 2018). For example, farmers may observe a price change from one local 
buyer but may be uncertain if other buyers have also changed their prices (Miller & Hayenga, 
2001). Given the continuously changing nature of spot market prices, small and midsize family 
farms cannot afford to search for better prices and tend to receive lower prices in the short run 
(Miller and Hayenga, 2001) because they have less experience and more limited knowledge of 
prices in the local spot market.  
In the presence of imperfect information about current spot market conditions, the previous 
price is often used as a proxy (e.g., Borenstein et al., 1997). A large body of agricultural economics 
research suggests that farmers use “backward-looking expectations” to inform their price 
expectations (e.g., Boetel et al., 2007; Chavas, 1999 p.20). For example, in the pork market, 
Chavas (1999) found that a significant proportion of farmers – approximately 73% – base their 
price expectations on historical data. In practice, farmers use the spread between the futures price 
and spot market price in the previous period – known as the basis (Chicago Board of Trade, 2004) 
– as a benchmark for future spot market prices (CME Group, 2019a). The spread “localizes” 
macro-level futures price information and conveys additional information about the state of the 
local market relative to the macro-market (Hayek, 1945).  Farmers thus infer information about 
local market conditions based on the spread between the futures price and spot market price to 
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determine the best time to sell and when to accept a spot market bid (Chicago Board of Trade, 
2004). 
Inferences based on information conveyed by the spread between the futures price and spot 
market price will, of course, be imperfect, because small and midsize family farms only have “half 
the equation” and are restricted in their ability to assess demand and downstream prices.  
Accordingly, I posit that buyers will exploit their informational advantage by adjusting spot market 
prices asymmetrically in response to positive and negative spreads in the immediate past such that 
the magnitude of adjustment is greater in response to negative spreads relative to positive spreads. 
A positive spread (i.e., when the spot market price is greater than the futures price) implies limited 
supply or greater demand in local markets relative to the macro-market. The positive spread – or 
premium – encourages small and midsize family farms to accept bids in local spot markets rather 
than store the commodity. The positive spread also implies that supply and demand in the macro-
market are not necessarily there to sustain the price premium, which encourages buyers to adjust 
local spot market prices downward in subsequent periods. However, under such circumstances, 
buyers are not incentivized to adjust spot market prices as much. Given that supply and demand 
fundamentals in the local market support higher prices, buyers risk setting their bids too low and 
failing to procure the commodity if prices are adjusted too far downward. Further, farmers are 
already receiving a premium in local spot markets and are less price sensitive (Wu et al., 2018).  
Conversely, a negative spread (i.e., when the spot market price is less than the futures price) 
implies oversupply or limited demand in the local spot market. Under such circumstances, buyers 
are incentivized to adjust spot market prices downward to a greater extent in order to use the local 
surplus to their advantage and expand their margins. Only armed with futures price information 
related to macro-level supply and demand, farmers will try to negotiate higher prices to bring spot 
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market prices closer to futures prices. However, because buyers have significant pricing power 
(especially under local surplus conditions), farmers are not in a position to demand higher prices 
in local spot markets. Buyers can thus capitalize on their power advantage and farmers’ imperfect 
information by adjusting spot market prices more fully in response to negative spreads. Stated 
formally:  
Hypothesis 2: Spreads between futures prices and spot market prices exhibit asymmetric 
effects on subsequent spot market price changes such that a negative spread will result in a 
larger change in subsequent spot market prices than a positive spread of the same 
magnitude. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
Methodology 
Empirical Context  
 Within agriculture, the empirical context for this study is the U.S. rice industry, which is a 
suitable context for four primary reasons. First, there is a distinct lack of publicly available spot 
market prices and information provided by third-party organizations in the rice industry 
(McKenzie & Darby, 2017; U.S. International Trading Commission, 2015), which is in stark 
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contrast to other agricultural commodity industries in the U.S. For example, the U.S. Agricultural 
Marketing Service (2019) provides daily reports with spot market prices and contract prices for 
other grains and oilseeds (e.g., wheat, soybeans, and corn) at various spot market locations, and 
private analytical firms provide free tools that farmers can use to access spot market bids from 
buyers based on their zip code (e.g., Farm Journal, Inc., 2019). In the U.S. rice industry, however, 
futures prices are the primary mechanism through which small and midsize family farms access 
relevant information. This private information gap is in line with my theorizing and, 
methodologically, allows us to isolate the effects of futures prices and spreads between futures 
prices and spot market prices because it is not confounded by the presence of other sources of 
information typically provided in agricultural commodity industries in the U.S.  
 Second, rice is a critical component of the diets of approximately four billion people across 
the world (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004). A cornerstone of national history and 
cultural identity, rice has been consumed for almost five thousand years but was not traded in the 
global market until the last century (Childs, 2001). Today, only eight percent of the world’s rice 
supply is traded on the global market (Hamilton, 2013), and the U.S. is one of the top five exporters 
and accounts for approximately ten percent of world trade (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2019). 
The U.S. rice industry thus plays a critical role in feeding the world’s population, particularly those 
in developing economies who are often low-income and food-insecure (U.S. International Trading 
Commission, 2015). Despite its global significance, however, the U.S. rice industry has been 
largely unexamined in academia—likely a consequence of the lack of publicly available data. 
Accordingly, focusing on the U.S. rice industry allows us to contribute to the established body of 
research on asymmetric price adjustment (e.g., see Frey and Manera (2007) and Meyer and von 
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Cramon-Taubadel (2004) for reviews) and also articulate important industry-specific insights for 
both practitioners and policymakers (Joglekar et al., 2016).  
Third, due to requirements related to availability of water, soil type, and high average 
temperatures during the growing season, rice production is limited to particular areas of the U.S. 
(Childs, 2001). The relatively high concentration of production and the relatively short distances 
between farmers and buyers, as well as the fact that many of the buyers are declared regular for 
delivery on the exchange (see the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Deliverable Commodities 
Under Registration for a list), helps to alleviate concerns related to transportation factors, which 
are often cited as a reason for asymmetries in horizontal price adjustment (e.g., Meyer & von 
Cramon Taubadel, 2004). The high spatial concentration of rice production also helps to alleviate 
concerns related to spreads in futures prices and spot market prices (Hypothesis 2) being due to 
transportation costs. Lastly, focusing on a particular industry allows us to examine specialized 
variables that may not be accessible in inter-industry studies (Joglekar et al., 2016), helps to ensure 
internal validity, and is suitable given that the purpose is to elaborate middle-range theory 
(Craighead et al., 2016).  
Data and Measures 
 The Chicago Mercantile Exchange (2008) defines a futures contract as a “legally binding 
agreement to buy or sell a commodity or financial instrument at a later date”. Each futures contract 
has standardized specifications related to the underlying commodity, including the quality, 
quantity, physical delivery time, and delivery location (CME Group, 2008). For the rice futures 
contract, the underlying commodity is long-grain rough rice, the quantity is 2,000 
hundredweights—or 100 tons, and the quality is U.S. No. 2 or better with a milling yield of at least 
65% (CME Group, 2008). Because the specifications are otherwise standardized across futures 
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contracts, each futures contract for a particular commodity is differentiated by its delivery month 
and year. For rice, futures contracts are listed for every other month (January, March, May, July, 
September, and November) and can be traded up to fifteen months in advance. For example, in 
June 2019, the rice futures contracts for July 2019, September 2019, November 2019, January 
2020, March 2020, May 2020, and July 2020 were being traded on the exchange. While futures 
contracts that are further into the future are available, their liquidity is significantly less than that 
of the nearest-to-maturity futures contract. The nearest-to-maturity futures contract reflects the 
most current (at the time of retrieval) set of information and has been shown to have the highest 
ratio of volume to open interest (e.g., Bekiros et al., 2017; Thomson Reuters, 2010), which is 
important for reliability.  
 For the present study, I obtained daily rice futures prices for the nearest-to-maturity futures 
contract from Quandl’s Chicago Mercantile Exchange futures database, which were cross-
referenced with data provided by the Registrar’s Office at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for 
data validation purposes. I used the Type 0 roll method (Thomson Reuters, 2010) to create a 
continuous futures price series. The Type 0 roll method uses the futures price for the nearest-to-
maturity contract until the first business day of the contract month. Following the first business 
day of the contract month, the futures price “rolls over” to the next contract month. For example, 
the futures price for the week ending on April 7, 2017 was calculated based on the May 2017 
futures contract, which was the nearest-to-maturity contract. The weekly futures price was 
calculated by averaging the settlement prices, which are available each day at the end of trading14, 
across the five trading days in that week (April 3 through April 7). The weekly futures price for 
 
14 There were an insignificant number (less than one percent of the total observations) of daily futures price 




the subsequent weeks in April 2017 ending on April 14, April 21, and April 28, respectively, were 
also based on the May 2017 contract and calculated in the same manner.  In 2017, the first business 
day of the contract month (May) was May 1, so the futures price was “rolled over” to the July 2017 
contract on this date. For the week ending on May 5, 2017, the weekly futures price was calculated 
by averaging the settlement price of the July 2017 contract – which is now the nearest-to-maturity 
contract – across the five trading days (May 1 through May 5) in that week.   
 In stark contrast to other agricultural commodities in the U.S., there is no comparable spot 
market price publicly available in the rice industry. I thus obtained proprietary spot market 
transaction data from Firstgrain, Inc., a well-established market intelligence and advisory firm. 
The data are weekly and calculated based on a weighted average of spot market transactions in 
each of the respective spot market locations. The spot market price represents the price paid for 
rice that meets the quality and quantity standards specified in the rice futures contract; due to 
confidentiality agreements protecting the proprietary and sensitive nature of the data, I am limited 
in the amount of detail I can disclose about these data.  
 For the present study, I focus on the spot market location in Arkansas for three primary 
reasons. First, the commodity underlying the rice futures contract is 2,000 hundredweights of long-
grain rough rice, and Arkansas is the number one rice producer and produces approximately 57% 
of the long-grain rice produced in the U.S. (Economic Research Service, 2019). Second, all of the 
warehouses declared regular for delivery by the Chicago Board of Trade are located in this area of 
Arkansas (see the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s Deliverable Commodities Under Registration 
for a list). Given that the delivery locations for the futures market and Arkansas spot market are 
similar, the futures price should, in theory, be the most informative for the Arkansas spot market 
price as compared to other major spot market locations (e.g., Texas and Louisiana). This also 
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allows me to control for transportation costs, which can contribute to asymmetries in horizontal 
price adjustment. Lastly, in line with the theorizing and purposes of this study, family farms 
account for an overwhelming majority – approximately 96% – of the 2,500 rice farms located in 
Arkansas (USA Rice Federation, 2019).  
 Time series of equal length are necessary for the analysis, so the estimation period is limited 
to the start and end date of the proprietary spot market transaction data. The estimation period 
begins on January 9, 2004 and ends on August 29, 2017, which yields 711 weekly observations 
for each price series. Following convention (e.g., Peltzman, 2000), I first took the natural logarithm 
of each price series. The natural logarithm of the weekly spot market price is denoted as 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 , 
and the natural logarithm of the weekly futures price is denoted as 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡. The difference 
between the two – denoted as 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 – was calculated by subtracting the futures price in time t 
from the spot market price in time t (i.e., 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡).  
 Additional data was collected from the weekly Commitment of Traders report to control 
for the effects of increased financialization in commodity futures markets. Following convention, 
I calculated the proportion of short and long open interest positions held by non-commercial 
traders (i.e., non-hedgers) including swap dealers, managed money accounts, and index funds 
(U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 2019) to include as a measure of financialization, 
which is denoted as 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡.   
Preliminary Analysis 
 The spot market price and futures price series are plotted in Figure 2 – and the spread 
between the two series is plotted in Figure 3 – to provide a visual representation of their 
relationship and evolution over time. There are a few events that occurred during the estimation 
period that are worth noting. First, in 2007 and 2008, the world food price crisis occurred, and the 
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price of rice skyrocketed in international markets. Various trade restrictions were implemented 
throughout Asia to protect citizens from rising rice prices during this time, and the “global rice 
crisis” persisted through late 2008 (Slayton, 2009). Second, the spread between the spot market 
price and futures price became increasingly large during the time period from 2010 to 2012, and 
concerns over this decoupling were brought to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission. At the end of 2012, the fixed storage rate for 
warehouses declared regular for delivery by the Chicago Board of Trade was increased in an effort 
to narrow this spread (CME Group, 2012; Seamon, 2010). Following the storage rate increase, the 
spot market price and futures price appear to be more closely coupled for the remainder of the 
estimation period.  
 
 













Figure 3: Spread Between Spot Market Prices and Futures Prices (Spot – Futures) 
Unit Root Tests 
 With time series data, there are additional steps that are necessary prior to analysis (Enders, 
2015). The first step is to test each data series for stationarity—the extent to which the statistical 
properties of the series are constant over time (Enders, 2015). To do this, Augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests were conducted using optimal lag lengths based on Schwarz information criterion 
(SIC), and the results are reported in Table 1. The results indicate that 𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 
are both non-stationary in the level (p > .01) but are stationary in first differences (p < .01). Both 
price series were thus transformed using week-over-week differences to ensure stationarity and 
are denoted as ∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 and ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡, respectively. Note that this transformation also aligns 
with my theorizing, which focuses on whether there are asymmetric effects of positive and 
negative price changes. Because the results indicated that it is stationary in the level (p < .01), 













Table 1: Unit Root Tests 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(Level) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
(First Difference) 
 Test Statistic 1% Critical Value Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 
𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 -1.944 -3.439 -31.330** -3.439 
𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 -1.955 -3.439 -15.492** -3.439 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 -6.091** -3.439 -17.041** -3.439 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics and correlations. As economic theory would 
suggest (e.g., Garbade & Silber, 1983; Stigler & Sherwin, 1985), spot market price changes and 
futures price changes are positively correlated. However, the standard deviation of spot market 
price changes ( = 0.043) is greater than that of futures price changes ( = 0.030). There is a 
statistically significant difference between the standard deviations, which suggests that local spot 
markets are characterized by greater volatility and may be subject to more extreme price 
realizations (e.g., Seifert et al., 2004).  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix  
 Mean Std. Dev. ∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 4.51 × 10-4 0.043    
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 4.56 × 10-4 0.030 0.384   
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡 -0.070 0.081 0.075 -0.273  
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 0.560 0.123 -0.001 0.022 -0.192 
 
Model Estimation and Results  
 First, to test Hypothesis 1, which posits that futures price changes will exhibit symmetric 
effects on spot market price changes, we use the distributed lag approach developed by Almon 
(1965) with two-piece spline terms (Cudeck & Klebe, 2002; Flora, 2008). The distributed lag 
approach imposes a shape on the lag distribution, which reduces the number of parameters being 
estimated and the effects of multi-collinearity. We specified a linear distributed lag model that 
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included a contemporaneous effect and four lags15 for positive futures price changes and negative 
futures price changes, respectively. The inclusion of a contemporaneous effect and four lags is 
also in line with industry observations that spot market prices are adjusted immediately and rapidly 
in response to futures price changes (Chicago Board of Trade, 2004).    
Following common practices (e.g., Enders, 2015), dummy variables for each month 
(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑡) and year (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡) were included to capture seasonality and macroeconomic conditions. 
We also included 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 to control for increased financialization in commodity futures 
markets. The model to test Hypothesis 1 was specified as Model (1):  
∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼0




+  +  𝛽3
+∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−2
+  
+   𝛽4
+∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−3
+  +   𝛽5
+∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−4





− +   𝛽8
−∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−2
− +  𝛽9
−∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−3
−   
+  𝛽10
− ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−4










0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛 < 0




   ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛   𝑖𝑓   ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛 < 0
0    𝑖𝑓  ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛 ≥ 0
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛
  is the nth futures price change, and n = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The coefficients 𝛽 
+ and 𝛽 
− 
measure the magnitude of adjustment of the spot market price to a futures price increase and a 
 
15Various lag distributions (e.g., polynomial specifications) and lag lengths (e.g., two, three, and five lags) were also 
modeled as a robustness check. There were no substantive differences in the results.  
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futures price decrease, respectively. Note that Model (1) allows for the n series to begin at zero in 
order to examine the contemporaneous adjustment of spot market prices to positive and negative 
futures price changes.  Hypothesis 1 posits that 𝛽 
+ and 𝛽 
– in each respective period (t – n) will not 
be statistically significantly different.  
 For ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛
+ , the distributed lag approach (Almon, 1965) constrains  𝛽1
+ −  𝛽5
+ to 
lie on a linear function such that:  
 𝛽1
+ =  𝜑0  
 𝛽2
+ =  𝜑0 + 𝜑1  
 𝛽3
+ =  𝜑0 + 2𝜑1 
 𝛽4
+ =  𝜑0 + 3𝜑1 
 𝛽5
+ =  𝜑0 + 4𝜑1 
 Similarly,  ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛
− ,  𝛽6
− −  𝛽10
−  are constrained to lie on a linear function such that:  
 𝛽6
− =  𝜔0  
 𝛽7
− =  𝜔0 + 𝜔1  
 𝛽8
− =  𝜔0 + 2𝜔1 
 𝛽9
− =  𝜔0 + 3𝜔1 
 𝛽10
− =  𝜔0 + 4𝜔1 
The results of Model (1) are reported in Table 3. Beginning with the control variables, the 
effect of 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡  is negative but not statistically significant (p > .05), which is line with 
previous studies demonstrating that financialization does not necessarily spill over to spot markets 
(e.g., Garcia et al., 2015; Irwin et al., 2011). Moving to the variables of interest for Hypothesis 1, 
the effect of contemporaneous futures price changes is positive and statistically significant. The 
effects of lagged futures price changes are also positive and statistically significant (p < .01) in 
145 
 
weeks one and two for futures price increases and weeks one, two, and three for futures price 
decreases. The lagged effect of positive futures price changes becomes non-significant in week 
three, whereas the lagged effect of negative futures price changes becomes non-significant in week 
four. This suggests that the adjustment process for futures price increases takes place during the 
current period and two weeks that follow, whereas the adjustment process for futures price 
decreases takes place during the current period and subsequent three weeks. For both positive and 
negative futures price changes, the magnitude of the effect decays over time with contemporaneous 
changes (t) having the largest effect followed by changes in the immediate past (t –1). The 








Figure 4: Distributed Lag Effects of Positive and Negative Futures Price Changes on Spot 



























To test Hypothesis 1, which posits that futures price changes will exhibit a symmetric effect 
on spot market price changes, formal asymmetry tests were conducted based on Model (1) 
estimates. The results of the Wald test with four separate null hypotheses H0: 𝛽𝑛
+ =  𝛽𝑛
− for n = 0, 







+  0.223** 
(0.040) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−2
+  0.123** 
(0.030) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−3
+  0.024 
(0.034) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−4






−  0.228** 
(0.046) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−2
−  0.167** 
(0.030) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−3
−  0.107** 
(0.042) 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−4




Year Dummies Included 
Month Dummies Included 
Observations (T) 706 
R2 0.452 
Standard errors reported in parentheses are Newey-West standard 
errors robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation. Diagnostic checks indicated approximately normally 
distributed residuals and no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.28). 
Two potential outlier observations were identified and controlled for 
using dummy variables.  
 
* = p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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1, 2, 3, 4 are reported in Table 4. The results indicate that I fail to reject the null hypothesis for 
contemporaneous (t) and lagged futures price changes (t –n), which suggests that futures price 
increases and decreases result in similarly sized adjustments in subsequent spot market prices and 
provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1. In addition to examining if there are asymmetries 
in the intertemporal dynamics of the adjustment process, the distributed lag approach also allows 
us to examine if there are asymmetries in the long-run effect of futures price changes (Wooldridge, 
2009). The sum of the coefficients for positive futures price changes ( 𝛽1
+ to 𝛽5
+) is 0.617, which 
suggests that a one percent increase in futures prices results in an 0.617 percent change in spot 
market prices. In comparison, the sum of the coefficients for negative futures price changes 
( 𝛽6
−to 𝛽10
− ) is 0.836, which suggests that a one percent decrease in futures prices results in a 0.836 
percent change in spot market prices. While the magnitude of the effect suggests that futures price 
decreases may be incorporated more fully than futures price increases, a Wald test with the null 
hypothesis H0: ∑ 𝛽𝑖
+5
𝑖 = 1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗
−10
𝑗= 6  indicated that I fail to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric 
effects (t-statistic = -0.782). In combination, these findings suggest symmetry in both the short-
run and long-run effect of futures price changes, and the implications of this will be explored 
further in the discussion. Overall, Hypothesis 1 is corroborated by the results of Model (1). 






To test Hypothesis 2, which posits that previous spreads between futures prices and spot 
market prices will exhibit asymmetric effects on subsequent spot market price changes, we added 
 H0 t-Statistic 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
  𝛽1
















+ =  𝛽10
−  -1.136 
* p < .05; ** p < .01  
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a two-piece spline term for 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 to Model (1). We also altered Model (1) slightly to include 
only a two-piece spline term for contemporaneous futures price changes (∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡) and 
removed the two-piece spline terms for lagged futures price changes (∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡−𝑛) because 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 is a lagged measure and already incorporates previous futures prices. The model to test 
Hypothesis 2 was specified as Model (2):  
∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 =  𝛼0
+  𝛽1
+∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
+  + 𝛽2
−∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
−   + 𝛾1
+𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1
+  +  𝛾2
−𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1
−










0 𝑖𝑓 ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 < 0




   ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡   𝑖𝑓   ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 < 0
0    𝑖𝑓  ∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 ≥ 0
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑓𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
  is the contemporaneous change in futures prices, and the coefficients 𝛽1
+ and 𝛽2
− 
measure the magnitude of adjustment of the spot market price to a futures price increase and a 
futures price decrease in the current period, respectively; and  
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1
+ = {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 < 0




   𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1   𝑖𝑓   𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 < 0
0    𝑖𝑓  𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1 ≥ 0
 
𝛾1
+ and  𝛾2
− measure the magnitude of adjustment of the spot market price to a positive spread and 
a negative spread in the previous period, respectively. Hypothesis 2 posits that 𝛾1
+ and 𝛾2
− will be 
statistically significantly different such that |𝛾2




 The estimates for Model (2) are reported in Table 5. In line with Model (1), the effect of 
𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 is again negative and not statistically significant (p > .05). Turning to our focal 
independent variables, the effects of positive and negative contemporaneous futures price changes 
is positive and statistically significant (p < .01), and a Wald test indicates that we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis of a symmetric effect of positive and negative futures prices changes. Model (2) 
thus provides further evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.  
 Turning to Hypothesis 2, the effect of positive spreads (i.e., when the spot market price is 
greater than the futures price) is slightly negative (-0.08) but not statistically significant (p > .05). 
In line with our theorizing, this result suggests that positive spreads have essentially a null effect 
on spot market prices in subsequent periods. Given local market conditions, buyers may be willing 
to adjust spot market prices upward to avoid potential shortages, but they are also wary of adjusting 
spot market prices too much because the macro-level market conditions are not there to sustain the 
price premium. Consequently, the results of Model (2) suggest that buyers do not really adjust spot 
market prices in response to positive spreads.   
In contrast, the effect of negative spreads (i.e., when the spot market price is less than the 
futures price) is negative (-0.262) and statistically significant (p < .01). This finding suggests that 
buyers are able to use their informational and power advantages to a greater extent following 
periods of negative spreads by adjusting spot market prices downward. Farmers will try to 
negotiate higher prices to bring spot market prices in line with futures prices, but they have limited 
information about the local market and limited power to do so. The results of Model (2) suggest 
that buyers can thus capitalize on surplus conditions in the local market by adjusting spot market 
prices downward – and to a greater extent – in order to expand their margins. Moreover, the results 
of a Wald test with the null hypothesis H0: 𝛾1
+= 𝛾2
− indicate that the null hypothesis can be rejected, 
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which suggests that spot market prices are adjusted differently in response to positive and negative 
spreads. In line with Hypothesis 2, the asymmetry is such that |𝛾2
−| is greater than |𝛾1
+|, which 
suggests that buyers adjust spot market prices more fully in response to negative spreads relative 
to positive spreads. Overall, Hypothesis 2 is corroborated by Model (2).  































Implications for Theory and Future Research 
Small and midsize family farms face significant information asymmetries in anticipating 
how prices for their commodities will evolve, which are critical input to their decision-making 
Dependent Variable: ∆𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑡 
















+  -0.080 
(0.056) 
𝛾1
+ =  𝛾2
− 2.551** 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡−1





Year Dummies Included   
Month Dummies Included   
Observations (T) 710   
R2 0.529   
Standard errors reported in parentheses are Newey-West standard errors 
robust in the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Diagnostic checks indicated approximately normally distributed 
residuals and no autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson = 2.08). Two potential 
outlier observations were identified and controlled for using dummy 
variables.  
 
 * = p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01 
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given their heavy reliance on spot market exchange and limited resources to dedicate to the 
development of in-house information (e.g., MacDonald, 2015; Moriarty & Spekman, 1984). To 
overcome this information asymmetry, small and midsize family farms often rely on the futures 
market to inform their exchanges in local spot markets. Given that the futures market is a low cost, 
publicly available source of information that is widely used in industry (Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, 2019), I posited that buyers would be compelled to adjust spot market symmetrically 
in response to positive and negative changes in futures prices. The analysis found support for this 
hypothesis, as positive and negative futures price changes exhibited similarly sized effects on 
subsequent changes in spot market prices.  
In addition to examining the short-run intemporal dynamics of the price adjustment 
process, the distributed lag approach (Almon, 1965) also allowed me to examine if there are 
asymmetries in the long-run effect of futures price changes.  The analysis also found support for 
symmetry in the long-run effect of futures price changes, as the sum of the coefficients for positive 
futures price changes (0.749) was not statistically significantly different from the sum of the 
coefficients for negative futures price changes (0.974). However, a long-run effect of close to one 
implies elasticity, whereas a long-run effect of less than one suggests inelasticity. One potential 
explanation for the inelasticity is that actors view futures price changes as having some degree of 
“noise” due to increased financialization (e.g., Cheng & Xiong, 2014; Irwin et al., 2011) and 
rationally choose not to respond fully to futures price changes. However, the elastic adjustment of 
spot market price in response to futures price decreases and relatively inelastic adjustment in 
response to futures price increases calls into question this “conservatism” hypothesis. Further, the 
effect of increased financialization – as measured by 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡 – was not statistically 
significant in either model. Instead, I contend that these findings suggest that buyers may adjust 
152 
 
spot market prices symmetrically in response to positive and negative futures price changes in the 
short-term but, in the long-term, are able to adjust spot market prices in a way that stretches their 
margins by incorporating futures prices decreases more fully and over longer periods. Indeed, the 
findings indicated that spot market prices continue to be adjusted for four weeks – the current 
period and subsequent three weeks – following negative futures price changes versus three weeks 
– the current period and subsequent two weeks – following positive futures price changes.  
 While futures prices convey important information about macro-level supply and demand 
fundamentals, small and midsize family farms also need information about supply and demand in 
local spot markets. This information, however, is private and costly to acquire in a timely manner 
(Scott, 2018) due to the costs of search (Stigler, 1961) and the continuously changing nature of 
prices (Hayek, 1945; Kirzner, 1963). Acquiring this private information is particularly costly for 
small and midsize family farms, who interact less frequently with the spot market and are more 
limited in the time, resources, and personnel they can devote to information acquisition (Bruderl 
& Schussler, 1990; Freeman et al., 1983). Farmers thus infer information about local spot market 
conditions from the spread between the futures price and spot market price in the previous period. 
Because small and midsize family farms only have “half the equation”, buyers are able to exploit 
their informational advantage by asymmetrically adjusting spot market prices in response to 
positive and negative spreads between the futures price and spot market price. The analysis found 
support for this hypothesis, as spot market prices were adjusted more fully in response to negative 
spreads as compared to positive spreads. This finding suggests that negative spreads play a more 
significant role in the price adjustment process in agriculture, which is in contrast to the spot 
markets examined in previous studies (Scott, 2018; Seifert et al., 2004) that typically command a 
premium (i.e., positive spread) for added flexibility.  
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While buyers can exploit their relative informational advantage by asymmetrically 
adjusting spot market prices in response to differences, the futures price limits the extent to which 
they can do so because of the “law of one price” (e.g., Protopapadakis & Stoll, 1983). If buyers 
disregard futures prices, they risk setting their spot market bid too high – and transferring some of 
their margins to farmers – or setting their bid too low and failing to procure the commodity (Huber 
& Spinler, 2014) The futures price thus puts a “limit” on the extent of the asymmetry as buyers 
are be compelled to offer prices that concur with the information conveyed by the futures markets. 
In this sense, the findings suggest that futures markets play an important role in mitigating the 
effect of information asymmetry in buyer-supplier exchange. This expands understanding of the 
role of futures markets in supply chain operations beyond risk management (e.g., Kouvelis et al., 
2018; Zsidisin et al., 2016) and contracting (e.g., Goel & Tanrisever, 2017; Li et al., 2018) to 
include their role as a price discovery mechanism and information conduit.  
More broadly, this study illustrates how information asymmetry affects the market 
mechanism (Williamson, 1991) through the asymmetric adjustment of prices.  The market – in it 
various forms – plays an important coordinating role in a number of industries critical to supply 
chain management, such as agriculture (MacDonald, 2015), truckload freight (e.g., Caplice, 2007) 
and ocean bulk shipping (e.g., Adland & Alizadeh, 2018), but extant research has focused more 
extensively on ‘hybrids and hierarchies’ (Williamson, 1991).  Moreover, given the dominant focus 
on downstream echelons (e.g., distributors, wholesalers, and retailers), collaboration (Cao & 
Zhang, 2011), contracting (e.g., Sluis & Giovanni, 2016), and information-sharing practices (e.g., 
Sahin & Robinson, 2002) are often recommended to mitigate information asymmetry in buyer-
supplier exchange.  In contrast, this study revealed how small and midsize family farms use an 
alternative mechanism (i.e., the futures market) to reduce the information asymmetry they face 
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relative to large buyers in local spot markets. In doing so, I respond to calls for incorporating “the 
structure and institutional features of specific marketing chains” (Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004 p.605) to better understand how and why asymmetric price adjustment occurs and to calls 
from supply chain scholars to increase the practical relevance of our theorizing by ensuring that 
the underlying mechanisms align with industry conditions (e.g., Calantone et al., 2017). 
Implications for Practice and Public Policy 
 By identifying and empirically estimating asymmetries in the price adjustment process, 
this study offers quantitative, industry-specific insights that can be used by small and midsize 
family farms and procurement managers. Small and midsize family farms can use these insights 
to forecast spot market prices, which can then be used as an input in short-term operations 
decisions throughout the year. One important insight is that the informational value that futures 
markets provide varies depending on market conditions, particularly related to positive and 
negative spreads between futures prices and spot market prices. The structure of the rice supply 
chain prevents complete adjustment of spot market prices to correct for these spreads, as powerful 
buyers dictate the price in local spot markets and incorporate negative spreads more fully. Because 
futures prices are only “half the equation”, small and midsize family farms need to be careful of 
the extent to which they infer information about local conditions from these spreads. Likewise, 
procurement managers can also use the findings from this study to time their purchasing activities 
in local spot markets in ways that expand their margins. For example, this study suggests that it 
takes approximately three weeks for spot market prices to fully adjust to futures price increase 
whereas it takes slightly longer – approximately four weeks – for spot market prices to fully adjust 
futures price decreases. Thus, by buying sooner in periods of rising futures prices and later in 
periods of falling futures prices, procurement managers can achieve a cost advantage.  
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 For exchange executives and regulators, this study reiterates the importance of policies and 
contract specifications that foster the futures market’s role as a price discovery mechanism and 
limit the effects of factors that are unrelated to supply and demand. Ensuring the proper functioning 
of the futures market is particularly important for small and midsize family farms in the U.S. rice 
industry, who face significant information asymmetries due to the nature of buyer-supplier 
exchange and the private information gap plaguing the industry (e.g., Food and Agriculture 
Organization, 2004; McKenzie & Darby, 2017). To supplement the price information provided by 
futures markets, some industry experts have advocated for more extensive reporting of inventory 
levels to “ensure that all decision-makers have access to relevant information” (U.S. International 
Trading Commission, 2015 p.84) – like in the Stocks of Grains reports published by the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange – and “the creation of price-reporting systems in order to bring more 
transparency to market transactions” (p.85).  
 Price reporting is voluntary for most commodities but has been mandated for some due to 
issues with the price discovery process. For example, in hog and cattle markets, Congress passed 
the Livestock Mandatory Price Reporting Act of 1999 “to facilitate price discovery, make the 
market open, and provide all market participants with market information that can be easily 
understood” (MacDonald et al., 2004 p.59). While well-intentioned, the legislation was 
controversial because of the concentration of buyers in downstream markets; only a few companies 
handled most livestock purchases, and they did not want their spot market prices – competitive 
information – known to others (MacDonald et al., 2004). The Agricultural Marketing Service 
responded by developing confidentiality guidelines, which specified that at least three entities 
needed to provide price data and no single entity could provide more than 70 percent of the data 
(MacDonald et al., 2004). The findings suggest that such confidentiality guidelines may be 
156 
 
necessary to facilitate the development of price-reporting systems in the U.S. rice industry given 
the concentration of buyers.  
 For the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the findings suggest that it may be time to 
reevaluate existing crop insurance and revenue protection policies, which use futures prices as the 
“trigger” for insurance indemnities paid to farmers (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2018). The 
analysis revealed that, although the two are correlated, price movements in futures markets and 
price movements in spot markets deviate from one another—particularly in the short-term (e.g., 
see Figure 3). Because small and midsize family farms rely more heavily on spot markets and often 
do not have the resources or expertise to dedicate to hedging with futures markets (e.g., Schnitkey 
& Coppess, 2018), current insurance indemnity payments may not fully compensate farmers. This 
is particularly the case during periods of increasing prices or positive spreads (i.e., when the spot 
market price is greater than the futures price) because buyers do not adjust spot market prices as 
fully during these periods. The findings suggest that price decreases and negative spreads (i.e., 
when the spot market price is less than the futures prices) are passed on more fully, so farmers 
“disproportionately suffer the losses of lower prices relative to the gains of higher prices” 
(Shrinivas and Gomez, 2016 p.435). Understanding these asymmetries can thus help policymakers 
determine benchmarks that are more localized and more representative of the price risks small and 
midsize family farms face in their daily operations.   
Limitations and Directions for Future Research  
This study has several limitations that offer fruitful avenues for future inquiry. First, the 
U.S. rice industry was the empirical context for this study. While focusing on the U.S. rice industry 
aligned with the purposes and assumptions of this study, it limits the generalizability of the 
findings to other industries. For example, further inquiry is needed to understand which external 
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sources of information are used by SMEs to overcome information asymmetries in industries 
where futures markets do not exist.  
Second, my theorizing and analysis was based on three assumptions regarding the nature 
of buyer-supplier exchange in the spot market. While these were in line with extant research (e.g., 
Ma et al., 2019; Meyer & von Cramon Taubadel, 2004) and corroborated with industry feedback, 
the nature of the proprietary data set did not allow for formal measurement of information 
asymmetry and power asymmetry in each spot market transaction. Empirically examining the 
direct and/or moderating effects of information asymmetry and power asymmetry on the price 
adjustment process is a fruitful avenue for future research to better understand the exchange factors 
influencing spot market prices. Additional industry idiosyncrasies, such as barriers to entry due to 
the labor-intensive nature of both rice production and rice milling, low futures market liquidity, 
and government regulations and price supports, may also be contributing to asymmetries in the 
price adjustment process and would also be interesting to examine should such data become 
available.  
Lastly, buyer-supplier exchanges characterized by size and information asymmetries may 
also be characterized by relational capital asymmetry – an imbalance in buyers and suppliers’ 
perceived levels of trust and reciprocity (Thomas & Esper, 2010; Villena & Craighead, 2017) – or 
power asymmetry (e.g., Touboulic et al., 2014). It would thus be interesting for future research to 
explore if and to what extent power asymmetry and/or relational asymmetry moderate(s) or 
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The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how institutions influence exchange in the 
farm-supply chain interface. Essay 1 used a qualitative approach to identify the individual and 
institutional actors influencing farmers’ operations decision-making. Field interviews revealed that 
farmers approach buyer-supplier exchange differently and tend to rely more heavily on market 
mechanisms to coordinate activities with buyers and inform their decision-making. Essay 2 builds 
on this finding to examine the institutional factors influencing exchange in the spot market, which 
accounts for a significant proportion of the value of agricultural commodity production. A 
proprietary data set and time series econometrics were used to investigate how spot market 
exchanges between farmers and buyers are influenced by the futures market—a longstanding 
institution in the agriculture industry. The findings indicate that farmers and buyers use the 
information conveyed by the futures market as they negotiate prices in the spot market, which is 
in line with the predictions of Austrian economics. Essay 3 builds on this finding to further explore 
how the futures market influences spot market exchanges by examining how information 
asymmetry affects the price adjustment process. A proprietary dataset and nonlinear time series 
econometrics were used to test the hypotheses; in line with economic theory, the findings suggest 
that buyers exploit their informational advantage by adjusting spot market prices asymmetrically. 
Taken together, the three essays demonstrate how institutions influence decision-making and 
exchange in the agricultural supply chain. More broadly, the three essays demonstrate (1) the role 
of the market as a coordination mechanism and (2) the dynamic influence of institutions, and, as 
detailed below, offer important implications for research, practice, and public policy.  
Coordination – the matching of supply and demand – is foundational to effective supply 
chain management (Esper et al., 2010; Fugate et al., 2006; Mentzer et al., 2001), and extant supply 
chain research has focused extensively on how ‘hybrids and hierarchies’ are used to coordinate the 
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activities of buyers and suppliers (e.g., Sahin and Robinson, 2002; Cao and Zhang, 2011; Sluis 
and Giovanni, 2016). This dissertation extends this body of work by demonstrating the role of the 
market as a coordination mechanism. In his seminal piece, Williamson (1991) noted that markets 
are a “marvel” in terms of adaptation (p.279) because they allow actors to respond autonomously 
to changes, whereas hybrids are “arguably the most susceptible” to disturbances (p.291) because 
they require coordinated responses. Indeed, actors engaged in market exchange are relatively clear 
about how they transact, and their activities are linked through price negotiations (Cai et al., 2017; 
Kim and Choi, 2015). Ironically, however, the coordinating role of the market – and price more 
specifically – has received less empirical inquiry in supply chain management given the emphasis 
on relational exchange (e.g., Davis-Sramek et al., 2007). This dissertation sheds initial light on 
how markets coordinate the activities of farmers and buyers over time through the adjustment of 
prices, but additional research is needed to understand how the market – in its various forms – 
coordinates exchange across other echelons of the supply chain, as well as its implications for 
supply chain performance. For example, as Kim and Choi (2015 p.61) pose in their typology of 
buyer-supplier exchange: “Could arms-length relationships actually be beneficial and, if so, 
when?” 
 Amidst an increasingly dynamic global macroenvironment, supply chain thought leaders 
have called for more research that examines how institutions influence supply chain operations 
(e.g., Fugate et al., 2019). The focus of recent studies has been the moderating effect of institutions 
in emerging economies, such as China or India, because of the “deleterious” nature of the 
institutional environment (Zhou et al., 2016). In contrast, institutions in developed economies, 
such as the United States and Europe, are assumed to be stable, so they are treated as a “control” 
or assumed away because of their purportedly static and unchanging influence. However, the effect 
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of institutions – even in the most developed economies – is not homogenous across firms, even 
within the same industry, or across time (Blake and Moschieri, 2016; Hassan et al., 2017). Indeed, 
a fundamental tenet of Neo-Institutional Economics is the dynamic nature of the actor-institution 
relationship (North, 1994), so it is important to understand “how heterogeneity unfolds across 
different tiers of the supply chain” (Bhakoo and Choi, 2013 p.436). By examining the farm 
echelon, which is characterized by individuals or small groups of individuals making decisions, 
this dissertation demonstrates the multilevel and dynamic role of institutions. In doing so, this 
dissertation reiterates the importance of understanding the effect of institutions external to the 
supply chain, such as government, regulatory agencies, and futures markets. A natural extension 
thus would be to explore the institutions operating in other echelons and contexts, such as non-
governmental organizations (Johnson et al., 2018).  
 More broadly, this dissertation extends the current conception of institutions beyond their 
role as contingency factors to include their direct influence on interfirm exchange. Underlying 
Neo-Institutional Economics is the idea that ‘institutions matter’ because they determine 
transaction costs and the value of engaging in exchange (North, 1990; Williamson, 1991). Further, 
institutions play a critical informational role—that is, the “ability to coordinate different 
expectations through time” (Foss and Garzarelli, 2007 p.795). By examining how actors use 
futures market information to inform their exchanges in local spot markets, this dissertation 
provides preliminary insight into this informational role and into how institutions influence buyer-
supplier exchange. In doing so, this dissertation enriches the buyer-supplier exchange literature 
and demonstrates the importance of integrating macro-level institutional perspectives with micro-
level exchange perspectives.  
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While this dissertation focused on how institutions influence transactional exchange, 
markets often exist alongside ‘hybrids and hierarchies’ (Williamson, 1991). For example, markets 
and contracts are used concurrently in the truckload transportation industry (Scott, 2019), and 
markets coexist with vertical integration in livestock and poultry industries (MacDonald et al., 
2004). Further, although markets continue to govern most transactions for agricultural products 
(MacDonald, 2015), the use of markets varies across commodities. For example, markets account 
for a large share of the production of major field crops, such as corn, cotton, rice, soybeans, and 
wheat, but a smaller share of the production of specialty crops, poultry, and livestock (MacDonald, 
2015). As field crops become less commoditized in response to consumer demands for particular 
product attributes (e.g., organic, non-GMO, free-range), food safety, and traceability (Wowak et 
al., 2016), as well as farmers’ desires to differentiate their products to earn higher returns 
(MacDonald et al., 2004), there may be a shift towards relational exchange and more integrated 
forms of organization such as contracts and strategic partnerships (e.g., Williamson, 1981). Further 
empirical inquiry is needed to examine if and to what extent institutions like the futures market 
influence ‘hybrid and hierarchy’ forms of exchange. For example, with the recent launch of the 
freight futures market, industry experts have touted the potential risk management benefits, but 
questions remain regarding how informative the freight futures price will be for contracts and spot 
market exchange (Hampstead, 2018).  
For practice and public policy, this dissertation provides guidance on the coordination 
challenges and information asymmetries currently plaguing the agricultural supply chain. While 
information-sharing practices are often recommended as “generic cure[s]” for such problems 
(Sahin and Robinson, 2002 p.510), the three essays illustrated that small and midsize family farms 
continue to rely on information from the futures market and U.S. Department of Agriculture. Given 
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resource constraints and lack of visibility in the supply chain, small and midsize family farms use 
this low-cost, publicly available information to inform their exchanges with buyers in local spot 
markets. The information, however, is imperfect, and, as illustrated in Essay 3, buyers exploit these 
imperfections by adjusting spot market prices asymmetrically to expand their margins. The 
informational value that futures markets provide thus varies depending on market conditions. For 
small and midsize family farms, this warrants caution regarding the extent to which they use 
futures market information to inform their operations decision-making because such information 
is only “half the equation”. For exchange executives and regulators, this reiterates the importance 
of policies and contract specifications that foster the futures market’s role as a price discovery 
mechanism and limit the effect of factors unrelated to supply and demand. Lastly, for 
policymakers, this suggests that there may be an opportunity for the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture to supplement the information provided by futures markets. However, as illustrated in 
Essay 1, the historically significant role of the public sector in agriculture may discourage farmers’ 
engagement with the supply chain, so the provision of additional information should be examined 
in light of the effects on farmers’ profitability and welfare, as well as the implications for food 
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